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Alamat Redaksi:
Jl. KH. Ramli Selatan No. 20A Menteng Dalam, Tebet Jakarta
Telp : (+62) 218298855
Fax : (+62) 218354925
E-mail : tashwirulafkar9@gmail.com
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Malay-Archipelago Ethnic Diversity in Mecca: Jawi Scholars in the Book of al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān by Zakariyyā Bīlā

Jajang A Rohmana
UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia
e-mail: jajangarohmana@uinsgd.ac.id

Abstrak

Kajian ini memfokuskan pada keragaman etnis Melayu-Nusantara di Mekah. Objek kajiannya adalah daftar ulama Jawi di Mekah dalam kitab al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān karya Zakariyyā Bīlā (1329-1413/1911-1992), seorang ulama Arab keturunan Bilah, Labuhanbatu Sumatera Utara. Zakariyyā Bīlā dalam kitab tersebut memuat daftar ulama dan guru di Mekah (299 orang), Madinah (21) dan Jeddah (7) yang ditemui atau didengarnya antara abad ke-19 hingga pertengahan abad ke-20. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa ulama Nusantara yang berkarir di Timur Tengah pada dua abad tersebut hanya didapatkan di Mekah, tidak ada di Madinah. Dari 299 daftar ulama Mekah yang dirincinya, terdapat 65 ulama Nusantara berasal dari pulau Sumatera, Jawa, Kalimantan, Sumbawa, Patani, dan Malaysia. Ini menunjukkan bahwa Mekah menjadi daya tarik penting bagi komunitas Jawi, karena posisi Masjidil Haram sebagai pusat ibadah haji, dibanding Madinah. Selain itu, keragaman geografis Nusantara berpengaruh terhadap keragaman etnisitas ulama Jawi di Mekah. Kajian ini berkontribusi bagi penguatan ciri kosmopolitanisme Muslim Nusantara yang membawa keragaman etnis dan bahasa ke pusat peribadatan Islam terbesar di dunia.

Kata Kunci: *Ulama; Jawi; Mekah; Zakariyyā Bīlā; etnisitas*

Abstract

This study focuses on the ethnic diversity of the Malay Archipelago in Mecca. The object of this study is the compilation of Jawi scholars (ulema) in Mecca as documented in the book al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān, written by Zakariyyā Bīlā (1329-1413/1911-1992), a prominent Arab scholar originating from the Bilah lineage in Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra. Zakariyyā Bīlā provided a comprehensive record of the scholars and teachers he met or heard in Mecca (299 people), Medina (21 people), and Jeddah (7 people) over the period spanning from the 19th century to the mid-20th century. The study results indicate that Indonesian scholars who pursued professional opportunities in the Middle East were exclusively located in Mecca, with no presence in Medina over those two

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centuries. Of the 299 list of Mecca scholars, 65 were Archipelago (*Nusantara*) scholars from Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sumbawa, Patani, and Malaysia. The significance of Mecca as a prominent destination for the Jawi people stems from the Grand Mosque's central role in the Hajj pilgrimage, in contrast to Medina. In addition, the Archipelago's geographical variety impacts the ethnic diversity of Jawi scholars in Mecca. Indonesian Muslim cosmopolitanism is characterized by its ability to incorporate ethnic and linguistic variety into the largest Islamic worship center worldwide. This study offers new insight into the intellectual and spiritual interactions between Indonesian scholars and Islamic science centers in Mecca. This study contributes to the strengthening of the Nusantara Muslim cosmopolitanism that brings ethnic and linguistic diversity to the largest Islamic worship center in the world.

Keywords: *Ethnicity; Jawi; Mecca scholars; Zakariyyā Bīlā*

Introduction

Historically, the extensive intellectual network between Indonesians and Haramain scholars from the 17th to the 19th century has been well-documented. Academics interpret this phenomenon within the framework of Islamic revitalization in the Middle East, which subsequently spread to the Archipelago, and the connection between the works of Indonesian scholars and scientific traditions in the Middle East. So far, many studies have examined the prominent Indonesian scholars in the 17th to 19th centuries, specifically from Hamzah Fansuri to Nawawi Banten.[1] Nevertheless, information regarding the identity of the Indonesian scholars, particularly those from the 20th century, and their record in Mecca has not been extensively revealed. Arab historians have compiled a list of Ḥaramayn scholars from the 20th century, notably including more Indonesian scholars than in the previous century.

One of the 20th-century historians who compiled biographies of Ḥaramayn scholars was Zakariyyā Bīlā (1911-1992), an Arab scholar of Indonesian descent, precisely from the Bilah region, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra. He was known as a close friend of al-Shaykh Yāsīn al-Padānī (1919-1989), one of the last Jawi scholars from Padang who became Sheikh in Mecca. In the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* (2006), Bīlā created a list of Indonesian scholars who were considered Ḥaramayn and Ḥijāz scholars, which he compiled in the mid-20th century.[2] In comparison to biographical works of

[1] Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia* (Leiden: BRILL, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004488199; Basri, "Indonesian Ulama in the Haramayn and the Transmission of Reformist Islam in Indonesia (1800-1900)" (University of Arkansas, 2008).

[2] Zakariyyā bin 'Abdillāh Bīlā, Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān (Mekah: Mu'assasah al-Furqān li al-Turāth al-

scholars by other Arab historians, such as *Ḥilyah al-Bashar* (1961)[3] by al-Bayṭār, *al-Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr wa al-Zuhr* (1986)[4] by ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr, *Fayḍ al-Mulk al-Wahhāb* (2009)[5] by ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī, *Siyar wa Tarājim* (1982)[6] by ʻUmar ʻAbd al-Jabbār and *A'lām al-Makkiyyīn* (2000)[7] by Mu'allimī and other works, Bīlā's writing hold particular importance due to his background as the sole Arab historian of Malay-Archipelago descent. He devoted significant attention to the Indonesian scholars he met and heard about during his academic endeavors. The list of Archipelago scholars in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* demonstrates his strong connections to the diverse and cosmopolitan network of Indonesian scholars in Mecca.[8]

This study focuses on the ethnic diversity of Indonesian scholars as recorded in the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* by Zakariyyā Bīlā. The discussion will focus on providing a concise biographical explanation of Zakariyyā Bīlā on *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* as his masterpiece, the Indonesian scholars in the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* and analysis of the ethnic diversity of Indonesian scholars in Mecca in the book. The researcher uses a social-intellectual historical approach to explain the historical context of the activities of Indonesian scholars. Here, Bīlā's work is positioned as a text that has an important role in understanding history.[9] This approach looks at how scholars in the past thought about things influenced by the conditions around them. He tries to reveal the social, intellectual, and cultural factors that influence the occurrence of historical events.[10]

Islāmī, 2006).

[3] al-Shaykh ʻAbd al-Razzāq Al-Bayṭār, Ḥilyah Al-Bashar Fī Tārīkh Al-Qarn Al-Thālith ʻAshar, 1961.

[4] al-Shaikh ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khair, Al-Mukhtaṣar Min Kitāb Nashr Al-Nūr Wa Al-Zuhr Fī Tarājim Afāḍil Makkah Min Al-Qarn Al-ʻĀshir Ilā Al-Qarn Al-Rābiʻ ʻAshr (Jeddah: ʻĀlam al-Maʻrifah, 1986).

[5] ʻAbd al-Sattār bin ʻAbd al-Wahhāb al-Bakrī al-Dahlawī al-Hindī, Fayḍ Al-Mulk Al-Wahhāb Al-Mutaʻālī Bi Anbāʼ Awāʼil Al-Qarn Al-Thālith ʻAshar Wa Al-Tawālī (Mekah: Maktabah al-Asadī, 2009).

[6] ʻUmar Abd al-Jabbār, Siyar Wa Tarājim Baʼḍ ʻUlamāʼInā Fī Al-Qarn Al-Rābiʻ ʻAshr Li Al-Hijrah (Jeddah: Mamlakah al-ʻArabiyyah al-Suʼūdiyyah, 1982).

[7] ʻAbdullāh bin ʻAbdurraḥman bin ʻAbdurraḥīm Al-Muʼallimī, Aʼlām Al-Makkiyyīn Min Al-Qarn Al-Tāsiʻ Ilā Al-Qarn Al-Rābiʻ ʻAshr Al-Hijrī (Mekah: Muʼassasah al-Furqān li al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 2000).

[8] Sumanto Al Qurtuby, 'Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Networks: On Islamic and Muslim Scholars', ISLAM ARCHIPELAGO:Journal for the Study of Islamic History and Culture 2, no. 2 (27 July 2021): 17–44, doi:10.47776/islamArchipelago.v3i1.-118.

[9] Kuntowijoyo, Metodologi Sejarah (Yogyakarta: PT. Tiara Wacana, 2003), 166–67.

[10] Azyumardi Azra, Historiografi Islam Kotemporer: Wacana, Aktualitas Dan Aktor

This study is important to show that Arab historians have found a shared Malay cultural identity among Meccan scholars despite the diverse ethnic backgrounds from the Malay-Archipelago region. According to Laffan, they constitute an *ecumene*, a single community built by a complex and heterogeneous network of people.[11] Arab historians, such as al-Baytar, Abū al-Khayr, al-Dahlawi, Bīlā, 'Abd al-Jabbar, and al-Mu'allimi, commonly refer to them as Jawi scholars (al-Jāwī) denoting their origins from the regions of Java or Malay Archipelago, rather than exclusively Java. The terms seen as representative of the scholars' identity from the Malay Archipelago region and their role in establishing the Malay language as a *lingua franca* are of scholarly significance. Andaya refers to this phenomenon as "leaves from the same tree."[12] Historians, including Bīlā in his work *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*, expressed their concern with the shared identity of being a Jawi scholar.

Bīlā's writing stands out significantly compared to biographical scholars produced by other Arab historians, as it encompasses the most extensive compilation of names of Indonesian scholars. One of the motivating factors for Bīlā was the similarity between his ethnic identity and that of the Indonesian scholars. Bīlā, an Arab historian of Indonesian descent, will be further explained in the discussion. His father came from Bilah, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra.[13] This study confirms that the same ethnic identity as Jawi scholars encouraged Arab historians of Indonesian descent, such as Bīlā, to record the traces of Indonesian scholars in the scholars' biographies he compiled.

It is important to understand that the term Archipelago (*Nusantara*) or Jawi scholars in this article pertains to the ethnic and geographical elements, specifically people who were born in Southeast Asia or the Archipelago (comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Patani/Southern Thailand, and the Southern Philippines), or born in Mecca to parents from the Indonesian Archipelago. Their parents subsequently pursued a career as teachers in Mecca until their passing or returned to the Archipelago.[14] The researcher has not included scholars from outside the Archipelago, such as those from Mecca, Medina, Yemen, Egypt, and other

Sejarah (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002), 80–81.

[11] Michael Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, The Umma below the Winds (London-New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 2–3.

[12] Leonard Y Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree* (Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008), 4, https://doi.org/10.21313/hawaii/9780824831899.001.0001.

[13] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*.

[14] Nelly van Doorn-Harder, "Southeast Asia," in *The Islamic World*, ed. Richard C Martin (New York: Routledge, 2004), 644–48, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203-019139.ch7.

regions, who are mentioned in Bīlā's records as having arrived, pursued careers, and even passed away within the Archipelago. The primary focus of this study is due to the genealogical and geographical considerations of the Archipelago. One of the Arab scholars who had a career in the Archipelago, for example, was 'Abdullāh bin Ṣadaqah bin Zaynī Daḥlān (1291-1363), a scholar born in Mecca who died in Garut, West Java.[15] He was the grandson of Aḥmad Zaynī Daḥlān (1817-1886), the grand *mufti* of Mecca, author of the book *Muhimmāt al-Nafāis*.[16] Even though he died in the Archipelago, 'Abdullāh bin Ṣadaqah was not of Indonesian descent.

Results and Discussion

1. Jawi Scholars in Mecca

The precise historical time of Indonesians coming to Ḥaramayn remains uncertain. The primary purpose of their arrival in the holy land was to undertake the Hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam. The difficult and long journey requires the pilgrims not only to pause but also to stay there. The Indonesians staying in Mecca engage in more than just undertaking the Hajj trip and enhancing their spiritual and religious devotion. Some also dedicated their time to pursuing religious studies and acquiring livelihood opportunities.

Insufficient evidence is available regarding the precise number of Archipelago scholars who became teachers in houses and madrasas in Mecca or those who attained the esteemed role of head teachers (*shaykh*) at the Grand Mosque. The available data on the quantity of Indonesians who became teachers in Mecca during the 19th century is notably comprehensive. An Ottoman government report in 1303/1884-5 stated that there were 270 teachers in that year from various countries. A Dutch advisor who had visited Mecca, C. Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), considered this number doubtful, considering it excessive in quantity. It is related to payments provided by the government for knowledge development. Snouck Hurgronje believes the total number is only around 50-60 people.[17] In comparison, Azra stated that the average estimate for scholars in Mecca in the 17th and 18th centuries was between 100-200 people. Even if that number is added to the number of

[15] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*; Abū al-Khair, *Al-Mukhtaṣar Min Kitāb Nashr Al-Nūr Wa Al-Zuhr Fī Tarājim Afāḍil Makkah Min Al-Qarn Al-'Āshir Ilā Al-Qarn Al-Rābi' 'Ashr*.

[16] Nico Kaptein, Muhimmāt Al-Nafā'is: A Bilingual Meccan Fatwa Collection for Indonesian Muslims from the End of the Nineteenth Century (Jakarta: INIS, 1997), 3.

[17] C.Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century, Tranlated by J.H. Monahan with an Introduction by Jan Just Witkam (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 199.

scholars who only teach in madrasas and houses, the number will be quite large.[18]

This explanation elucidates that the number of Indonesians who pursued careers as teachers in Mecca was very large during the nineteenth century. This phenomenon is distinct from the preceding century or two, which reportedly did not exhibit comparable numbers. Several researchers have presented a list of Indonesian scholars from the 17th and 18th centuries who had contact with Mecca, as evidenced by data indicating fewer numbers than the above data. Azra highlighted the people named al-Sinkīlī, al-Maqassarī, and 'Abd al-Shakūr Banten, who were students of al-Qushāshī and Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī in Medina in the 17th century. In the 18th century, there was a significant increase in Indonesian scholars who became teachers in Mecca. This trend was particularly prominent among people from regions such as Minangkabau, Palembang, Patani, Betawi (Batavia), and Banjar (Kalimantan).[19] Al-Bayṭār, for example, recorded the name 'Abd al-Ṣamad al-Palimbanī in his work, *Ḥilyah al-Bashar*.[20]

Then, over time, the number of Indonesians who became teachers in Mecca increased. In his work titled *al-Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr wa al-Zuhr* (1986), Abū al-Khayr reported approximately 16 Indonesian scholars in the 19th century. This number is comparatively lower than the 23 names of Indonesian scholars recorded by 'Abd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī in his book *Fayḍ al-Mulk al-Wahhāb* (2009). It cannot be separated from the increase of the number of the Archipelago peoples going to Mecca. In the mid-19th century, approximately 2000 pilgrims came to Mecca, doubling to reach 12,000 pilgrims by the end of the century.[21] Some data shows that in specific periods, the number of Indonesians returning home is less than the number of people coming there. It is not only related to the many obstacles experienced by Indonesians during their journey, such as dying at sea or in Ḥaramain, but also to the large number of those who choose to settle in the holy land for trading and studying.[22]

Hence, it is understandable that there was a rise in the count of Indonesians who became teachers in Mecca, particularly throughout the

[18] Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia*.
[19] Zacky Khairul Umam, "Seventeenth-Century Islam Teaching in Media: The Life, Circle, and Forum of Aḥmad Al-Qushāshī," *Qiraat*, no. 6 (2016): 22; Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia*.
[20] Al-Bayṭār, *Ḥilyah Al-Bashar Fī Tārīkh Al-Qarn Al-Thālith 'Ashar*.
[21] Jacob Vredenbregt, "Ibadah Haji, Beberapa Ciri Dan Fungsinya," in *Indonesia Dan Haji* (Jakarta: INIS, 1997), 3, 57.
[22] Martin van Bruinessen, 'Mencari Ilmu Dan Pahala Di Tanah Suci: Orang Archipelago Naik Haji', in Indonesia Dan Haji, ed. Dick Douwes and Nico Kaptein (Jakarta: INIS, 1997), 124–27.

period from the 19th century to the early 20th century. They provided instruction to fellow Indonesians using Malay or regional languages, such as Javanese, Sundanese, and others. It can be seen from the circulation of the number of books written by Indonesian scholars who taught in Mecca using various Indonesian languages, such as Malay, Javanese, and Sundanese. Their books were printed in Mecca and Egypt at the end of the 19th century.[23]

The data on the increase in the number of Indonesian scholars who became teachers in Mecca has been recorded by various Arab historians. These historians include both contemporaries, such as Mirdād Abū al-Khayr (d. 1924) and al-Dahlawī (1869-1936), who lived during the 19th century, as well as historians of the 20th century, such as 'Umar 'Abd al-Jabbār (1902-1970), 'Alī Maghribī (1914-1996), Zakariyyā Bīlā (1911-1992), and others. One of the historians who documented Indonesian scholars living in Mecca during his era was Bīlā, a Meccan historian of Indonesian descent who extensively engaged with Indonesian scholars in his studies. Therefore, the next section will explain Bīlā and the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān,* which recorded the list of Indonesian scholars in Mecca from the 19th century to the early 20th century.

2. About Zakariyya Bīlā

His full name is al-Shaykh Zakariyyā bin al-Shaykh' Abdullāh bin al-Shaykh Ḥasan Bīlā or Bīlah al-Indūnīsī. He was born in Mecca on Friday night, 7 Jumadil Ula 1329/6 May 1911. He learned to read the Qur'an from his parents. His father, 'Abdullah Bīlā bin Ḥasan bin Zaynal (1296-1356/1879-1937), was a scholar born in Bilah, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra, who came to Mecca with his brother, al-Shaykh Abū Bakar Tambusai, before 1916.[24] Bīlā had three brothers, namely Muḥammad, 'Abd al-Karīm and Salmān. He studied at Madrasah al-Amīriyyah al-Hāshimiyyah in al-Ma'lāh Mecca during the reign of Sharif Ḥusayn bin' Alī. Then, during the reign of the Ibn Sa'ūd dynasty, Bīlā studied Islamic studies at Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah, an educational institution founded by al-Shaykh Raḥmatullāh al-Hindī. He studied from 1925 until he finished and got *Shahadah* (degree) in 1934.[25]

While studying at Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah, Bīlā studied at Masjidil Haram with many scholars. He obtained academic degrees from Shafi'iyyah,

[23] Oman Fathurahman, "Kitabs from Cairo: An Overview of the New Collection of Southeast Asian Kitabs at Sophia University," in *Comparative Study of Southeast Asian Kitabs*, ed. Yumi Sugahara (Tokyo, Japan, 2011).

[24] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*; Al-Mu'allimī, *A'lām Al-Makkiyyīn Min Al-Qarn Al-Tāsi' Ilā Al-Qarn Al-Rābi' 'Ashr Al-Hijrī*.

[25] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*.

Mālikiyyah and Ḥanafiyyah scholars, such as from al-Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī bin Ḥusayn al-Mālikī, al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ḥayy al-Kattānī, al-Shaykh 'Abdullāh bin Muḥammad Nayyāz al- Namnakānī, al-Shaykh 'Umar al-Daghistānī (d. 1946), al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī (1869-1936), and others. His teachers reached around 32 people, among them al-Shaykh' Umar Bā Junayd (d. 1935), al-Shaykh' Umar Ḥamdān al-Mahrisī (d. 1910), 'Abdullāh al-Namnakānī, al-Shaykh Ḥasan al- Mashshāt al-Makkī (d. 1979), al-Shaykh Mukhtār Makhdūm, al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Musāwā (d. 1935), al-Shaykh Abū Bakar Sālim al-Bar, and others. In addition to learning from Arab scholars, he also studied from Archipelago scholars, such as al-Shaykh' Abdullāh Bīlah (his father), al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Paṭānī and al-Shaykh Muḥammad Zuhdī al-Jāwī.[26] In addition to Mecca, Bīlā also studied with many scholars in Medina, such as al-Shaykh Bārī al-Madanī, al-Shaykh Aḥmad Basātī al-Madanī (d. 1948), al-Shaykh' Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Miṣrī (d. 1941) and others.

Bīlā then obtained an opportunity to be a teacher at Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah, where he got the trust to teach students across all educational levels, including primary, secondary, and higher levels, until 1958. He also taught in Masjidil Haram and Ma'had al-Su'ūdī. He also conducted *halaqah* (circle) teachings in Bāb al-Ziyādah. Many students come from various countries, such as the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and Asia. Specifically, from Southeast Asia, they came from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam. Among his prominent students were Aḥmad 'Alī al-Adamī, al-Sayyid Ḥamīd al-Kāf, Zumayl Muḥammad 'Uthmān al-Kunawī, Aḥmad Balū and Muḥammad 'Adnān bin Ḥikmatullāh.

In addition, Bīlā was also elected as the management official for the Grand Mosque under the Ministry of Hajj and Endowments. Amid his busy life, Bīlā traveled to Indonesia several times to fulfill formal invitations, including in 1976, accompanying al-Shaykh Yāsīn al-Padānī, who was invited by the Minister of Religion Mukti Ali; fulfilling the invitation of K.H. Idham Khalid; fulfilling the invitation of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leadership to attend the congress; and fulfilling the invitation of the Minister of Religion Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranagara. He also took the time to visit several of his relatives in Java and Sumatra, including Medan, the land of his parents' birth. Bīlā died in Mecca on Tuesday, 7 Jumadi al-Thānī 1413/2 December 1992, at the age of 83 years.[27]

The works compiled by Bīlā reach 23 books, generally in the field of jurisprudence. Among others are *Kashf al-Lathām, al-Azhar al-Wardiyyah,*

[26] Ibid.

[27] Yūsuf Al-Mar'ashlī, *Nathr Al-Jawāhir Wa Al-Durar Fī 'Ulamā' Al-Qarn Al-Rābi' 'Ashar, Jilid 2* (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifah, 2006), 1767; Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*.

Durūs al-Tahdhīb, al-Raḥmah al-Laduniyyah al-Manān al-Wahbiyyah, al-Nuzhah al-'Ilmiyyah, Kashf al-Niqāb, al-Ta'līq 'ala Khulāṣah al-Naḥw, Asnā al-Taqrīrāt, al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān, Nūn al-Tawkīd, al-Qawl al-Musirr, Khulāṣah al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah, al-Ḥilal al-Sundusiyyah, Ta'līqā t'alá Risālah Ibn al-Mulaqqin, Jalī al-Aqwāl, al-Ajwibah al-Jaliyyah, Mā shahidtu wa mā sami'tu al-kashāfah wa al-kashshāf, al-Ra'y al-Ṣa'īb, al-Ta'līq al- Zayn, Mujmal Tārīkh al-Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah al-Hindiyyah, I'm Dhawī al-Ihtishām, Ta'liqāt 'alá Risālah al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Ākhir Sā'ah fī Ḥukm Lubs al-Muḥrim li al-Sā'ah, and others.[28]

3. The Book al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān

Of the many works of Zakariyya Bīlā, one of the important works that contains the list of scholars of the Archipelago is the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān fī Tarājim al-Fuḍalā' wa al-A'yān min Asātidhah wa Khallān aw al-Durar al-Gharar fī Tarājim al-Qarn al-Rābi' 'Ashar*. This book was originally a manuscript written around the middle of the 20th century. This book has been made into a text edition (*taḥqīq*) by 'Abd al-Wahhāb Ibrāhīm Abū Sulaymān and Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Aḥmad' Alī in 1424/2003 or eleven years after Bīlā died. This book was published in 1426/2006 by Mu'assasah al-Furqān al-Turāth al-Islām in Mecca in two volumes reaching 890 pages. Bīlā explained the purpose of compiling the book:

> ومن علماء المسلمين ما بين الوافدين إلى أرض الحرم وخلافهم فخليق بداعي الواجب أن أجمع تراجمهم على قدر الإستطاعة وأذكر أخبارهم المنبئة عن عظيم قدرهم وعلو مقامهم تذكارا لنفسي الضعيفة ومرجعا لمن تحدثه نفسه للوقوف على سيرهم
>
> Among the Muslim scholars, some came to the Ḥarām land along with their successors. Therefore, it is appropriate that there is a reason that requires me to collect their biographies based on my ability. I will mention the news circulating about the majesty of their power and high position as a reminder of my weak self and a reference for people who tell stories to themselves to understand the journey of their lives.[29]

Bīlā stated that the purpose of compiling the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* is a reminder to him as well as a reference for understanding the life journey of these great scholars. Therefore, Bīlā focused on the biographies of scholars and *shaykh* in Haramain and Jeddah. The total number is 327 scholars,

[28] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*.
[29] Ibid.

consisting of scholars from Mecca (299), Medina (21) and Jeddah (7). Hundreds of scholars come from various countries, such as Arab countries (Mecca, Medina, Ta'if, Yemen, Damascus/Syria, Aleppo, Amman, Bahrain and others), Africa (Egypt, Timbuktu, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria and others), Asia (India, Malay-Archipelago, Pakistan and others) and areas in East Asia such as Bukhara, Daghestan, Uzbekistan and others. According to the editor, Bīlā prioritized the scholars at Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah in Mecca, both teachers and students. This madrasa is an educational institution around the Grand Mosque, which an Indian cleric, Shaykh Raḥmatullāh al-Hindī, founded.

Bīlā is quite detailed in mentioning the year of birth and/or year of death of each scholar. He also explained the peculiarities of their scientific nature and thinking. He explained the biographies of Meccan scholars and those who came to Mecca and settled there in the 20th century. The scholars who came to Mecca came from various regions in the Islamic world. He explained the number of scholars' friends, places of study, teachers' names, students, and their works. He also discussed scholars who were not his contemporaries but people who had left great works. Most scholars mentioned in this book were affiliated with Madrasah al-Sawlatiyyah, serving as educators, colleagues, and students. It is worth noting that a few of these people were not the author's contemporaries. He also listed scholars' tendencies regarding schools of faith, Sufism, and Islamic jurisprudence. In addition to his experience, he also used several other biographical books that have been compiled by previous scholars, especially the book *Nathr al-Durar fi Tadhyil Nazm al-Durar fi Tarajim' Scholars' Makkah min al-Qarn al-Thalith' Ashar ila al-Qarn al-Rabi' 'Ashar,* the works of 'Abdullah bin Muḥammad Ghazi and other biographical books.[30]

The next paragraph will explain one of the interesting things about the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*. It means that there are many names of scholars who come from the Malay-Archipelago region, especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Some of them studied at the Grand Mosque, some taught, although many also returned to their home country. The Indonesian scholars live in Mecca, and none live in Medina. Of the 299 names on the list of Mecca scholars, 65 are Indonesian scholars.

[30] Ibid.

4. Archipelago Scholars in the Book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*

As the explanation above, Zakariyya Bīlā in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* mentions 65 names of Archipelago scholars. Due to their origins, the Indonesian scholars came from three countries, namely Indonesia (53 people), Patani (Southern Thailand) (6 people), and Malaysia (6 people). The following are details of all Archipelago scholars in Bīlā's works:

Table 1: List of Archipelago scholars in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* by Bīlā

No	Country	Area	Scholars' Name
1.	Indonesia (53)	Sumatera (32)	Riau (9): Abū Bakar Tambusai, 'Uthmān Tambusai, Muḥammad Ṣālih Palaplan Tambusai, Zubayr Palaplanī Melayu, Muḥammad Yatīm bin Dikūl Riau, Dr. Ṭabrānī bin 'Abd al-Rabb, Teungku Ma'mūn al-Rashīd Siak, 'Abdullāh bin 'Umar al-Saqqāf, Teungku 'Umar bin Muḥammad al-Jufrī al-Indūnīsī Palalawan; Palembang (5): Shams al-Dīn al-Palimbānī, al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Musāwá Palembang, Dāwud Komering al-Jāwī Campang Tiga Palembang, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Palembang, Amān Palembang; Jambi (3): Sa'īd Jambi, 'Uthmān Tungkal Jambi, Sayf Layzan Tungkal Jambi; Mandailing (3): 'Abd al-Qadīr bin Ṣābir al-Mandailī, 'Abd al-Qadīr bin Ṭālib al-Mandailī, Sharīf 'Abd al-Ṣamad al-Mandailī; Minangkabau (3): Aḥmad Khaṭīb al-Minangkabau, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Khaṭīb bin Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb Minangkabau, Junān Ṭayyib al-Minangkabawī; Padang (3): Muḥammad Yāsīn bin Muḥammad 'Īsá al-Padanī, Muḥammad Junān Ṭayyib al-Padanī, 'Abd al-Hādī Ilyās Rawāh (Rao) Pasaman; Lampung (2): Fatḥullāh Lampung, Jamīl 'Ārif Lampung; East Sumatera (2): 'Abdullāh Bīlā (Labuhanbatu); Muḥammad Ṭāhir Batubara Tanjungbalai;

			Bangka Belitung (1): Muḥammad Yāsīn bin ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Bangka Pangkal Pinang; Aceh (1): ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Āshī.
		Java (13)	West Java (4): Muḥammad Sirāj al-Qārūtī, Mukhtār ‘Aṭārid Bogor, Muḥammad Aḥyad Bogor, Sulaymān bin Muḥammad Ḥusayn Sumedang; Jawa Timur (3): ‘Abd al-Muḥīṭ Panji Sidoarjo, Kiai Sulaymān Kurdī Bojonegoro, Ilyās al-Indūnīsī (Probolinggo); Yogyakarta (2): Kiai Muḥammad al-Baqīr Yogya, Kiai (Aḥmad) Daḥlān Yogya; Jawa Tengah (2): ‘Abd al-Muhaymin al-Lasemī, Aḥmad Naḥrāwī Banyumas; Banten (1): Muḥammad Nawawī Banten; Jakarta (1): Haji Isḥāq Yaḥyá Jakarta.
		Kalimantan (4)	Muḥammad Arshad Banjar, Aḥmad Qistī al-Banjarī, ‘Alī Banjar Martapura, Muḥammad ‘Ārif Sambas.
		Nusa Tenggara (4)	Muḥammad Arshad Sumbawa, Muḥammad Zayn al-Dīn Ampenan Pancor, Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ampenan, Muḥammad Rubā’ī bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ampenanī.
2.	Southern Thailand	Patani (6)	‘Abdullāh bin Ismā’il al-Paṭānī, ‘Abd al-Muṭallib Ramlī al-Paṭānī, Ismā’īl Paṭānī, Muḥammad Nūr al-Paṭānī, Maḥmūd Zuhdī al-Paṭānī, Ibrāhīm Paṭānī.
3.	Malaysia	(6)	Ṣāliḥ bin Muḥammad bin Idrīs al-Kelantanī, ‘Abd al-Hādī bin Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Palaplan Bukit Mertajam Penang, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Miṣrī Seremban Negeri Sembilan, Aḥmad al-Manṣūrī Penang, Muḥammad bin ‘Alawī al-Ḥaddād Pahang, Aḥmad Awang Kedah.

In Table 1, there are probably two names of Sumatran scholars who refer to the same person, namely Junān Ṭayyib. Bilā mentioned that he originated from Padang. However, the subsequent list of scholars includes a repetition of the same name that he was from Minangkabau. Upon reviewing Bīlā’s description regarding Junān’s role as a pioneer in establishing the madrasa for Indonesians in Mecca, it likely refers to the same person. However, Bīlā mentioned a slightly different year of death.

In addition to the information above, the data indicates that Archipelago scholars are predominantly represented by scholars from Sumatra, with a total of 32 people. Conversely, there are only 13 scholars from Java, followed by four from Kalimantan and four from Nusa Tenggara. The dominance of Sumatran scholars in Mecca may be related to the long history of this area since the beginning of the Islamization of the Archipelago over the centuries. It is also related to some of the earliest Sumatran scholars recorded as having activities in Mecca, such as Hamzah Fansuri, Shams al-Din al-Sumatra'i, and 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sinkili in the 17th century, then continued by 'Abd al-Samad al-Palimbani who was a teacher in Mecca in the 18th century. However, what is quite surprising about Bīlā's list is that there is no single name of an Indonesian scholar from Sulawesi. As is known, scholars from Sulawesi were only found in the 17th century, namely Sheikh Yusuf al-Maqassari and 'Abd al-Wahhab Bugis from the 18th century.

Diagram 1: The country of origin of the Archipelago scholars in Mecca in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*





In addition to the explanation above, it is noteworthy to mention that among the list of Indonesian scholars listed by Bīlā in his work *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*, only one Indonesian scholar emerged from the 18th century. This person is identified as Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjarī (1122-1272/1710-1812), coming from Banjar, a region located in South Kalimantan. Muhammad Arshad al-Banjarī was recognized as the earliest Banjar scholar who studied and taught in Mecca before returning to his land in 1772. Some of his books, such as *Tuḥfah al-Rāghibīn*, were written in Javanese characters, making him well-known in the Archipelago.[31]

In the 19th century, 29 scholars existed in Bīlā's list. However, the number of scholars in the 20th century exceeded this amount, reaching 34 people. The significant number of scholars during these two periods can be attributed to Bīlā's attention to prioritizing the scholars he met and those who lived contemporarily with him. Bīlā, who was born in 1911, listed not only senior scholars who were born at the end of the 19th century but also scholars who were the same age as him (born in the early 20th century) and even several scholars who were much more junior than him, such as Dr. Tabrani bin' Abd al-Rabb Riau (born 1941) and Sayf Layzan Tungkal Jambi (born 1957). His attention to contemporary scholars tends to contrast the name of the Archipelago scholars from the 18th century, which only had one person, Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjarī.

In addition, the list that Bīlā made probably refers to scholars with a prominent reputation in Mecca. Therefore, apart from the names of prominent 18th-century scholars such as Muḥammad Arshad al-Banjarī, Bīlā also listed several other prominent scholars from the 19th and 20th centuries, either who had died or were still alive when Bīlā was a child, although it was not too much. This phenomenon is evident in the case of Muḥammad Nawawi Banten (1230-1314/1815-1896), a prominent scholar of the 19th century who passed away well before the birth of Bīlā. However, because of Nawawi Banten's reputation for outstanding productivity, especially among Indonesian scholars in Mecca, Bīlā included his name in the book *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*. Nawawi Banten is known as Sayyid Scholars Hijaz, who wrote over 100 books in Arabic, most of which were printed in Mecca and Egypt.[32]

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[31] Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Tuḥfat Al-Rāghibīn, The Work of 'Abdul Ṣamad Al-Palimbani or of Muḥammad Arsyad Al-Banjari?," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde (BKI* 163, no. 1 (2007): 67–85.

[32] Alex Soesilo Wijoyo, "Shaykh Nawawī of Banten: Texts, Authority, and the Gloss Tradition" (Columbia University, 1997); Jajang A Rohmana, "Authorship of The Jāwī 'Ulamā' in Egypt: A Contribution of Nawawī Banten and Haji Hasan Mustapa to Sharḥ Tradition'," *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman* 15, no. 2

In addition to Nawawi Banten, Bīlā also included other prominent Indonesian scholars in his list, including Aḥmad Khatib al-Minangkabau (1276-1334/1859-1916), teacher of the great scholar who founded Muḥammadiyah, K.H. Aḥmad Dahlan (1868-1923) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari (1871-1947).[33] Bīlā also mentioned the name of Mukhtar' Atarid Bogor (1278-1349/1861-1930), a Sundanese scholar who was a teacher at the Grand Mosque and wrote several Sundanese works that were printed in Mecca and Egypt.[34] There was also the name Aḥmad Nahrawi al-Jawi Banyumas (1276-1346/1859-1927), known as Kiai Muhtaram. He had several works, such as *Qurrah al-'Uyūn li al-Nāsik al-Muṭī' bi al-Funūn*.[35] Table 2 is a list of Indonesian scholars who were born in the 18th to 20th centuries and are listed in the *book al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*:

Table 2: List of Archipelago Scholars based on Year of Birth

Century	Archipelago Scholars
12/18	Muḥammad Arshad Banjar (1122-1272/1710-1856)
13/19	Muḥammad Nawawī Banten (1230-1314/1815-1896), 'Uthmān Tambusai (1251-1369/1835-1950), Aḥmad Khaṭīb Minangkabau (1276-1334/1860-1916), Aḥmad Naḥrāwī al-Jāwī Banyumas (1276-1346/1859-1927), 'Abd al-Laṭīf Bangka Pangkal Pinang (1277-1367/1860-1948), Mukhtār 'Aṭārid Bogor (1278-1349/1861-1930), Abū Bakar Tambusai (1280-1359/1863-1940), Muḥammad Arshad Sumbawa (d. 1351/1932), 'Abd al-Qadīr bin Ṣābir al-Mandailī (1282-1352/1865-1933), 'Alī Banjar Martapura (1285-1370/1868-1951), Muḥammad Nūr al-Paṭānī (1290-1363/1873-1944), Sulaymān bin Muḥammad Ḥusayn Sumedang (1295-1376/1878-1957), 'Abdullāh Bīlā Labuhanbatu (1296-1356/1879-1937), Amān Palembang (1296-1362/1879-1943), Aḥmad Qistī al-Banjarī (1299-1367/1882-1948), 'Abd al-Muḥīṭ al-Jāwī al-Mrikī (Sidoarjo) (1301-1388/1884-1968),

(2020): 221–64, https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2020.15.02.221-264.

[33] Alwi Shihab, "The Muḥammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia" (the Temple University, 1995), 173.

[34] Jajang A Rohmana, "The Discourse of Malay-Indonesian Sufism in Mecca : A Response of Mukhtār ' Aṭārid of Bogor Towards the Doctrine of Seven Grades," *Jurnal Lektur Keagamaan* 19, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.31291/jlk.v19i1.-923.

[35] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*; Abd al-Jabbār, *Siyar Wa Tarājim Ba'ḍ 'Ulamā'Inā Fī Al-Qarn Al-Rābi' 'Ashr Li Al-Hijrah*; Al-Mu'allimī, *A'lām Al-Makkiyyīn Min Al-Qarn Al-Tāsi' Ilā Al-Qarn Al-Rābi' 'Ashr Al-Hijrī*.

	Maḥmūd Zuhdī al-Paṭānī (1302-1376/1885-1957), Muḥammad bin ʻAlawī al-Ḥaddād Pahang (1303-?/1886-?), Muḥammad Aḥyad al-Jāwī Bogor (1303-1373/1886-1954), Kiai Muḥammad al-Baqīr al-Mriki Yogya (1305-1363/1888-1944), Aḥmad Awang Kedah (1307-?/1890-?), Muḥammad Sirāj al-Qārūtī (1313-1390/1895-1970), ʻAbd al-Muhaymin al-Lasemī (1313-1365/1895-1946), Muḥammad Junān Ṭayyib al-Padanī (d. 1363/1944, 1365/1946), Dāwud Komering al-Jāwī Campang Tiga Palembang (1313-?/1895-?), Ṣāliḥ bin Muḥammad bin Idrīs al-Kelantanī (1315-1379/1897-1959), ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Khaṭīb bin Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb Minangkabau (1316-1381/1898-1961), Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Palaplan Tambusai (?), Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Miṣrī Seremban Negeri Sembilan (?).
14/20	Fatḥullāh Lampung (1318-?/1900-?), Muḥammad Ḥusayn Palembang (1319-1399/1901-1979), Ibrāhīm Paṭānī (1320-1413/1902-1992), ʻUthmān Tungkal Jambi (1320-1405/1902-1985), Aḥmad al-Manṣūrī Penang (1322-?/1904-?), ʻAbd al-Wahhāb Āshī Aceh (1322-1405/1904-1985), Kiai Sulaymān Kurdī Bojonegoro (1322-1372/1904-1953), al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Musāwá Palembang (1323-1354/1905-1935), Zubayr Palaplanī Melayu (1324-?/1906-?), Muḥammad Zayn al-Dīn Ampenan Pancor (1327-1417/1909-1996), ʻAbd al-Qadīr bin Ṭālib al-Mandailī (1329-1385/1911-1965), Jamīl ʻĀrif Lampung (1329-1387/1911-1967), ʻAbd al-Hādī bin Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Palaplan Bukit Mertajam Penang (1330-1362/1912-1943), Teungku ʻUmar bin Muḥammad al-Jufrī al-Indūnīsī Palalawan (1331-?/1913-?), Ismāʼīl Paṭānī (d. 1385/1965), Saʼīd Jambi (d. 1388/1968), Ilyās al-Indūnīsī Probolinggo (1331-1390/1913-1970), Muḥammad Tāhir Batubara Tanjungbalai Asahan (1333-?/1915-?), ʻAbd al-Muṭallib Ramlī al-Paṭānī (1333-?/1915-?), Muḥammad ʻĀrif Sambas (1334-?/1916-?), Teungku Maʼmūn al-Rashīd Siak (1917-?), Sharīf ʻAbd al-Ṣamad al-Mandailī (1336-?/1918-?), ʻAbdullāh bin Ismāʼīl al-Paṭānī (1336-1362/1918-1943), Shams al-Dīn al-Palimbanī (1338-?/1919-?), Muḥammad Rubāʼī bin ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Ampenanī (d. 1396/1976), Kiai (Ahmad) Dahlān Yogya (d. 1409/1989), Muḥammad Yāsīn bin Muḥammad ʻĪsá al-Padanī (1337-1410/1919-1989), Muḥammad Yatīm bin Dikūl Riau (1921-?), Muḥammad bin ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz Ampenan (1340-?/1922-?), ʻAbd al-Hādī Ilyās

	Rawāh (Rao) Pasaman (1340-?/1922-?), Haji Isḥāq Yaḥyá Jakarta (1928-?), ʻAbdullāh bin ʻUmar al-Saqqāf Riau (1939-?), Dr. Ṭabrānī bin ʻAbd al-Rabb Riau (1941-?), Sayf Layzan Tungkal Jambi (1957-?).

As can be seen in Table 2, Bīlā in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* tends to highlight Archipelago scholars born in the 20th century like himself. Thus, compared to only one 18th-century scholar and 29 19th-century scholars, he listed 34 scholars born in the 20th century. This contemporary period and ethnic ties may have prompted Bīlā to focus on fellow archipelago people, who he was also a descendant of Archipelago descent.

In addition, the data also shows that the number of Archipelago scholars who studied and taught at the Grand Mosque and several educational institutions in Mecca in the 20th century was still quite large, at least until the mid-20th century. This number shows that despite the shift in the religious-political situation in Saudi Arabia in 1924, from traditionalist Sunni to Salafi/Wahabi, it did not dampen the interest of Archipelago students from various regions to continue studying and working in Haramain. Therefore, the next section will focus on the issue of ethnicity and the socio-religious situation that influenced Bīlā in listing the Archipelago scholars.

5. Bīlā, Ethnicity and Jawi Scholars in Mecca

As explained above, there are 65 names of Archipelago scholars in Mecca in the list of Bīlā's *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*. It is more than the biographical data of Meccan scholars published by previous Arab historians. ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr (d. 1924), a Mecca-born scholar, for example, only mentioned 16 names of Archipelago scholars in his work, *al-Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr wa al-Zuhr fī Tarājim Afāḍil Makkah min al-Qarn al-'Āshir ilā al-Qarn al-Rābi' 'Ashr* (1986). Similarly, ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī (1869-1936), an Arab historian of Indian descent, only mentioned 21 names of Archipelago scholars out of around 1800 names of scholars in Ḥaramayn in his book *Fayḍ al-Mulk al-Wahhāb al-Muta'ālī bi Anbā' Awā'il al-Qarn al-Thālith' Ashar wa al-Tawālī* (2009). It shows that Bīlā paid more attention to the Archipelago scholars than both historians. The following is a comparison of the names of Archipelago scholars between Bīlā's *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān, Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr* by ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr and *Fayḍ al-Mulk al-Wahhāb* by ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī:

Table 3: Comparison of the list of Archipelago scholars among Arab historians

Book	Names of Archipelago Scholars
Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr by ‘Abdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr (16 scholars)	Aḥmad bin Ismā’īl al-Jāwī al-Paṭānī, Aḥmad Khaṭīb Sanbas (Sambas, Kalimantan), Ismā’īl Minangkabau al-Khālidī, Ṣāliḥ Rawāh (Rao), ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Jāwī, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Kudus, ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm Mandūrah, ‘Abd al-Ghanī Bīmā al-Jāwī, ‘Abd al-Qadīr Mandailī, ‘Alī Kudus, Muḥammad Azharī al-Jāwī Minangkabau, Muḥammad Shādhalī al-Jāwī bin Muḥammad Wāsi’, Muḥammad Nūr Patānī, Marzūqī al-Jāwah, Nawawī al-Jāwī, Nūr Ismā’īl al-Jāwī al-Khālidī.
Fayḍ al-Mulk al-Wahhāb karya ‘Abd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī (21 scholars)	Ismā’īl Minangkabau (1712-1864); ‘Abd al-Ghanī Bima (1780-1854); ‘Alī Kudus (d. 1875); Muḥammad Nawawī Banten (1813-1897); Aḥmad bin Ismā’īl al-Paṭānī (1854-1908), Muḥammad Marzūqī Banten (d. 1914), Muḥammad Azharī al-Khālidī Minangkabau (d. 1885), Muḥammad Nūr Minangkabau (d. 1895), dan Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-Qādir bin ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Paṭānī (1813-1864); Mukhtār ‘Aṭārid Bogor (d. 1930); ‘Abd al-Qādir Mandailing (d. 1933); Ṣāliḥ Rāwa (Rao) Minangkabau (1845-1933), ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Kudus (1860-1916), Muḥammad ‘Ārif Banten (1863-1929), ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Banten (grandchild of Nawawī Banten) (1868-1906), Muḥammad Shadhalī Banten (born in 1873-?), Muḥammad Nūr al-Paṭānī (1873-1944), Muḥammad ‘Umar Sumbawa (born about 1915), ‘Abdullāh bin Muḥammad Azharī Minangkabau (1861-1932), ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīm Madura (d. 1917) dan Sayyid ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-‘Aydarūs (1825-1917)
al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān karya Zakariyyā Bīlā (65 scholars)	Muḥammad Arshad Banjar, Muḥammad Nawawī Banten, ‘Uthmān Tambusai, Aḥmad Khaṭīb Minangkabau, Aḥmad Naḥrāwī al-Jāwī Banyumas, ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Bangka Pangkal Pinang, Mukhtār ‘Aṭārid Bogor, Abū Bakar Tambusai, Muḥammad Arshad Sumbawa, ‘Abd al-Qadīr bin Ṣābir al-Mandailī, ‘Alī Banjar Martapura, Muḥammad Nūr al-Paṭānī, Sulaymān bin Muḥammad Ḥusayn Sumedang, ‘Abdullāh Bīlā Labuhanbatu, Amān Palembang, Aḥmad Qistī al-Banjarī, ‘Abd al-Muḥīṭ al-Jāwī al-Mrikī (Sidoarjo), Maḥmūd Zuhdī al-Paṭānī, Muḥammad bin ‘Alawī al-Ḥaddād Pahang, Muḥammad Aḥyad al-Jāwī Bogor, Kiai

	Muḥammad al-Baqīr al-Mriki Yogya, Aḥmad Awang Kedah, Muḥammad Sirāj al-Qārūtī, ‘Abd al-Muhaymin al-Lasemī, Muḥammad Junān Ṭayyib al-Padanī, Dāwud Komering al-Jāwī Campang Tiga Palembang, Ṣāliḥ bin Muḥammad bin Idrīs al-Kelantanī, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Khaṭīb bin Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb Minangkabau, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Palaplan Tambusai, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Miṣrī Seremban Negeri Sembilan, Fatḥullāh Lampung, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Palembang, Ibrāhīm Paṭānī, ‘Uthmān Tungkal Jambi, Aḥmad al-Manṣūrī Penang, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Āshī Aceh, Kiai Sulaymān Kurdī Bojonegoro, al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Musāwá Palembang, Zubayr Palaplanī Melayu, Muḥammad Zayn al-Dīn Ampenan Pancor, ‘Abd al-Qadīr bin Ṭālib al-Mandailī, Jamīl ‘Ārif Lampung, ‘Abd al-Hādī bin Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Palaplan Bukit Mertajam Penang, Teungku ‘Umar bin Muḥammad al-Jufrī al-Indūnīsī Palalawan, Ismā’īl Paṭānī, Sa’īd Jambi, Ilyās al-Indūnīsī Probolinggo, Muḥammad Tāhir Batubara Tanjungbalai Asahan, ‘Abd al-Muṭallib Ramlī al-Paṭānī, Muḥammad ‘Ārif Sambas, Teungku Ma’mūn al-Rashīd Siak, Sharīf ‘Abd al-Ṣamad al-Mandailī, ‘Abdullāh bin Ismā’īl al-Paṭānī, Shams al-Dīn al-Palimbanī, Muḥammad Rubā’ī bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ampenanī, Kiai (Ahmad) Dahlān Yogya, Muḥammad Yāsīn bin Muḥammad ‘Īsá al-Padanī, Muḥammad Yatīm bin Dikūl Riau, Muḥammad bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ampenan, ‘Abd al-Hādī Ilyās Rawāh (Rao) Pasaman, Haji Isḥāq Yaḥyá Jakarta, ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Umar al-Saqqāf Riau, Dr. Ṭabrānī bin ‘Abd al-Rabb Riau, Sayf Layzan Tungkal Jambi.

Table 3 shows that only three Archipelago scholars in Bīlā's *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* are mentioned in 'Abdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr and 'Abd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī, namely Nawawī Banten, 'Abd al-Qadīr al-Mandaylī and Muḥammad Nūr al-Patanī. All three were prominent 19th-century Archipelago scholars. It shows that Bīlā’s list does not refer to the two works of his predecessor historians, as many names of other Archipelago scholars are not included in his work. It may be because Bīlā’s work refers to the names of Archipelago scholars who were active in Madrasah al-Ṣawlatiyyah, where Bīlā studied and taught alongside the other scholars listed in his work. Therefore, the Archipelago scholars who were not included in his work may be because they did not study at the madrasa.

In addition, Bīlā in *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān* listed the names of more Archipelago scholars than the two previous historians, ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr, who only listed 16 names, and ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī mentioned 21 names. One of the factors driving Bīlā's greater attention than these two historians is Bīlā's identity as an Arab historian of Archipelago descent born in the 20th century. While ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr was a scholar of Meccan descent, and ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī was a scholar of Indian descent. Both were born in the 19th century. As already explained, Bīlā's father, Abdullah Bīlā bin Ḥasan bin Zaynal (1879-1937), was a scholar born in Bilah, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra, who came to Mecca before 1916.[36] It demonstrates that Bīlā's motivation to include more Indonesian scholars' names in his records was primarily driven by a significant sense of shared ethnicity, exceeding the work of previous Arab historians.

For 18th-20th century Arab historians, such as al-Bayṭār, ʻAbdullāh Mirdād Abū al-Khayr, ʻAbd al-Sattār al-Dahlawī, Zakariyyā Bīlā, ʻAbd al-Jabbār and al-Mu'allimī, the term Jawi or Jawah is considered an important marker to refer to the Malay-Archipelago ethnic living in Mecca. It refers not only to the geographical aspect of the Malay-Archipelago area but also to the shared Malay ethnicity to unite the scholars from the land downwind. Although historians realized that there were various ethnicities of Mecca scholars who came from the Malay-Archipelago region, such as Aceh, Minangkabau, Mandailing, Padang, Madura, Banjar, Makasar, Bogor, and others, they were united by the same Malay cultural identity that made Malay a *lingua franca*.

Although the Malay-Archipelago ethnic or Jawi community in Mecca had a variety of languages and cultures, they were aware of their common genealogical and regional roots. They felt united as a Malay-Archipelago ecumene in the holy land amidst cosmopolitan cultural hybridity. Hence, the careful efforts of all groups to enforce ethnic boundaries that emphasized the differences among them could not hide the fact that they belonged to the same roots.[37] European colonial efforts to generate inter-group rivalry through economic competition and politicization of ethnic identity in the Straits of Malacca region since the 17th century apparently did not work when the Jawi community was in Mecca. They studied Islamic science in Mecca and united as Jawah immigrants with other scholars from various countries, such as India, Africa, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Malabar, and many others. It was a cosmopolitan life of Muslim immigrants who brought ethnic and linguistic diversity to the center of Islamic worship in the world.

[36] Bīlā, *Al-Jawāhir Al-Ḥisān Fī Tarājim Al-Fuḍalā' Wa Al-A'yān Min Asātidhah Wa Khallān*.
[37] Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree*.

Therefore, the list of Archipelago scholars made by Bīlā in his book, *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*, shows the significance of the Malay-Archipelago ethnic identity that took an important role in the Islamic intellectual tradition in Mecca. Of course, the significance of Archipelago scholars in Mecca did not emerge suddenly. Many factors have contributed to the increasing number of archipelago scholars becoming teachers in Mecca compared to the previous few centuries, as shown in Bīlā's list. It may not only be related to the scientific capacity of these scholars but also to the steady and increasing arrival of Archipelago people to Mecca, even setting a record in 1913-14 when half of the total pilgrims came from Indonesia.[38] In addition, the increase in the intensity of the Archipelago people also happened along with the more accessible transportation of Hajj after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the improvement of the economic level of the natives in the Dutch East Indies, and the greater influence of Islam through educational institutions founded by Hajj alums in the land downwind.[39] Equally important was the Turkish government's subsidization of the living expenses of the Jawi and other communities during their stay in Mecca. It, for example, was seen in 1326/1908 reportedly providing a subsidy of 1 pound (*junayh*) 'Uthmani for the Jawi people.[40]

Unfortunately, when entering the mid-20th century, especially in the last four decades, the reputation of Archipelago scholars in Mecca has slowly declined. Scholars from the Archipelago, especially Indonesia, had recently switched their teaching careers at various universities in Saudi Arabia in the field of non-Islamic studies, some of which tend to be ultra-conservative and militant, others tend to be progressive and moderate.[41] There were not many Archipelago scholars who were teachers in the Haramain anymore. The works produced by Archipelago scholars in Mecca were also decreasing. One of the reasons may be the change in the religious-political situation in Ḥaramain. Socio-religious conditions in the Hijaz at the beginning of the 20th century were increasingly pressured by the development of the Salafi/Wahhabi ideology brought by Muḥammad bin' Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792). Mecca, under Ottoman Turkish rule since the 16th century, was shaken by the political power of the Hashimid rulers and the Salafi/Wahhabi Sa'ud dynasty under British support. As is well known, this religious sect

[38] Vredenbregt, "Ibadah Haji, Beberapa Ciri Dan Fungsinya."
[39] M.Dien Majid, Berhaji Di Masa Kolonial (Jakarta: CV. Sejahtera, 2008).
[40] Aḥmad Al-Sibā'ī, Tārīkh Makkah, Dirāsah Fī Al-Siyāsah Wa Al'Ilm Wa Al-Ijtimā' Wa Al-'Umrān (Riyāḍ: al-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'ūdiyyah, 1999), 653.
[41] Al Qurtuby, "Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Networks: On Islamic and Muslim Scholars."

tends to be puritanical, considering the teachings of other Muslims heretical.[42]

The emergence of the Salafi/Wahhabi groups led to various accusations of heresy and polytheism directed at traditional Muslim religious Sufistic practices in Mecca and Medina, such as the practice of pilgrimage, *tawasul, istigatsah, maulid* of the Prophet, and veneration of objects around the Kaaba, facing the Prophet's tomb when praying, seeking blessings from the former pious and others.[43] The sacred tombs, Khadijah's house, Abu Bakr's birthplace, and the *zawiyah* where the *tariqah* practitioners gathered were destroyed. The practice of various schools of *Tariqah* and Sufism was eliminated. In fact, according to some reports, about 18 *Tariqah* sects were active in the Hijaz in 1887.[44] The practitioners chose to flee to other regions in Arabia. Ibn Sa'ud, as Saudi ruler, basically did not want to disrupt the Hajj and disturb the large number of Muslim immigrants living in Mecca. At the same time, however, Ibn Sa'ud had to satisfy the Salafi/Wahhabi scholars as his main supporters in homogenizing religious views and eliminating what he considered to be polytheism.[45] The decline in Archipelago scholars in Mecca cannot be separated from the dynamics of socio-religious developments that hit the Hijaz. The difference between the religious ideology of the Archipelago scholars and the Salafi/Wahhabi ideology adopted by the Saudi government is one of the reasons why Jawi scholars have been increasingly eliminated from academic activities in Mecca until now. It is a socio-religious dynamic that reflects the strong interference of political power over the dominance of religious understanding.

Conclusion

The explanation above shows that the diversity of the geographical background of Archipelago scholars influenced the ethnic diversity of Jawi scholars in Mecca. This Malay-Archipelago ethnic diversity is reflected in the list of names of Archipelago scholars made by Zakariyyā Bīlā in his book, *al-*

[42] Michael Farquhar, Circuits of Faith: Migration, Education, and the Wahhabi (Mission, California: Stanford University Press, 2017), 51.
[43] Aḥmad Zaini Daḥlān, Al-Durar Al-Saniyyah Fī Al-Radd 'alá Al-Wahhābiyyah (Damaskus: Maktabah al-Aḥbāb, 2003), 80–108.
[44] Naser Dumairieh, "Intellectual Life in the Hijaz in the 17th Century: The Works and Thought of Ibrahim Al-Kurani (1025-1101/1616-1690" (Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 2019), 25–26.
[45] David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 79, https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755609444; Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 103.

Jawāhir al-Ḥisān. Zakariyyā Bīlā listed scholars and teachers in Mecca (299 people), Medina (21), and Jeddah (7) whom he met or heard about between the 19th and mid-20th centuries. There were 65 names of Archipelago scholars. It is quite a large number compared to the list of names of Archipelago scholars made by previous Arab historians. Bīlā, an Arab historian of Bilah descent, Labuhanbatu, North Sumatra, seems to pay great attention to the names of Archipelago scholars. It shows that ethnicity was a strong motivation for Bīlā to list the names of Archipelago scholars in greater numbers than previous Arab historians. A list of Archipelago scholars demonstrates the significance of ethnic Malay-Archipelago scholars who took an important role in the Islamic intellectual tradition in Mecca amidst the decline of their reputation from the mid-20th century to the present. Although this study has revealed the importance of the contributions of Archipelago scholars in the intellectual landscape of Islam in Mecca, this research has some limitations. First, the heavy reliance of data on one primary source, the book of *al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān*, may lead to historical bias and interpretations that are limited to Zakariyyā Bīlā's perspective. Second, this study has not thoroughly mapped the scientific influence of Archipelago scholars on local and international communities, which requires further studies with a multidisciplinary approach and more diverse sources. Third, this study has not examined in depth the social, political, and economic factors that may have influenced the migration and reputation of Archipelago scholars in Mecca. Therefore, the conclusions drawn should be seen as a starting point for more extensive and in-depth research on this subject in the future.

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Attachment



Picture 1: al-Shaykh Yāsīn al-Padānī (left) and Zakariyyā Bīlā (right)
Source: https://www.facebook.com/405054030028423/-photos/pcb.474736283060197/¬474736193060206/?type=3&theater downloaded on 20/06/2023 at 22:39.



Picture 2: Cover of the book "al-Jawāhir al-Ḥisān" by Zakariyyā Bīlā.

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Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in Our Times: How al-Ghazali is Interpreted and Transmitted in the Contemporary Turkish Context

Gokhan Bacik
Department of Politics and European Studies, Palacky University, Czech Republic
e-mail: gokhan.bacik@upol.cz

Abstrak

Apakah Abu Hamid al-Ghazali berkontribusi pada kemunduran tradisi rasionalis dan ilmiah di dunia Muslim adalah perdebatan besar dalam studi Islam. Namun, literatur tentang pertanyaan ini hanya berusaha untuk membangun perdebatan historis. Meskipun al-Ghazali meninggal pada tahun 1111, pendapatnya masih mempengaruhi umat Islam saat ini. Jadi penelitian ini, berkontribusi melampaui perdebatan historis tersebut, mempelajari bagaimana al-Ghazali ditafsirkan di Turki kontemporer, dan apa yang diungkapkan oleh penafsiran mereka tentang pendekatan terhadap hukum alam, pengetahuan dan filsafat (pada dasarnya, studi tentang kejernihan konseptual dan prosedur yang valid dalam berpikir). Ketiga disiplin ilmu ini dipilih karena al-Ghazali dituduh berkontribusi terhadap kemunduran tradisi ilmiah di dunia Islam karena kritiknya terhadap filsafat, pandangannya tentang kausalitas, dan penggabungan pengetahuan batin ke dalam Sunnisme. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan seperti: "Apakah karya-karya al-Ghazali dirujuk saat ini untuk membenarkan sikap permusuhan terhadap filsafat?" Untuk mencapai tujuan ini, penelitian ini mempelajari bagaimana al-Ghazali ditafsirkan oleh dua gerakan sosial Islam di Turki: Işıkçılar dan Erenköy. Dengan mempelajari kasus-kasus ini, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa bagaimana al-Ghazali ditafsirkan dan disebarkan di Turki berkontribusi pada (i) sikap yang sangat skeptis terhadap hukum alam, (ii) kecurigaan yang mendalam terhadap pengetahuan rasional dan akibatnya kepercayaan terhadap pengetahuan batiniah, dan (iii) sikap yang sangat kritis terhadap filsafat.

Kata Kunci: *Al-Ghazali, Islam dan filsafat, Turki, Islam dan ilmu pengetahuan, Işıkçılar, Erenköy, Islam dan rasionalisme.*

Abstract

Whether Abu Hamid al-Ghazali contributed to the decline of rationalist and scientific tradition in the Muslim world is a grand debate in Islamic studies.

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However, the literature on this question ventures only to construct a historical debate. Though al-Ghazali died in 1111, his opinions still influence Muslims today. So this research, rather than contribute to that historical debate, studies how al-Ghazali is interpreted in contemporary Turkey, and what this interpretation reveals about approaches to natural law, knowledge and philosophy (essentially, the study of conceptual lucidity and the valid procedures of reasoning). These three disciplines are chosen because al-Ghazali is accused of contributing to the decline of the scientific tradition in the Islamic world because of his criticism of philosophy, his occasionalist view of causality, and his incorporation of inner knowledge into Sunnism. The research aims to answer questions like: 'Are al-Ghazali's works referenced today to justify a hostile stance on philosophy?' To achieve this goal, the research studies how al-Ghazali is interpreted by two Islamic social movements in Turkey: Işıkçılar and Erenköy. Studying these cases, the paper concludes that how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted in Turkey contributes to (i) a highly sceptical stance on natural law, (ii) a deep suspicion of rational knowledge and the consequent belief in inner knowledge, and (iii) a highly critical stance on philosophy.

Keywords: *Al-Ghazali, Islam and philosophy, Turkey, Islam and science, Işıkçılar, Erenköy, Islam and rationalism.*

Introduction

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1056-1111) is one of the most influential names in Islamic history. In 1920, Samuel M. Zwemer, in *A Moslem Seeker After God*, defined al-Ghazali as a person who has 'left a larger imprint upon the history of Islam than any man, save Mohammad himself'. What Zwemer wrote of al-Ghazali, quoting al-Suyuti (d. 1505): 'If there had been a prophet after Mohammed, it would have been Al-Ghazali,[1] is the oft-repeated demonstration of the latter's impact.

There are, however, contending views among the assessments of al-Ghazali's impact. For some, al-Ghazali's legacy contributed to the decline of scientific inquiry in the Muslim world. For others, such a correlation is wrong. On this account, al-Ghazali is himself the subject of a grand-debate in Islamic studies.

The goal of this paper is to shed light on the grand debate on al-Ghazali from a novel perspective, that is, in terms of how his works are interpreted and transmitted in a contemporary context. Usually, arguments on the impact of al-Ghazali are studied in the continuum of the historical trajectory of Muslim societies. Indeed, the literature on al-Ghazali is primarily a historical debate. However, given that his works still influence Muslims, how al-Ghazali

[1] Samuel M. A Zwemer, *Moslem Seeker After God: Showing Islam at Its Best in the Life and Teaching of Al-Ghazali Mystic and Theologian of the Eleventh Century* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920), 21.

is interpreted and understood contemporarily in the transmission of religious knowledge is an equally fair method of evaluating his impact on Muslims. A consideration of whether al-Ghazali's works are used today to justify among Muslims a hostile stance on philosophy is as important as the consideration of whether al-Ghazali's opinions were behind the decline of philosophy in Islamic history. Reasoning thus, this paper aims to bring the grand debate on al-Ghazali into the present time.

To achieve its goal, this paper studies how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted by two Turkish Islamic groups, Işıkçılar and Erenköy, and to estimate how that affects those groups' religious views. These two Islamic groups are chosen because they provide us with the opportunity of observing how Sunni actors reference al-Ghazali in the real-life contexts that transmit religious knowledge. This approach is another expected contribution of this paper, given that the literature on al-Ghazali is in fact a collection of scholars' articulations. Differently, the level of analysis in this paper is not concerned with intellectual articulations about al-Ghazali, but with the real-life-context transmissions of al-Ghazali's part of religious knowledge.[2]

Below, I shall first summarise how al-Ghazali's impact is interpreted by contending intellectual perspectives – particularly, on which grounds some scholars see that impact as a historical reason that explains the weakening of the scientific and rationalist tradition in the Muslim world. The debate on al-Ghazali's impact in Islamic history is methodologically important: I use it in this paper as the reference frame for understanding which narrative best captures the impact of al-Ghazali's works in the contemporary Turkish context: Is it the one that argues that al-Ghazali's legacy has played a negative role in the weakening of the scientific and rationalist tradition in the Muslim world, or is it the one that rejects such a correlation?

Next, I shall present the paper's cases, and describe why they are explanatory cases through which we can understand the contemporary use of al-Ghazali in religious communications. After that, I shall first present the methodology that I use in studying the cases, then analyse accordingly how al-Ghazali is referenced in the transmission of religious knowledge in the contemporary Turkish context. The paper will conclude by evaluating the findings that these two cases yield.

[2] There are works on Turkish scholars' interpretation of al-Ghazali. For example, Taraneh Wilkinson studied how al-Ghazali's thought are referenced in Turkish theology faculties, see Taraneh Wilkinson, "Moderation and Al-Ghazali in Turkey," *American Journal of Islam and Society* 32, no. 3 (July 2018): 29–43, https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i3.269. Also, for a summary of how various historicists Turkish theologians criticize al-Ghazali see, Gokhan Bacik, *Contemporary Rationalist Islam in Turkey: A Religious Opposition to Sunni Revival* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021), 137–38, https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755636778.

Results and Discussion

1. The Grand Debate on Al-Ghazali

Al-Ghazali was born in 1056 in Tus (today's modern Iran). After his early education in Tus, he became the disciple of al-Juwayni (d. 1085), an influential Ash'ari scholar of the time, at the Nizamiyya Madrasa in Nishapur.[3] Al-Ghazali was later appointed to the prestigious Nizamiyya Madrasa in Baghdad. That position put him in close contact with the Seljuqi political elite, including Sultan Malikshah and the Grand Vizier Nizam al-Mulk.[4] However, his close contact with rulers, and his position at the Baghdad Madrasa (madrasas are faulted for serving the Saljuqi political projects[5]) are deemed by some to have affected him as conduits of political influence. In 1095, he suddenly abandoned his posts for a reclusive life. After 11 years of isolation, he returned to teaching at the Nizamiyya School in Nishapur in 1106.[6] He died in 1111, leaving many books behind that later became classics of Islamic thought.

His legacy is so influential that it alone is believed to have been transformative of the trajectory of Islamic thought. For example, Antony Black defined al-Ghazali as a person who embarked upon 'the most radical re-structuring of Islamic thought that has perhaps ever been attempted'.[7]

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[3] Eric Ormsby, *Ghazali* (London: Oneworld, 2000), 27; Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 97, https://doi.org/10.1515/978074-8647569. The Nishapur Madrasa was founded in al-Juwayni's name, see Sibt ibn Al-Jawzi, *Mir'at Al-Zaman Fi Ta'rikh Al-a'yan* (Ankara: A. Sevim, 1968), 135.

[4] Kenneth Garden, *The First Islamic Reviewer: Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali and His Revival of the Religious Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 18, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso-/9780199989621.001.0001.

[5] Said Amir Arjomand, "The Law, Agency, and Policy in Medieval Islamic Society: Development of the Institutions of Learning from the Tenth to the Fifteenth Century," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, no. 2 (April 1999): 269, doi:10.1017-/S001041759900208X; Massimo Campanini, "In Defence of Sunnism: Al-Ghazali and the Seljuqs," in *The Seljuqs: Politics, Society and Culture* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 228–39. R. Levy defined the school as 'founded officially as theological school, being recognized both by the religious leaders of Islam and by the State that provided its revenues, though by indirect means'. See, Reuben Levy, *A Baghdad Chronicle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), 193–194; A. L. Tibawi, "Origin and Character of Al-Madrasah," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 25, no. 2 (June 1962): 225–38, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00063709. Ibn al-Athir (1160–1233) gave details of several cases in which Nizam al-Mulk personally appointed lecturers at the madrasa. See Ibn Al-Athir, *The Annals of the Saljuq Turks: Selections from Al-Kamil Fi'l-Ta'rikh of 'Izz Al-Din Ibn Al-Athir*, trans. D.S. Richards (New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2002), 207, 213, 247.

[6] Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 24, 49, 58.

[7] Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought*.

However, for some, that impact was destructive, as it contributed to the decline of philosophy, and of general rationalist thought, in the Muslim world. Particularly, scholars who adhered to what is known as the Sunni Revival Thesis[8] have explained the legacy of al-Ghazali as another factor that caused the decline of Islamic civilization.

The semantics (systems of meaning) of the Sunni Revival Thesis, according to W. Cantwell Smith, is driven by the view that 'something has gone wrong with Islamic history'.[9] The things said to have gone wrong are usually the various grand changes, such as the rise of a new statehood inspired by the Sassanid tradition. (This is criticised for having weakened the trade-oriented mentality of Islamic societies.) There is also the birth of the Sunni orthodoxy that asserts the cooperation of state and religion, with scholars diminishing the autonomy of the latter.[10] In this construct, al-Ghazali is identified as another incident gone wrong, one that marked a break with the previous age (dubbed the golden age of Islam), causing decay in Islamic societies.[11]

[8] George Makdisi, "The Sunni Revival," in *Islamic Civilization*, ed. D. H. Richards and Bruno Cassier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 155–68; Ahmet T. Kuru, *Islam, Authoritarianism, Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 118–63; H. A. R Gibb, "An Interpretation of Islamic History," in *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, ed. S. Shaw and W. Polk (Princeton: Princeton University Press, n.d.), 3–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7ztmgq.5; Ignaz Goldziher, *Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 67–115; John Joseph Saunders, *A History of Medieval Islam* (London: Routledge, 2002), 106–24, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203199763; Ahmed Renima, Habib Tiliouine, and Richard J. Estes, "The Islamic Golden Age: A Story of the Triumph of the Islamic Civilization," in *The State of Social Progress of Islamic Societies* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 25–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24774-8_2; Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 111; Marshall G.S Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam Vol. 2* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 3, 12, 408; C. E. Bosworth, "The Heritage of Rulership in Early Islamic Iran and the Search for Dynastic Connections with the Past," *Iran* 11 (1973): 52, https://doi.org/10.2307/4300484.

[9] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 41.

[10] This list also includes other issues. For example, for various scholars, the adoption of *iqta* (originally an Iranian system of land tax) by Muslims as a major reason to explain the decline of Muslim societies. See, C. E. Bosworth, "Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq," *Oriens* 18 (1965): 161, https://doi.org/10.2307/1579733; Ann K. S Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1969), 61; Heribert Busse, "Iran Under the Buyids," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. R.N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 260, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521200936.008.

[11] Bacik, *Contemporary Rationalist Islam in Turkey: A Religious Opposition to Sunni Revival*.

However, revisionist scholars dismiss the Sunni Revival Thesis as a myth by arguing that Muslims' contribution to science continued till after the 13th century.[12] The revisionist narrative argues also that al-Ghazali's legacy has not played a negative role in the decline of philosophy and rationalist thought in the Muslim world.[13]

This paper takes the critique of al-Ghazali by the Sunni Revival Thesis as the reference frame for studying how he is interpreted in contemporary Turkey. This is a result of methodological parsimony: Al-Ghazali constitutes a large space in the Islamic knowledge that is transmitted in Turkey. So, this article studies al-Ghazali in a Turkish context, but only in reference to critical issues raised by the Sunni Revival Thesis. This comparative analysis is expected to help us interpret al-Ghazali's impact in contemporary Turkey. With it, we can better answer questions like 'does the way contemporary Turkish actors use al-Ghazali result in an antagonistic stance on philosophy or science?' The justification of a such an inquiry is that al-Ghazali's impact continues today.

To avoid reductionism, on the other hand, this paper expands parsimony by increasing the number, as well as the scope, of the factors that define how the Sunni Revival Thesis criticises al-Ghazali.[14] In this regard, the critique of al-Ghazali is explained under three complex sub-titles:

[12] Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 7, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337657; Khaled El-Rouayheb, "The Myth of 'The Triumph of Fanaticism' in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire," *Die Welt Des Islams* 48, no. 2 (2008): 196–221, https://doi.org/10.1163/157006008X335930; Dimitri Gutas, *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abbasid Society* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 170–75, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203316276; George Saliba, *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 241; Mohamad Abdalla, *Islamic Science: The Myth of the Decline Theory* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008), 1–9; Makdisi, "The Sunni Revival."

[13] Munawar Haque, "The Impact of the Controversy between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd on the Development of Islamic Thought," *Transcendent Philosophy Journal* 11 (2010): 93–132; Garden, *The First Islamic Reviewer: Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali and His Revival of the Religious Studies*; Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*. There are also scholars who argue that the legacy of al-Ghazali is complex (including both the motifs of Aristotelian philosophy and Sufism) that cannot be reduced into a one narrative. See, Ebrahim Moosa, *Ghazali & The Poetics of Imagination* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 2005), 1–32, 237–60.

[14] Michael Baumgartner, "Parsimony and Causality," *Quality & Quantity* 49, no. 2 (March 2015): 840, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0026-7. To Baumgartner only maximally parsimonious solution formulas can represent causal structures.

(i) *His attack of philosophers made Muslims sceptical of philosophy*: Al-Ghazali's criticism of Aristotelian philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and al-Farabi, left an enduring legacy of a sceptical approach to philosophy among Muslims.[15] To remember the several places in his works that display his critical stance on philosophy: In *Ihya*, seemingly disturbed by the influence of philosophers, al-Ghazali declared that his aim is to let them know their limits.[16]

However, the problem is not his criticism of philosophers' concerns and procedures, but his assertion that they are heretics because of the views they defend.[17] This is most visible in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*: He challenges some opinions of Aristotelian philosophers like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, such as their argument that all substances are pre-eternal. Not satisfied with this, he asserted also that their proclamation of those views makes them heretics. Furthermore, al-Ghazali did not refrain from broaching the issue of whether it is religiously permissible to kill those who endorse the philosophers' various beliefs, not only the philosophers themselves.[18] The scholars did not take kindly to this, specifically because the charge of being an infidel was central in al-Ghazali's opposition to the philosophers.[19]

(ii) *His explanation of causality contributed to the emergence of a mentality that has weakened the scientific tradition in the Muslim world*: Al-Ghazali was an interpreter of Ashari occasionalism. Thus, we read in his works that God creates events independently of any necessary connection with natural causes.[20] This shows al-Ghazali asserting that the proposal that natural law has the capacity to cause natural events is to deny God's omnipotence, since it implies that something is acting on its own accord, independently of God.[21] This assertion is mostly visible in the oft-quoted example of the burning cotton: The one who enacts the burning of the cotton

[15] Mohd Fakhrudin Abdul Mukti, "Al-Ghazali and His Refutation of Philosophy," *Jurnal Usuluddin* 21 (2005): 9; Konrad Hirschler, *Medieval Arabic Historiography* (London: Routledge, 2006), 59, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965290.

[16] Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *The Book of Knowledge; Being a Translation with Notes of the Kitab Al-'Ilm of Al-Ghazzali's Iḥya' 'ulum Al-Din Vol. 2*, trans. Nabih Amin Faris (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1979), 53–57.

[17] Mukti, "Al-Ghazali and His Refutation of Philosophy."

[18] Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut Al-Falasifa]*, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2000), 226. These beliefs are those like arguing all substances are pre-eternal and God's knowledge does not encompass the temporal particulars.

[19] W. Montgomery Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazali* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963), 26.

[20] Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut Al-Falasifa]*.

[21] Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *Deliverance From Error [Al Munkidh Min Ad Dallal]*, trans. W.M. Watt (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), 37.

is God, through the mediation of His angels, or without mediation, not any agency in nature.[22]

Purporting hereby to have refuted the natural law, al-Ghazali developed a theory of movement that is ontologically dependent on agency, not laws. Accordingly, a movement is possible only when there is an agent capable of volition. So, since nature is not a living entity endowed with volition, it cannot be an agent of any movement.[23] God remains as the only agent. Therefore, causal relationships between natural events cannot be proposed.[24] For al-Ghazali, the term 'natural law' is simply a misnomer: All actions in nature belong to God. But the human mind tends to frame them as laws.

In *The Incoherence of the Incoherence,* Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) criticised al-Ghazali's theory of causality by pointing out that the denial of constant laws would require a 'tyrannical idea of God'. That would destroy the possibility of knowledge, for there would be 'no standard or custom to which reference might be made'.[25] That criticism continues to be levelled by contemporary critics for whom al-Ghazali's view of causality contributed to the weakening of scientific methodology. For example, Magid Fakhry says that it resulted in a systematic refutation of the concept of the necessary causal nexus of events, and created a major problem of bipolarity in Muslim thought.[26] As a result, popular engagement with Islamic theology has tended to focus on divine causation, and to maintain a deep mistrust of the natural laws.

(iii) *He incorporated the inner knowledge thesis into Sunnism, which weaken scientific and rationalist inquiry among Muslims*: Al-Ghazali provided a relentless critique of sense-based rational knowledge. He insisted that human knowledge cannot be doubt-free, because human senses are restricted.[27] As he no longer trusts sense-perception, al-Ghazali's dreams of finding an infallible body of knowledge.[28] Inspired by Sufi thought, he suggested a different method for acquiring knowledge.[29] As explained in *Al-*

[22] Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut Al-Falasifa]*.
[23] Al-Ghazali.
[24] S.H. Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 9.
[25] Ibn Rushd, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence [Tahafut Al-Tahafut]*, trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (Cambridge: EJW Gibb Memorial Trust, 1987), 325.
[26] Magid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 167. Also see, Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 46..
[27] Al-Ghazali, *Deliverance From Error [Al Munkidh Min Ad Dallal]*.
[28] Al-Ghazali.
[29] Margaret Smith, *Al-Ghazali: The Mystic* (Lahore: HIP, 1983), 225.

Risalat al-Laduniyya, this is the alternate method of 'acquiring knowledge from within'.[30] Unlike the knowledge from without, which is rational knowledge that is drawn through sensory perception and reasoning, knowledge from within is acquired, without sensory perception or reasoning, through the self-realisation that transcends all spatio-temporal dimensions. Al-Ghazali explained this in *Al-Munkidh* as the knowledge that 'did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light which God most high cast into my breast'.[31]

The incorporation of inner knowledge into Sunnism was tantamount to adding a new discipline to the curriculum of Islamic knowledge.[32] Thus, the critics denounce al-Ghazali for elevating inner knowledge above the sciences.[33] Pragmatically, this was the downgrading of reason to a subservient status that is without the independent ability to determine truth. That is, reason can do no more than endorse one idea among alternatives, and then only if it is supported by religion. Simply, reason was given a subordinate role.[34] Magid Fakhry thus described al-Ghazali's legacy as 'sowing the seeds of misology.'[35] Mohammed Abed al-Jabri likened his legacy to a deep wound inside reason, which is still bleeding.[36]

Having summarised the critique of al-Ghazali according to the Sunni Revival Thesis, I should again remind that there are revisionist scholars who challenge that narrative on each point. To revisit various samples of the revisionist narrative on al-Ghazali, on causality only: Hans Daiber argues that al-Ghazali combined contingent causality and Occasionalism.[37] Karen Harding writes that al-Ghazali was in favour of causality and implied quantum physics.[38] Lenn E. Goodman is of the opinion that al-Ghazali was not

[30] Margaret Smith, "Al-Risālat Al-Laduniyya. By Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad Al-Ghazālī (450/1059–505/1111)," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland* 70, no. 2 (April 1938): 186, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0035869X0008789X.

[31] Al-Ghazali, *Deliverance From Error [Al Munkidh Min Ad Dallal]*.

[32] Ahmet T Karamustafa, *Sufism the Formative Period* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 107.

[33] D. B. Macdonald, "The Meanings of the Philosophers by Al-Ghazzālī," *Isis* 25, no. 1 (May 1936): 9–15, https://doi.org/10.1086/347057.

[34] Fiazuddin Shuʿayb, "Al-Ghazzali's Final Word on Kalam," *Islam & Science* 9 (2011): 157. Also see, Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought*.

[35] Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy*.

[36] Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, *The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construction of Modernity in the Arab World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 361, https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755610617.

[37] Hans Daiber, "God versus Causality," in *Islam and Rationality* (Leiden: BRILL, 2015), 12, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004290952_002.

[38] Karen Harding, "Causality Then and Now: Al Ghazali and Quantum Theory," *American Journal of Islam and Society* 10, no. 2 (July 1993): 167, https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.-

against the idea of causality.[39] Omar Edward Moad believes that al-Ghazali held a neutral position on Occasionalism.[40] However, as stated before, the critique of al-Ghazali (under the three titles, above) by the Sunni Revival Thesis is provided as the methodological choice: I shall use it as the reference frame, an independent variable, according to which I interpret the case, that is, how contemporary Turkish actors use al-Ghazali's works in their religious interpretation, which will be the subject of the following sections.

2. The Cases: Işıkçılar and Erenköy

Explaining how Ghazali is interpreted today in the transmissions of religious knowledge is possible by observing exemplary cases that reflect the general trends of how Sunni actors reference al-Ghazali as part of their religious socialisation and activism.[41] To achieve this goal, this article studies two Islamic movements in Turkey: Işıkçılar and Erenköy.

Islamic orders and networks such as the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya have played important roles in the transmission of Islamic knowledge in the Saljuqi-Ottoman-Turkish historical continuity.[42] Linked to that historical tradition through Naqshbandiyya, Işıkçılar and Erenköy are organised as new religious social movements.[43] In a sense, they are modern incarnations of historical religious orders and networks, which today work collectively 'to restore, protect or create values in the name of a generalised

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[39] Leen E. Goodman, "Ghazali's Argument from Creation (I)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, no. 1 (January 1971): 67–85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074380000088X.

[40] Omar Edward Moad, "Al-Ghazali's Occasionalism and the Natures of Creatures," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 58, no. 2 (October 2005): 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-005-1595-0. For further revisionist in this context see, Ilai Alon, "Al-Ghazālī on Causality," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 100, no. 4 (October 1980): 397, https://doi.org/10.2307/602085; Binyamin Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazali's Theory of Causality," *Studia Islamica*, no. 67 (1988): 98, https://doi.org/10.2307/1595974.

[41] On exemplary cases see, Colin J. Beck, "The Comparative Method in Practice: Case Selection and the Social Science of Revolution," *Social Science History* 41, no. 3 (July 2017): 538, https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2017.15. On this role of case studies see, Howard Lune and Bruce L Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences* (London: Pearson, 2017), 172; Robert K. Yin, "The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (March 1981): 59, https://doi.org/10.2307/2392599; Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Case," in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, ed. Michael Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao (London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 90, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589.

[42] See, İsmail KAYA, "Osmanlı Devletinde Devlet-Tarikat İlişkileri Bağlamında Meclis-i Meşayih," *Türk Kültürü ve HACI BEKTAŞ VELİ Araştırma Dergisi* 100 (December 2021): 162, https://doi.org/10.34189/hbv.100.008.

[43] Sefa fiimfiek, "New Social Movements in Turkey Since 1980," *Turkish Studies* 5, no. 2 (June 2004): 111–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/1468384042000228611.

belief',[44] in our case, Sunni Islam. So, organised as social movement, Işıkçılar and Erenköy utilise modern means and strategies to transmit their religious messages to the public. On this account, neither İskenderpaşa nor Erenköy is an isolated Sufi organisation. They are typical organisational agents of the interpretation and transmission of Sunni Islam.

Social religious movements derive their power mainly through their networking capacity. In this regard, a typical religious movement has usually an institutional network of schools, dormitories, charity organisations, radio, business organisations, newspapers, hospitals and television. For example, around one third of 10,000 private schools in Turkey are affiliated with religious movements.[45] There is also the informal network, which consists of various activities, such as gatherings, visits and collective religious meetings. The network is critical in recruitment, financing, solidarity, group activism and socialisation. It also enables the religious movements to disseminate their religious interpretation to the larger society.[46] Expectedly, that ability creates complex relations also with politics.

Islamic social movements have a serious role in the recent Islamisation of Turkey as partners of the Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party).[47] Reflecting that, there are politicians within the AKP who have Islamic social-movement backgrounds. For example, Mustafa Şentop, the incumbent Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, had his Islamic socialisation within İskenderpaşa, another Naqshbandiyya group.[48] Religious movements' complex relations with politics are particularly important, as those movements are proactively oriented bureaucracies.[49] They constantly strive for their members to be included in the bureaucracy, and to achieve this, they benefit from the help of their connections with politics. This sometimes creates even cases where a religious movement dominates a ministry. For example, bureaucrats who were socialised in the Menzil group

[44] Kayhan Delibas, "Conceptualizing Islamic Movements: The Case of Turkey," *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 1 (January 2009): 91, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108097058.
[45] Cumhuriyet, "10 Bin Özel Okulun Üçte Biri Tarikatlarla Ilişkili," Cumhuriyet, 2019.
[46] Yusuf Sarfati, *Mobilizing Religion in Middle East Politics* (London: Routledge, 2013), 10–27, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203797198.
[47] Ayhan Kaya, "Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity," *South European Society and Politics* 20, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 47, doi:10.1080-/13608746.2014.979031.
[48] Gokhan Bacik, *Islam and Muslim Resistance to Modernity in Turkey* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 134, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25901-3.
[49] Hakkı Taş, "A History of Turkey's AKP-Gülen Conflict," *Mediterranean Politics* 23, no. 3 (July 2018): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1328766.

are dominant in the Ministries of Health and Energy.[50] Even when President Erdoğan appointed a new Minister of Health in 2018 (a person whose religious background is İskenderpaşa), this was interpreted as a strategy to counterbalance the Menzil group.[51]

It is in this regard that Işıkçılar and Erenköy are typical religious movements that use their institutional networks to bring their religious interpretations to the public. However, though they share the typical features of a religious social movement, Işıkçılar and Erenköy have their peculiarities that shape their group identity. To begin with the Işıkçılar: This group traces its modern origin to Abdülhakim Arvasi (1865–1943), who joined the Naqshbandiyya in 1879. However, the name that founded the movement was Hüseyin Hilmi Işık (1911-2001).

After graduating from military high school, Işık enrolled in the Chemistry Department of Istanbul University, graduating in 1936. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1938. After serving in various military units, he was appointed as a teacher to Kuleli Military High School (Istanbul) in 1951. He taught chemistry there until retirement in 1960.[52] However, Işık remained more of a spiritual leader, tolerating his son-in-law Enver Ören (1939–2013) to become the *de factor* leader in the late 1970s. Ören was Işık's student from the Kuleli Military School. After Kuleli, he attended the Zoology and Botany Department at Istanbul University. Upon graduation, he joined Istanbul University to pursue an academic career. However, in 1970, Ören resigned from the University to devote himself entirely to the activities of Işıkçılar. The division of labour between Işık and Ören, however, ended when Işık died in 2001. Ören stayed as the leader of Işıkçılar till his death in 2013, when his son Mücahid Ören became the new leader.

After his death, Işık's books remained the movement's reference texts for understanding and transmitting Islamic knowledge to its followers, as well as to the larger public. Neither Enver Ören nor Mücahid Ören wrote a book to become the reference for Işıkçılar. Enver Ören defined the reading and distributing of Işık's books as the most critical Islamic service, and his son Mücahid Ören continued this policy. In his books, Işık called for a Sunni revival against several perceived threats, including Communism, positivism, and the various 'heretical' interpretations of Islam, like Wahhabism and reformism. Arguing that all these approaches are wrong, Işık proposed a revival of Sunnism as defined in the previous books of distinguished Muslim scholars. He believed that Islam needs no new interpretations, and that the

[50] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Erbakan'dan Erdoğan'a : Laiklik, Demokrasi, Kürt Sorunu ve İslam* (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2011), 215.
[51] Cumhuriyet, "Yeni Bakanın Tarikat Bağlantısı," Cumhuriyet, 2018.
[52] Bacik, *Islam and Muslim Resistance to Modernity in Turkey*.

existing opinions and books are excellent.[53] Işık's books are therefore mostly translations of previous books of Sunni Islamic scholars, but they include his comments. The purpose of such a confusing method is to reconnect with the previous Islamic scholars' teachings. That method results in a strong traditionalism.[54]

The movement is known for its expertise in media. They have a newspaper (*Türkiye*), a television (*TGRT*) and a radio (*TGRT Radio*) that are popular nationwide, giving it a reach beyond the boundaries of the movement. The group has other typical institutions that an Islamic movement is expected to have, like printing companies, hospitals, schools and dorms. The group's İhlas School Network has 17 schools in Istanbul.[55] The group is also organised abroad.[56]

Erenköy, the second case, is an Islamic group that also follows the Naqshbandiyya order. The group traces its origins back to Muhammad Esed (1847–1931), a prominent Naqshbandiyya scholar of the late Ottoman and early Republican period. After Esed, Mahmud Sami Ramazanoğlu (1892–1984), a graduate of the School of Law at Istanbul University, emerged as the new leader of the movement in the 50s. Ramazanoğlu worked as an accountant in various Anatolian cities, where he developed contacts with merchants.[57] Those contacts gave Erenköy a sophisticated network of economic actors across the country. Under Ramazanoğlu, the group gradually advanced a distinctive brand of Islamic activism that targeted the merchant class. The group was led by Musa Topbaş (1916-1999), after Ramazanoğlu.

When Musa Topbaş passed away, his son Osman Nuri Topbaş (d. 1942) emerged as the new leader of Erenköy. Topbaş is a graduate of İmam Hatip High School (a religious vocational school). Reflecting the merchant-oriented mentality of Islamic activism in Erenköy, Topbaş engaged in a trade for a while.

Unlike Işıkçılar, Erenköy has no past leader whose books are still regarded as major works in the interpretation and transmission of Islamic knowledge. Instead, in Erenköy, the incumbent leader dominates the group's interpretation of religion, but of course, in continuity with the previous leaders. In this regard, Osman Nuri Topbaş, the incumbent leader, has

[53] Mustafa. Tekin, "Işıkçılık," in *İslamcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay, Tanıl Bora, and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 344.
[54] Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset Makaleler 3* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2015), 30.
[55] İhlas Koleji, "İhlas Koleji Website," *İhlas Koleji*, 2022, https://ihlaskoleji.k12.tr/okullarimiz/ortaokul.
[56] For activities abroad see İhlas Vakfı, "Yurtdışı Hizmetlerimiz," İhlas Vakfı, 2022.
[57] Necdet Tosun, "Mahmut Sami Ramazanoğlu," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi Vol. 34*, ed. Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Ankara: TDV ISAM, 2007), 442.

thematic books where the author presents his interpretation of religion from a typical Sunni-Sufi perspective.

As expected, the impact of Erenköy on middle-class merchants has attracted the interest of political actors. For example, Eymen Topbaş, a leading figure of the Topbaş family that dominates Erenköy, occupied high-level administrative positions in the 1980s, in the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal. The group has developed close relations also with President Erdoğan. For example, Mustafa Latif Topbaş, a Turkish billionaire, is close to Erdoğan. That cooperation with politics helps the movement in the bureaucracy. Some members of the group have recently been appointed to critical posts at critical public offices, including the *Diyanet* (The Directorate of Religious Affairs).[58]

Erenköy has a complex network of institutions to transmit its religious interpretation to the public. We see in this network schools, hospitals, radio station and affiliated companies that are active in various field such as tourism. Erenköy is also an internationally-operating movement. For example, its Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation has more than 130 educational institutions abroad.[59]

3. The Interpretation of al-Ghazali in Contemporary Turkey

The books written by Hüseyin Hilmi Işık and Osman Nuri Topbaş define 'Islamic knowledge' as it was interpreted by Işıkçılar and Erenköy, and transmitted to the members, as well as to the public. Members of religious movements are expected to regularly read these books, [60] for they guide those movements' activities. Group members are expected also to deliver and promote those books to others. The methods of argumentation and proof in such reference books are naturally different from those of academic works.[61] They are written from a religious perspective, where the purpose is to preach the orthodox religious truths. The ultimate objectives of these books are to affect Muslims' daily lives in specific ways by motivating them, and to provide a blueprint of the Islamic life. On this account, those books purvey epistemological and practical engagements with Islam. Below, I analyse how Işık and Topbaş reference al-Ghazali, expecting that this will serve us as a

[58] Adem Efe, *Dini Gruplar Sosyolojisi* (Istanbul: Dönem, 2013), 165–66.
[59] Cumhuriyet, "10 Bin Özel Okulun Üçte Biri Tarikatlarla Ilişkili."
[60] The group gathering where such books are read is called *sohbet.* It is a discursive practice of pious reading circles where people learn, interpret and transmit religious knowledge. Smita Tewari Jassal, "The Sohbet: Talking Islam in Turkey," *Sociology of Islam* 1, no. 3–4 (April 2014): 188–89, https://doi.org/10.1163/22131418-00104005.
[61] On this see, Martin Adam, "Persuasion in Religious Discourse: Enhancing Credibility in Sermon Titles and Openings," *Discourse and Interaction* 10, no. 2 (December 2017): 5–25, https://doi.org/10.5817/DI2017-2-5.

sample of how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted in present-day real-life contexts.

To achieve this goal, my methodological procedure is to make a referential content analysis of the works of Işık and Topbaş. As O. R. Holsti posits, content analysis is 'any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages'.[62] In this context, one technique of content analysis is referential content analysis, which is a tool for teasing out the main themes of a text.[63] K. Krippendorf defines 'referential content analysis' as the task of ascertaining how an existing phenomenon is portrayed.[64] In our case, this is to analyse and explain how Işık and Topbaş reference al-Ghazali in their transmissions of religious knowledge to their followers, and to the general public. This entails the effort to identify what *kind* of religious interpretation that referencing reveals about causality, knowledge and philosophy. That effort, successfully deployed, will enable us to answer questions like 'is al-Ghazali referenced to promote an antagonistic stance on philosophy?' The identification of causality, knowledge and philosophy as the three main themes is the logical consequence of this paper's appreciation of the fact–that the Sunni Revival Thesis is the active reference-frame in the interpretation of al-Ghazali's impact in contemporary Turkey. As discussed above, this interpretation bundles the thesis that al-Ghazali is a historical cause of the scientific decay in the Muslim world because of his opinions on causality, knowledge and philosophy.

4. Işıkçılar

Işık recognises al-Ghazali's works as a canonical authority. Commenting on the virtues of *Ihya* after describing it as the most useful book,[65] Işık writes that 'if a non-Muslim lovingly turns the pages of *Ihya*, he becomes an honorary Muslim'.[66] Naturally, al-Ghazali's opinions play an influential role in Işık's

[62] O. R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 14; Lune and Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. Also see, James Drisko and Tina Maschi, *Content Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 82, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190215491.001.0001.
[63] Roberto Franzosi, "Content Analysis," in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, ed. Michael Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao (London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004), 186, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412950589.
[64] K Krippendorf, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publication, 1980), 62.
[65] Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Kıyamet ve Ahiret* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2017), 62.
[66] Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 420.

framing of his views on causality, knowledge and philosophy. Işık references al-Ghazali's books extensively while commenting on those topics.[67]

As a typical proof of al-Ghazali's influence, Işık, borrows the former's 'fire and burning cotton' exemplar. Like al-Ghazali, Işık concludes that the fire does not cause the cotton to burn; only God does. To deny the secondary causes of fire, Işık reduced them to mere human illusions: 'nor oxygen, nor heat, nor the electrons cause the burning; only God does'.[68] His use of modern terminology (oxygen; electrons) intends to give the impression that religious truth has not changed because complex scientific discourses have come into being. Furthermore, that terminology enables him to give the Ghazalian argument a modern guise. These moves by Işık do not, however, change the Ghazalian substance: Işık simply repeats with al-Ghazali that natural law is a misnomer, since it is nothing but the custom of God, whose will is the momentum, or the driver of, events. So, causality is about God the agent and His customs, not about natural law, which has neither life nor the power to will.[69] It is abundantly clear that al-Ghazali's theory of events as the momentum of divine agency is the groundwork of Işık's explanation of causality. So, for Işık, it remains true that only a conscious agent with the ability to will can cause a movement/an event. Lacking those faculties, a law cannot be the cause an event/movement.

How Işık incorporates al-Ghazali's arguments into his religious interpretation results in his heavily sceptical stance on natural law: God is the governor of nature, creating and managing every event directly. So, people should appeal directly to God, not to natural law. Işık is against the attributing of events to natural causation. For him, the only concession to natural law is that the universe is operated by a dual causality, natural and the divine, but the latter is superior.[70] To support his interpretation, Işık asserts that God can change his custom as he wishes. What is more, he declares that belief in the suspension of nature is an essential part of faith.[71] This is to declare causality to be the primarily the domain of faith, and of scientific inquiry only secondarily. This requires Muslims to believe that there is no fixed natural law.

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[67] In fact, translations of al-Ghazali's various books like *Munkidh*, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* and *The Alchemy of Happiness* are part of reference books of Işıkçılar.
[68] Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Belief and Islam* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2015), 77–78.
[69] Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Kıymetsiz Yazılar* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 14, 224. For other places where Işık uses al-Ghazali's metaphors and analogies, see, Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[70] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[71] Hüseyin Hilmi Işık, *Faideli Bilgiler* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 39, 68.

Ibn Rushd, as explained above, objected that refuting causality rules renders God to be 'like a tyrannical prince … of whom no standard or custom is known to which reference can be made'.[72] On the contrary, for Işık, a nature with no standard is a requirement of faith, as any conception of natural law would imply limitations of God's sovereignty and omnipotence. Instead, God acts in nature as he wishes: no natural law binds him. He suspends order for some higher virtues.[73] Işık seeks to prove this by reminding that pious people have appeared in in different places at the very same time.[74] So, for Işık, what people call natural law is a fiction rather than a reality. If God lets someone fly, the man-made concept of 'natural' presents this case as supernatural. This had nothing to do with the supernatural or the natural. Rather, a flying man is only a change in God's custom.[75] (While reading Işık's comments, one should remember that he had a modern education in chemistry, and he worked as a chemistry teacher with the military title of colonel, for long years at the Işıklar Military High School, a backbone of modernist military education.)

When it comes to how Işık formulates his views on knowledge, we again observe al-Ghazali's strong influence. Almost as a replica of al-Ghazali's method, Işık starts by reminding that human reason and senses are limited in various ways, and this makes of human reason a faculty that fails to grasp the divine governance of nature.[76] He quotes al-Ghazali's *Al-Munkidh* directly while discussing the limited scope of human reason that makes it incapable of discovering all sorts of knowledge.[77] Işık uses al-Ghazali's example of the limits of the human eye.[78] Purporting to have established the limitations of human reason, Işık proceeds to address 'inner knowledge' as the sublime form of learning.[79]

Işık's intensive references to al-Ghazali in his effort to formulate a critical perspective on human reason and the senses brings him to the same conclusion that Ghazali had reached: the subservience of reason. According to Işık, reason can be only an instrument that operates according to mechanical principles, and this is never enough to generate reliable knowledge.[80] Reason is only an instrument of measurement that desperately

[72] Rushd, *The Incoherence of the Incoherence [Tahafut Al-Tahafut]*.
[73] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[74] Ali bin Emrullah and Muhammad Hadimi, *İslam Ahlakı* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 24.
[75] E. Abdullah Süveydi, *Hak Sözün Vesikaları* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 306–9., 306–9.
[76] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[77] Işık, *Faideli Bilgiler*.
[78] Işık.
[79] Süveydi, *Hak Sözün Vesikaları*.
[80] Ibid., 288.

needs the guidance of a superior method to acquire reliable knowledge.[81] At best, reason can choose only between alternatives, and then only if it is given true guidance. But there is always risk: If not properly guided, subservient reason can become an instrument of delusion. To prevent such risks, Işık takes an alarmist stance on the use of human reason in religious reasoning. He condemns as 'infidel' those who interpret the Qur'an according to reason, for the only legitimate and correct meanings are those advanced by the Sunni scholars.[82] He thus reduces Islamic reasoning to an intellectual effort within the tight boundaries of Quran, the hadith/traditions, and the previous scholars' works. In his hands, reason ceases to have authority to go beyond the texts, since dependence on pure reason leads to the rejection of prophethood. [83]

Having read Işık on causality and knowledge, it is not surprising to observe an antagonism to philosophy in his works. Işıkçılar reference books define philosophers as heretics for having ideas that threaten the Islamic faith. To a large extent, Işık interprets philosophy as part of al-Ghazali's fight with philosophers to purge Islamic thought of their errors.[84] In this context, Işık marks a period in Islamic history as the source of many problems, including the contamination of the Islamic faith with scientific knowledge and philosophical thinking.[85] For him, the interaction of Islamic and Greek thought in that period paved the way for erroneous interpretations of religion.[86] Işık salutes the latter period, where al-Ghazali played his role, as the restoration period when Islam's contamination was cured.[87] He defines al-Ghazali as a saviour of orthodox Islam in an age of chaos, when heretical ideas infected the Muslim world.[88]

Logically, this results in Işık's referencing al-Ghazali to develop a highly antagonistic stance on philosophy. Işık often repeats that 'Imam al-Ghazali informed that philosophers are infidel'.[89] The Ghazalian impact is most visible when Işık repeats al-Ghazali's criticism of philosophers on their tenet of eternal nature of universe in his *The Incoherence of the Philosophers.* Quoting al-Ghazali, Işık declares that the philosophers who hold the view that the universe is eternal are *kafir* [infidel]. [90] In a direct sense, al-Ghazali is the

[81] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[82] Işık.
[83] Işık.
[84] Işık, *Belief and Islam*.
[85] Işık, *Namaz*, 15. Süveydi, *Hak Sözün Vesikaları*.
[86] Işık, *Faideli Bilgiler*.
[87] Işık, *Belief and Islam*.
[88] Işık, *Kıyamet ve Ahiret*.
[89] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[90] Işık.

'proof' that justifies Işık's rejection of philosophy. This is evident when Işık writes:

> *Al-Ghazali detailly analysed the Greek philosophers, and informed that they are ignorant, idiot and infidel. He wrote in his books that Muslims should not appreciate such infidels.* [91]

Thus, Işık's account of philosophy is grim: He advises Muslims not to read the Greek philosophers, for their impact is the agent of the contamination of the Islamic faith. Instead, they should be satisfied with Islam, for even a simple tradition that grew from the Prophet's utterances is worth more than the talk of all the old Greek philosophers.[92] Greek philosophers are heretic scholars, Işık frequently tells the reader.[93] He writes that 'the Greek philosophers are the most ignorant people on earth'.[94] Işık makes no allowance even for the greats of classical philosophy. He calls Plato *ahmak* (stupid), and derides Aristotle for depending on reason rather than experience. Işık blames these two giants of Greek philosophy for the delay of Europe's technological development, which, he argues, would have happened much earlier than the eighteenth century, had it not been for their poor intellectual guidance.[95] That harsh stance is also valid for Muslim philosophers: Ibn Hazm (d. 1064) is a heretic.[96] Ibn al-Haytham (d. 1040) and Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. 935) were influenced by Greek philosophy.[97]

Işık reserves a special place for Ibn Sina in his list of heretics as the leader of those who follow reason. [98] For him, Ibn Sina was of limited vision. This caused his lesser share of Islam, and he stayed in the 'dirt of philosophy' (*felsefe pisliği.*) [99] Işık draws heavily on al-Ghazali while condemning Ibn Sina and al-Farabi.[100] As noted above, he repeats al-Ghazali's accusation of Ibn Sina and al-Farabi in particular, of sharing Aristotle's opinion that matter is eternal, then declares that they are unbelievers.[101] Besides, more symbolically, he quotes al-Ghazali to deride Ibn Sina and al-Farabi. [102] Işık

[91] Işık.
[92] Işık.
[93] Işık, *Namaz*,
[94] Muhammad bin Qutbuddin Izniki, *Miftah Al-Jannah* (Istanbul: Hakikat, 2014), 19; Işık, *Kıymetsiz Yazılar*.
[95] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[96] Izniki, *Miftah Al-Jannah*.
[97] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[98] Izniki, *Miftah Al-Jannah*.
[99] Işık, *Kıymetsiz Yazılar*.
[100] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[101] Işık, *Belief and Islam*.
[102] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.

declares Ibn Sina as faithless, quoting al-Ghazali directly.[103] Similarly, he quotes Al-Ghazali when he declares al-Farabi an infidel.[104]

Işık's opposition to philosophy is never limited by philosophers' problematic opinions. He categorically rejects philosophy, warning that philosophical statements are nothing but diversions from the right path.[105] Işık simply imagines philosophy as the opposite of religion. This is inevitable, as philosophy relies on pure reason, which is the rejection of revelation.[106] This categorical rejection made Işık conclude that there is no such thing as a truly Islamic philosophy. So, he rejects the presentation of al-Ghazali as an Islamic philosopher.[107] His conclusion is neat: 'No true Islamic scholar was a philosopher, and no true philosopher can be an Islamic scholar'.[108]

5. Erenköy

Al-Ghazali also shapes the religious paradigm of Erenköy's reference books. Reflecting this is Topbaş's way of formulating the Islamic concepts of causality, knowledge and philosophy with reference to al-Ghazali.

To start with causality: Topbaş uses a metaphor from al-Ghazali to summarise his perspective. Accordingly, he likens nature to a painting on a canvas. There is a painter who paints various dots, lines, and other shapes on the canvas. But those shapes on the canvas have no ability to influence the act of painting. The only authority to affect size, shape, or colour of the appearances on the canvas is the painter's will. There is no causal mechanism to determine the shapes on the canvas, other than the painter's custom or wishes. This gives rise to the analogy that God is the painter of nature: He decides and makes everything in nature. No other factor, therefore no natural law, causes something in nature.[109] This analogy is a replica of al-Ghazali's analogy in *Alchemy of Happiness*. Here, al-Ghazali likens a physicist who relies on natural law to an ant who, crawling on a sheet of paper and observing black letters spreading over it, sees the pen alone as the cause of those black letters. So, the ant cannot grasp the real cause of the shapes on the paper, that is, the fingers of the painter, God.[110] This last sentence of Al-Ghazali's appears

[103] Işık.
[104] Işık, *Kıymetsiz Yazılar*.
[105] Işık, *Belief and Islam*.
[106] Işık, *Kıymetsiz Yazılar*.
[107] Emrullah and Muhammad Hadimi, *İslam Ahlakı*; Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[108] Işık, *Tam İlmihal Se'adet-i Ebediyye*.
[109] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Gönül Bahçesinden Son Nefes* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2016), 176.
[110] Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *The Alchemy of Happiness [Kimiya-Yi Sa'Adat]*, trans. Claud Field (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf, 1991), 38.

in Topbaş in a slightly revised form: 'To understand nature we must focus on the artist, not on the work of art'.[111]

His views on causality make Topbaş highly critical of natural law: To Işık, attributing a real effect to natural law is wrong, as it is God who governs the universe.[112] The sole cause of every event in nature is divine power.[113] So also for Topbaş, for whom natural events are the results of God's creations that happen as his unceasing interventions in nature.[114] God rules the universe without intermediaries.[115] As explained by Topbaş, nature therefore has no place for any law that affects events.

As observed in the case of Işık, the refutation of causality by Topbaş also leads to an epistemic fatalism that Ibn Rush formulated as the denial of constant laws that would destroy the possibility of knowledge: Topbaş asserts that an understanding of nature is not possible.[116] This impossibility is caused by fact that the divine will determines natural events, so we cannot explain natural events with reference to the laws of nature. Facing this reality, Topbaş warns that people should be satisfied with their deficiency, so long as they do not develop an alternate method for understanding the divine aspect of natural events.[117] To explain the impossibility of knowing how nature works, Topbaş reminds of events like disasters, which he interprets as the hints of divine governance. To him, those events cannot be explained on the basis of scientific observations of natural phenomena.[118]

Thus, it is better to define Topbaş's nature as ruled by a divine arbitrariness. It is a nature where God does anything he wishes. Thus, for Topbaş, the human distinction of natural and supernatural is meaningless. People, for they are led by their limited senses and reasoning, mistakenly imagine some of God's actions as supernatural. [119] In truth, the man-made binary of natural and supernatural has nothing to do with God's custom. God can do whatever he wishes as there exists no consistent framework, including the natural law, to theorise God's actions. So, what is explained by humans as

[111] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2016), 67.
[112] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *The Secret in the Love for God* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2009), 62.
[113] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Islam Spirit and Form* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2006), 61.
[114] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2002), 238.
[115] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *The Golden Chain of Transmission Masters of the Naqshibandi Way* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2016), 176.
[116] Topbaş, *Islam Spirit and Form*.
[117] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[118] Topbaş, *The Secret in the Love for God*.
[119] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.

supernatural is only God's actions that are not comprehensible by humans. Accordingly, what seems like a natural law is an illusion.

This radical position enables Topbaş to propose a religious causality to explain natural events. Accordingly, natural events like fires, plagues and droughts, relate to people's piety:

> *If most of the servants are on the right path, rain comes down as a mercy and a blessing, and happiness follows. However, if most of the community is inclined to earthly desires, then floods, droughts or earthquakes become inevitable. These sad events occur because of sins or rebelliousness committed by people. In other words, natural disasters happen only after spiritual quakes have already happened to corrupt hearts.*[120]

According to Topbaş's idiosyncratic religious causality, 'people's spiritual states and their actions, good or evil, play a role in the triggering or the deflection of earthquakes'.[121] Natural law is now completely irrelevant. Topbaş freely writes that it is wrong to exaggerate the role of physical rules by saying things like 'if the buildings were strong enough, this earthquake would not have killed so many people'.[122] He thus rejects the explanation of nature as 'purely physical rules' that allow us, for instance to 'blame tectonic faults for earthquakes'. The offering of such explanations is only to wander around among ordinary causes that have no real effect, and to remain unaware of the divine will behind natural events.[123] The logical upshot of this argumentation is to ask Muslims to organise their lives in accordance with the reality of a divine causation, rather than rely on natural law, for natural laws are uncertain, while the divine rules are constant.[124]

On the next subject of knowledge: Reminding of Işık, Topbaş formulates his views through an intensive engagement with al-Ghazali's arguments. The dominance of al-Ghazalian methodology determines the similar conclusions of Topbaş. Since divine intervention is the agent behind events in nature, Topbaş requires a special way of knowing the divine dimension that is beyond the visible realm.[125] To prove the need for such an alternate knowledge, Topbaş repeats the al-Ghazalian method of elaborating

[120] Topbaş, *The Secret in the Love for God*.
[121] Topbaş.
[122] Topbaş.
[123] Topbaş.
[124] Topbaş.
[125] Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy*; Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.

the limits of human reason and senses.[126] So, given such limits of human reason and senses, inner knowledge remains the only reliable method of examining and comprehending the real causes that operate in nature. To strengthen his argument, Topbaş quotes al-Ghazali:

> *I realised that human reason alone cannot understand everything properly, and that it would not always fail in the attempt to draw aside the curtain that covers the visible side of things.*[127]

Topbaş presents inner knowledge as acquired only through a subjective process without standard rules, and accessible only upon spiritual maturation.[128] Thus, acquiring inner knowledge is not possible by a fulfilment of the various methodological inquiries that result in rational knowledge. Inner knowledge is independent of those sense-and-reason based endeavours. It is received directly through the heart.[129] Topbaş means here that the limits of human senses and reason are no longer problematic in the pursuit of inner knowledge, since it is independent of sense and reason.

It is obvious that the method and arguments of Topbaş on knowledge are the replicas of what al-Ghazali did in his *Al-Munkidh,* where he formulated inner knowledge as not coming about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light that the God most high casts into the breast.[130] As a matter of fact, when it comes to demonstrating the superiority of inner knowledge to rational knowledge, Topbaş narrates a parable where al-Ghazali is reported to have seen warned someone who was preoccupied with the sciences of the world:

> *I will feel pity for you, son, should you fail to transform your knowledge of theology, logic, rhetoric, poetry and grammar into wisdom and gnosis. You will have otherwise not received any benefit, but merely wasted the life given to you by the Almighty to worship Him.*[131]

Declaring the supremacy of inner knowledge, Topbaş inevitably reaches Ghazali's conclusion: Downgrading reason to a subservient status. This is a Ghazalian formula that we have detected also in Işık. As reasoning may

[126] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Islam: The Religion of Truth* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2015); Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*; Topbaş, *The Secret in the Love for God*.
[127] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[128] Topbaş.
[129] Topbaş.
[130] Al-Ghazali, *Deliverance From Error [Al Munkidh Min Ad Dallal]*.
[131] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.

generate conclusions mixed with 'doubt, hesitation, error, deficiency and delusion' due to its natural limits, Topbaş asserts that it is better for reason to stay 'within its natural limits', and to accept the guidance of revelation. Only in so doing can reasoning be saved from being dragged into contradiction.[132] Topbaş commends his solution as the putting of reason into the service of religion. He formulates this as 'may reason be sacrificed for Muhammad'.[133] If this is not done, and reason is taken as the only instrument, the result will be disaster for humanity.[134]

On the last, but not least, subject of philosophy, we again see that Topbaş interpret al-Ghazali in a way that results in a highly critical, sometimes even hostile, stance on philosophy. The reference books of Erenköy repeatedly state that philosophy is not compatible with Islam. Topbaş is alarmed by the weakness of philosophy as well by as its potential harm to people.[135]

His main criticism is that philosophy uses various procedures of reasoning, such as analogical deduction, that allows people to avoid submission to divine revelation. Topbaş thus interprets philosophy as the weakening of the human ability to engage with absolute knowledge. Philosophy enslaves the limited senses and human intellect.[136] For Topbaş, practising philosophy is to prefer a defective and misleading method when one has available the perfect method of inner knowledge. This harsh stance on philosophy is particularly visible in his argument that it is Satan who introduced analogical reasoning.[137] Topbaş bases this view on a Qur'anic verse where, after creating Adam, God ordered the angels to prostrate themselves before him. Satan did not comply, though all the other angels did. When asked, Satan reasoned to legitimate his disobedience as follows: 'I am better than Adam: you created me from fire, and you created him from clay'.[138] Topbaş interprets this verse as proof that reasoning might generate wrong results and lead one away from obeying God's orders. As interpreted by Topbaş, a logical derivative of Satan's argument is the lesson that the absolute knowledge that comes from God must be obeyed, and reasoning must be distrusted, because it has no ability to acquire true knowledge.

[132] Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy*.
[133] Topbaş.
[134] Topbaş, *Gönül Bahçesinden Son Nefes*; Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[135] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[136] Topbaş.
[137] Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy*.
[138] Topbaş, *Gönül Bahçesinden Son Nefes*.

To enhance his argument on the weakness of the philosophical method, Topbaş references al-Ghazali. For example, he borrows an argument from *The Incoherence of Philosophers* where al-Ghazali criticises the philosophers for busying themselves with empty arguments. Thus, to plunge into narrating the differences among the philosophers would involve too long a tale.[139] Repeating this argument, Topbaş also points out that the disagreements among philosophers are proof of the inadequacy of reason and philosophy.[140] Accordingly, philosophers prove their own limitations in their constant debates and falsification of one another's views.[141] So, we understand from Topbaş that the philosophers' lack of ability to acquire absolute knowledge leaves them engaged in endless and pointless debate. To illustrate this argument, Topbaş recounts the story of Muhammad Iqbal, who read Ibn Sina and al-Farabi. Not satisfied with their dry sentences, Iqbal found himself 'a traveller in their nightmare dead-end streets'.[142]

As another method, Topbaş tries to show how the philosophers' ideas have been useless throughout history. He claims that not even one person can be found who has attained happiness through belief in and practice of Aristotle's philosophy.[143] But this is again an argument borrowed from al-Ghazali. In challenging philosophers for their failure to produce useful knowledge, al-Ghazali, in *Munkidh*, describes the mystics as men of real experience and not merely men of words.[144] There is no doubt that 'men of words' in that comparison references philosophers. Quoting al-Ghazali verbatim here, Topbaş, too, repeats that philosophers are simply 'men of words,' not purveyors of ideas that can be put to work to cure social problems or guide people to salvation. He also quotes al-Ghazali saying that philosophy cannot provide sufficient answers to 'my need'.[145] Not surprisingly, in giving various examples of philosophers whose ideas have no practical application, Topbaş reminds al-Farabi.[146] To prove his thesis, Topbaş claims that in the history of humanity, no society has achieved peace and happiness by implementing the views of a particular philosopher.[147] On the contrary, he argues, philosophers have often provoked distress among people.[148]

[139] Al-Ghazali, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers [Tahafut Al-Falasifa]*.
[140] Topbaş, *Islam Spirit and Form*.
[141] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[142] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Civilization of Virtues 2* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2009), 437.
[143] Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy*.
[144] Al-Ghazali, *Deliverance From Error [Al Munkidh Min Ad Dallal]*.
[145] Topbaş, *Sufism: A Path Towards the Internalization of Faith*.
[146] Topbaş, *The Islamic Approach to Reasoning and Philosophy*.
[147] Topbaş.
[148] Osman Nuri Topbaş, *Contemplation In Islam* (Istanbul: Erkam, 2009), 16.

Conclusion

The interpretation and transmission of al-Ghazali in contemporary Turkey is indeed not limited to the two Islamic groups studied in this paper. That subject should also be analysed in other cases, like how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted in mosque sermons, or in the schoolbooks used in the compulsory religious courses in Turkey.

However, this paper, having studied two typical Sunni religious movements, has observed that how al-Ghazali is interpreted and transmitted in Turkey contributes to: (i) a highly sceptical stance on causality and natural law; (ii) a deep suspicion of rational knowledge because of the limits of human reason and the senses, and a consequent belief in the necessity and existence of inner knowledge; and (iii) a highly critical, even antagonistic, stance on philosophy and philosophers. The reference books of Işıkçılar and Erenköy interpret al-Ghazali as making categorical and normative adverse criticisms of natural law, rational knowledge and philosophy.

On this account, in terms of the characteristics of al-Ghazali's impact, the findings of this paper support those scholars who criticise the legacy of al-Ghazali's part in the Sunni Revival Thesis, albeit in a different temporal context. So, this paper's findings suggest that any person who is exposed to al-Ghazali as interpreted by Işıkçılar and Erenköy is likely to become critical of natural law, rational knowledge and philosophy. No case is detected in Işıkçılar and Erenköy that could tend to support the revisionist perspective on al-Ghazali.

Though al-Ghazali died in 1111, his impact upon Muslims continues today. In other words, al-Ghazali survives as a contemporary phenomenon. The nature of al-Ghazali's impact is therefore not solely a historical issue. This article, by illustrating through two cases how al-Ghazali's impact is crucial in contemporary Turkey, concludes that there is need for more studies on how contemporary Muslims incorporate al-Ghazali in their interpretations of Islam. The intensive debate on al-Ghazali's historical impact has the potential of preventing us from seeing and discussing how al-Ghazali's legacy influences today's Muslims.

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Between Liberty and Faith: Exploring the Dynamics of Childfree Choices in the Islamic Perspective of Malaysia

Syazwan Bin Samsudi
Harakah Islamiah (Hikmah), Jalan Tun Abdul Rahman Yakub Petra Jaya, 93050 Kuching Sarawak, Malaysia
e-mail: syzwnsmsd99@gmail.com

Busro
UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia
e-mail: busro@uinsgd.ac.id

Abstrak

Penelitian ini menyelidiki fenomena pilihan gaya hidup tanpa anak di Malaysia, khususnya dalam perpektif ajaran Islam sebagaimana ditafsirkan dalam "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin". Dengan pendekatan kualitatif, penelitian ini mengintegrasikan analisis kualitatif terhadap teks-teks keagamaan dan wawancara dengan lima individu Malaysia. Penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa keputusan untuk mengejar kehidupan tanpa anak, yang dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor seperti kebebasan individu, pertimbangan ekonomi, dan otonomi pribadi, berbeda dengan interpretasi ajaran Islam tentang keluarga dan prokreasi. Kitab suci Islam, terutama QS Al-Baqarah: 187 dan Al-Imran 14, menggarisbawahi pentingnya hubungan pernikahan tidak semata-mata untuk kepuasan fisik tetapi juga untuk tujuan menghasilkan keturunan yang saleh. Temuan-temuan ini menjelaskan perbedaan yang mencolok antara tren sosial kontemporer dan sudut pandang Islam tentang keluarga dan prokreasi di Malaysia. Penelitian ini memberikan kontribusi yang signifikan terhadap wacana akademis dengan menyajikan perspektif yang unik tentang bagaimana interpretasi Islam menyikapi pilihan gaya hidup kontemporer seperti hidup tanpa anak. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga menjelaskan hubungan yang rumit antara dinamika sosial, ekonomi, dan agama dalam masyarakat Malaysia. Penelitian ini menawarkan wawasan berharga yang dapat menginformasikan kebijakan dan praktik dalam kesehatan reproduksi, pendidikan, dan konseling keluarga.

Kata Kunci: Gaya Hidup Tanpa Anak; Interpretasi Islam; Malaysia; Pilihan Reproduksi; Dinamika Sosial

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Abstract

This study investigates the childfree lifestyle choice phenomenon in Malaysia, particularly within the framework of Islamic teachings as interpreted in "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin". Employing a qualitative approach, this research integrates qualitative analysis of religious texts and interviews with five Malaysian individuals. The study reveals that the decision to pursue a childfree life, influenced by factors such as individual freedom, economic considerations, and personal autonomy, contrasts with the interpretations of Islamic teachings on family and procreation. Key Islamic scriptures, notably QS Al-Baqarah: 187 and Al-Imran 14, underscore the significance of marital relations not solely for physical gratification but also for the purpose of producing righteous progeny. These findings illuminate a marked divergence between contemporary social trends and the traditional Islamic viewpoints on family and procreation in Malaysia. The study makes a significant contribution to academic discourse by presenting a unique perspective on how traditional Islamic interpretations shape attitudes toward contemporary lifestyle choices like childfree living. Additionally, it elucidates the intricate interplay of social, economic, and religious dynamics within Malaysian society. This research offers valuable insights that could inform policies and practices in reproductive health, education, and family counseling.

Keywords: *Childfree Lifestyle; Islamic Interpretations; Malaysia; Reproductive Choices; Social Dynamics*

Introduction

The phenomenon of childfree, the deliberate decision not to have children,[1] has become a significant topic of social and cultural debate worldwide.[2] In many countries, including Malaysia, the prevalence of this lifestyle choice continues to rise, driven by various factors such as shifting social values, career priorities, financial freedom, and environmental

[1] Christian Agrillo and Cristian Nelini, "Childfree by Choice: A Review," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 25, no. 3 (October 2008): 347–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/0887363080247-6292.

[2] Rebecca Harrington, "Childfree by Choice," *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* 20, no. 1 (January 2019): 22–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/15240657.2019.1559515; Helen Peterson and Kristina Engwall, "Silent Bodies: Childfree Women's Gendered and Embodied Experiences," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 20, no. 4 (November 2013): 376–89, https://doi.org-/10.1177/1350506812471338; Erik Nakkerud, "Ideological Dilemmas Actualised by the Idea of Living Environmentally Childfree," *Human Arenas* 6, no. 4 (December 2023): 886–910, https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-021-00255-6; Sabrina Helm, Joya A. Kemper, and Samantha K. White, "No Future, No Kids–No Kids, No Future?," *Population and Environment* 43, no. 1 (September 2021): 108–29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-021-00379-5; Shelly Volsche, Shelby Schmidt, and D. Nicole Farris, "From Voluntarily Childless to Childfree: Sociohistoric Perspectives on a Contemporary Trend," in *International Handbooks of Population*, 2020, 285–94, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35079-6_19.

concerns.[3] Within the Islamic world, this phenomenon faces unique challenges as it intersects with deeply held religious values and traditions regarding the role of family and progeny. In Malaysia, where Islam holds a significant role in the social and cultural fabric, the choice to be childfree raises important questions about the balance between personal freedom, social responsibility, and religious teachings. The increasing trend has drawn serious attention to how the childfree phenomenon is interpreted in the context of Islamic teachings, and more specifically, how it is viewed in the context of exegesis and the perspectives of scholars, including those in Malaysia.

While the phenomenon of childfree has not been extensively researched by scholars, some studies have provided valuable insights into the reasons why people choose not to have children. Research by Blackstone and Stewart,[4] Höglund dan Hildingsson,[5] serta Watling Neal dan Neal[6] has explored various motivations behind this decision. Commonly cited primary reasons revolve around the desire for personal freedom, including freedom from the responsibilities of parenting, opportunities for self-development, and a lack of willingness or suitability for the role of a parent. Earlier research on the childfree has delved into various aspects of this phenomenon, ranging from the psychological impact and well-being of individuals who choose not to have children, as evidenced in studies highlighting the subjective well-being and self-differentiation of childfree women, [7] to the social and cultural implications of this decision. For example, research has explored how the digital age and Islamic legal perspectives influence societal perceptions and acceptance of the childfree.[8] Additionally, there is research linking the

[3] Inquirer, "Malaysia's Shrinking Families," Inquirer, 2019; New Straits Times, "'Many Couples Choose Not to Have Children,'" New Straits Times, 2019.

[4] "Choosing to Be Childfree: Research on the Decision Not to Parent," *Sociology Compass* 6, no. 9 (September 2012): 718–27, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2012.00496.x.

[5] "Why and When Choosing Child-Free Life in Sweden? Reasons, Influencing Factors and Personal and Societal Factors: Individual Interviews during 2020–2021," *Sexual & Reproductive Healthcare* 35 (March 2023): 100809, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.srhc.2022.-100809.

[6] "Prevalence, Age of Decision, and Interpersonal Warmth Judgements of Childfree Adults: Replication and Extensions," ed. Janna Metzler, *PLOS ONE* 18, no. 4 (April 2023): e0283301, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0283301.

[7] Vered Shenaar-Golan and Omer Lans, "Measuring Differentiation of Self to Evaluate Subjective Well-Being in Women Who Are Childfree by Choice," *The Family Journal* 31, no. 2 (April 2023): 278–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/10664807221123552.

[8] Erfaniah Zuhriah et al., "Childfree, the Digital Era, and Islamic Law: Views of Nahdlatul

childfree choice to environmental concerns and activism, examining childfree as a response to climate change and as a form of environmental activism.[9] Studies have also examined the demographics and characteristics of the childfree population, including the prevalence and stereotypes faced by childfree individuals, as well as the application of the childfree concept in non-Western contexts.[10]

The main issue to be addressed in this research is how the childfree phenomenon, the deliberate decision of individuals or couples not to have children, can be explained in the context of the teachings of the Quran. This study will specifically focus on the interpretation of the Quran as elaborated in the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," a recognized tafsir work in Malaysia. Through this approach, the research aims to understand the Islamic perspective on the concept of childfree, exploring how this tafsir interprets relevant verses and connects them to this phenomenon. This research question is crucial given the significant role held by family and progeny in Islam and how this phenomenon is viewed in the broader social and cultural context, especially in Muslim-majority countries like Malaysia. This investigation seeks to provide fresh insights into the religious interpretation related to the childfree lifestyle choice and its potential contribution to a broader discussion on the role and significance of family in Islam.

The objective of this research is to investigate and comprehend how the childfree phenomenon is interpreted in the context of the teachings of the Quran, with a specific focus on the study of the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin." This research intends to explore the Islamic perspectives on childfree, considering theological, social, and cultural aspects. The significance of this research lies in its contribution to a deeper understanding of the childfree lifestyle choice in the context of Islamic religion, which plays a pivotal role in

Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Gender Activists in Malang, Indonesia," *Samarah: Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Dan Hukum Islam* 7, no. 3 (2023): 1606–26.

[9] Erik Nakkerud, "Choosing to Live Environmentally Childfree: Private-Sphere Environmentalism, Environmental Activism, or Both?," *Current Psychology*, March 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04295-9; Nakkerud, "Ideological Dilemmas Actualised by the Idea of Living Environmentally Childfree."

[10] Merve Erkaya and Anil Ozge Ustunel, "A Qualitative Study on the Marital Experiences of Childfree Couples in Turkey," *International Journal of Systemic Therapy*, July 2023, 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/2692398X.2023.2240680; Watling Neal and Neal, "Prevalence, Age of Decision, and Interpersonal Warmth Judgements of Childfree Adults: Replication and Extensions."

many societies. This is important as it will provide new insights for the academic community, religious leaders, and the broader society on how lifestyle choices like childfree can be viewed from a religious perspective, especially in Islam, which often emphasizes the importance of family and progeny.

In this study, a qualitative research methodology approach is employed to understand the childfree phenomenon in the context of the teachings of the Quran. This method involves a comprehensive analysis of the texts of the Quran and their interpretations in the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," both of which are the primary focus of the study. The research material includes Quranic verses directly or indirectly related to the concept of childfree and their interpretations in the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin." Furthermore, this research also entails an extensive literature review, including journals, articles, and books relevant to the theme of childfree, Quranic interpretation, and the socio-cultural context in Malaysia. The data collection and analysis processes aim to obtain a comprehensive understanding of Islamic views and interpretations of childfree, particularly through the lens of the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin" and its application in the Malaysian context. This research is enriched with qualitative data obtained from interviews with five Malaysian individuals, providing additional insights into personal perceptions and experiences related to childfree. This approach allows the research to uncover various aspects and nuances of the childfree phenomenon, integrating theological, social, and cultural perspectives into its analysis.

Results and Discussion

1. Fenomena Childfree di Malaysia

Respondent	Childfree Reasons
Ai (31)	Freedom from parental responsibilities
Yh (25)	Economic factors, cost of living, and financial aspects
Tr (29)	Focus on oneself and mental health
Ry (24)	Spirit of individualism and freedom
Yo (24)	Mental health challenges and concerns about harm to children

The research results indicate that the decision to adopt a childfree lifestyle in Malaysia is influenced by various complex factors, involving social, cultural, and religious dynamics. The societal perception of cultural norms

plays a key role in shaping individual choices regarding this decision. Some respondents, like Ai (31 years old), present a unique perspective with humor, depicting the freedom they enjoy from taking care of other people's children without the full responsibilities of parenthood.

Yh (25 years old) highlights economic factors as one of the primary reasons for choosing a childfree lifestyle. Concerns about the cost of living and the financial responsibilities associated with raising children are central points in her considerations. This reflects the complexity of social dynamics influencing childfree decisions in Malaysia, where social constructs and societal issues become crucial factors affecting individuals' perceptions of parental roles. Awareness of significant financial implications also highlights that the decision not to have children often involves deep considerations of economic stability and meeting living needs.

Tr (29 years old), a newlywed, underscores the importance of self-focus as a determining factor in her decision. With a background of ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) and commitment issues, Tracy prioritizes mental health as her primary concern in life's journey. The continuity of this consideration is evident in her expressed concerns about inheriting complex genetic factors. Thus, Tracy creates a narrative emphasizing the need for a balance between self-focus and responsibility for genetic factors that might influence her descendants.

Ry (24 years old) voices a strong view on personal freedom as her primary focus. Emphasizing her desire for independent living, Raya creates a narrative that reflects a strong sense of individualism in pursuing a childfree lifestyle. A concrete example of this perspective is her determination to maintain a focus on self-development without being encumbered by parental responsibilities. Therefore, Raya's viewpoint not only becomes a depiction of her personal preferences but also mirrors the spirit of freedom as the primary driving force behind her childfree decision.

Yo (24 years old) from Perak chose to live a childfree life due to challenges related to mental health issues. Her decision emerged because Yo found it difficult to handle the cries of a baby and had concerns about the potential for causing harm to the baby. Although this decision was based on acknowledging her limitations in caring for a child, full support and understanding from her immediate environment have not yet been fully

realized. These challenges create complex dynamics around Yo's childfree life decision, indicating a gap between personal choices and societal perceptions.

2. The Childfree Phenomenon in the Interpretation of "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin"

Within this commentary book, the author has identified several verses related to the concept of childfree or the choice not to have offspring within marriage. Some of the verses found by the author are as follows:

a. QS Al- Baqarah: 187

أُحِلَّ لَكُمْ لَيْلَةَ الصِّيَامِ الرَّفَثُ إِلَىٰ نِسَائِكُمْ ۚ هُنَّ لِبَاسٌ لَكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لِبَاسٌ لَهُنَّ ۗ عَلِمَ اللَّهُ أَنَّكُمْ كُنْتُمْ تَخْتَانُونَ أَنْفُسَكُمْ فَتَابَ عَلَيْكُمْ وَعَفَا عَنْكُمْ ۖ فَالْآنَ بَاشِرُوهُنَّ وَابْتَغُوا مَا كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ ۚ وَكُلُوا وَاشْرَبُوا حَتَّىٰ يَتَبَيَّنَ لَكُمُ الْخَيْطُ الْأَبْيَضُ مِنَ الْخَيْطِ الْأَسْوَدِ مِنَ الْفَجْرِ ۖ ثُمَّ أَتِمُّوا الصِّيَامَ إِلَى اللَّيْلِ ۚ وَلَا تُبَاشِرُوهُنَّ وَأَنْتُمْ عَاكِفُونَ فِي الْمَسَاجِدِ ۗ تِلْكَ حُدُودُ اللَّهِ فَلَا تَقْرَبُوهَا كَذَٰلِكَ يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ آيَاتِهِ لِلنَّاسِ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَّقُونَ

> *It has been made permissible for you the night preceding fasting to go to your wives [for sexual relations]. They are clothing for you and you are clothing for them. Allah knows that you used to deceive yourselves, so He accepted your repentance and forgave you. So now, have relations with them and seek that which Allah has decreed for you. And eat and drink until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct to you from the black thread [of night]. Then complete the fast until the sunset. But do not have relations with them while you are staying in the mosques. These are the limits [set by] Allah, so do not approach them. Thus does Allah make clear His verses to the people that they might become righteous.*

In the context of the interpretation of this verse, as explained by the late Dato Yusuf Zakya in this book, the meaning of the part of the verse that mentions, "هُنَّ لِبَاسٌ لَكُمْ" (they are clothing for you), is elaborated upon. According to Dato Yusuf, this verse conveys the idea that the marital relationship should be very intimate, close, and affectionate. There is a natural and secret desire within both spouses to have a close physical relationship, which should not be separated and is always desired by one another. This desire is beautifully described by Allah, indicating a high and ideal level of intimacy in the relationship.

Dato Yusuf emphasizes that every civilized individual needs "clothing" in their life because clothing provides comfort, protection, pleasure, as well

as self-esteem. Similarly, in the husband-wife relationship, it is expected that they provide each other with comfort, protection, understanding, support, tranquility, as well as satisfaction both physically and emotionally. This creates a harmonious relationship, strengthens self-esteem, and enhances happiness in marriage. Thus, the concept suggested by Allah is a concept of unity in diversity, where husband and wife become one entity within marriage.[11]

The natural inclination for married couples is to learn to respect and understand each other's roles. It's not just about providing for each other's material needs but also fulfilling emotional and spiritual needs. Moreover, it's emphasized in this surah that marital relations are not merely a physical act but have a purpose. In the book "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," it is stated in the interpretation of the verse (فَالْآنَ بَاشِرُوهُنَّ وَابْتَغُوا مَا كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ) that you are allowed to do what was previously forbidden because it has been made lawful. However, it should be done with good intentions, specifically with the intention of having offspring through the act of sexual relations. This indicates that the relationship is not merely about satisfying desires but should aim at achieving the highest purpose of marriage, which is to procreate and continue the lineage. It demonstrates that it's not just about fulfilling physical desires but also aligning them with the divine purpose (the command of Allah) and connecting both aspects

It is important to note that in the context of the interpretation of this verse, there is a strong emphasis on the purpose of marriage, which is to continue the lineage or procreate. This signifies that, in the religious perspective, marriage is not merely a physical act but also possesses a deeper spiritual dimension. This verse underscores the significance of having good intentions in the marital relationship, specifically with the noble aim of bearing offspring who will become the successors of generations. In the view of Islam, marriage constitutes a sacred bond with a higher purpose than merely satisfying individual desires. This leads us to the understanding that rejecting the idea of having children within marriage may be considered incompatible with the religious principles that delineate a loftier purpose for marriage itself.

[11] Abdul Hayie Sukor, *Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin* (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication, 2010), 256.

b. QS Al-Imran 14

زُيِّنَ لِلنَّاسِ حُبُّ الشَّهَوَاتِ مِنَ النِّسَاءِ وَالْبَنِينَ وَالْقَنَاطِيرِ الْمُقَنْطَرَةِ مِنَ الذَّهَبِ وَالْفِضَّةِ وَالْخَيْلِ الْمُسَوَّمَةِ وَالْأَنْعَامِ وَالْحَرْثِ ۗ ذَٰلِكَ مَتَاعُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا ۖ وَاللَّهُ عِنْدَهُ حُسْنُ الْمَآبِ

> *Made attractive to people is the love of desires, including women, children, heaps of gold and silver, fine branded horses, cattle, and tilled land. That is the enjoyment of worldly life, but Allah has with Him the best return (i.e., Paradise).*

In Surah Al-Imran, verse 14, an explanation is provided regarding what is considered attractive to human beings. This verse mentions several elements, including women, children, wealth in the form of gold and silver, chosen horses, livestock, and farmland, as objects of human desire. According to A. H. Sukor,[12] the mention of women at the beginning of this verse refers to the psychological view that behind the success of every man is a woman who provides support. This concept emphasizes the importance of women, especially in the context of family and lineage. However, in the context of the verse, it signifies that these elements are worldly provisions that should be enjoyed appropriately and not excessively, as a means to achieve higher purposes in life, namely goodness in the sight of Allah.

In the context of family life, the desire to have children is often considered a fundamental aspect. According to the perspective of fitrah, both men and women tend to have a deep-seated desire to have offspring. This is partly based on the understanding that children are a manifestation of the love between husband and wife. Psychologically and sociologically, love for children and the desire to have them can be seen as a natural human trait. Children are often viewed as a source of affection, hope, and the continuation of a parent's legacy and deeds after their passing. This perspective also finds support in Islamic teachings, where the prophets, including Prophet Ibrahim (AS), are described in the Quran as supplicating to Allah SWT to be granted righteous offspring, as exemplified in Surah As-Saffat verse 100: "O my Lord, grant me [a child] from among the righteous".[13] This emphasizes that in Islam, having offspring is not only seen as the continuation of generations but also as a means to preserve and continue religious practices and values. Thus, the

[12] *Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin Juzuj 3 Dan 4* (Jakim, 2011), 304.
[13] Sukor, *Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin*.

desire to have righteous children can be interpreted as part of the sunnatullah (natural order) in life.

In the religious context, particularly in Islam, the concept of having children and continuing the lineage plays a crucial role. This is based on the understanding that children not only represent the continuation of the lineage but also play an essential role in maintaining and continuing religious practices after their parents' passing. This concept is rooted in Islamic teachings, which emphasize the importance of offspring as one of the primary purposes of marriage. For example, the desire of the prophets, including Prophet Ibrahim (AS), to be granted righteous offspring, as described in the Quran, illustrates the significant value placed on having righteous children. This indicates that in Islam, supplicating for righteous offspring is considered a natural part of life and religious practice.

From this perspective, the practice of 'childfree' by choice—the decision not to have children—can be interpreted as conflicting with the principles taught in Islam. Quranic verses that refer to the importance of offspring in the context of family and society indicate that having and raising children is considered an integral part of a life based on Islamic teachings. In this context, the rejection of the concept of offspring, whether voluntarily or as part of a larger movement, can be seen as inconsistent with the values and practices recommended in Islam. Therefore, Islam's view of the importance of offspring and their role in the continuation of worship and religious traditions suggests that the 'childfree' practice is not in line with these religious teachings.

3. Childfree Lifestyle in Malaysia: Factors, Conflicts with Islamic Principles, and Societal Implications

In the context of Malaysia, the phenomenon of childfree living reflects the diversity of factors influencing individuals' choices in this lifestyle, primarily driven by social, economic, and mental health dynamics. Respondents such as Ai (31 years old) prioritize freedom from parental responsibilities, while Yh (25 years old) focuses on economic factors such as the cost of living and financial considerations. Tr (29 years old), with a background of ADHD and commitment issues, emphasizes mental health as their primary reason. Ry (24 years old) highlights individualism and freedom as determining factors, and Yo (24 years old) has made the childfree decision due to mental health challenges and potential concerns in caring for children. The results of this research reveal that the decision to live childfree in Malaysia is not only the

result of personal choices but also closely related to broader social issues, reflecting the complexity of social and cultural dynamics influencing this lifestyle choice.

Research on the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia indicates a conflict between this lifestyle choice and Islamic principles. Based on "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," verses like QS Al-Baqarah: 187 in Islam emphasize the importance of noble intentions in marriage, including the goal of bearing offspring as the successors of generations. This perspective views marriage as a sacred bond with a purpose beyond individual satisfaction but for the formation of a family and the continuation of generations. Furthermore, Al-Imran 14 underscores the importance of offspring in family life, where children are regarded as manifestations of love, affection, hope, and the continuation of parents' deeds. Support for having righteous offspring, as expressed by the prophets in the Quran, reaffirms the view that in Islam, offspring is an essential part of preserving and continuing worship practices and religious values. Therefore, the decision not to have children, as chosen by some individuals in Malaysia, can be interpreted as a deviation from Islamic teachings that emphasize the importance of offspring in the context of marriage and family life.

The results of this study indicate that the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia, influenced by various factors such as individual preferences, economic conditions, and mental health, raises important questions about the interaction between personal lifestyle choices and the dominant cultural and religious values in society. Rejection of the childfree practice based on Islamic principles, as described in the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," highlights the tension between individual choices and societal or religious expectations. The implications of these findings reflect the complex dynamics within Malaysian society, where lifestyle choices like childfree may be seen as deviating from prevailing social and religious norms. These findings also underscore the significant role of religion in shaping family and reproductive norms, as elucidated by Hamid[14] in their research on the influence of religion on reproductive behavior. Therefore, the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia is not merely a matter of personal choice but also raises broader questions

[14] "Influence of Religion on Healthcare Professionals' Beliefs toward Teenage Sexual Practices in Malaysia," *Makara Journal of Health Research* 24, no. 1 (2020): 27–34, https://doi.org/10.7454/msk.v24i1.1175.

about how social and religious norms influence individual decisions in a larger context.

The findings of this study, which explore the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia and its conflict with Islamic principles, can be compared to similar research in other contexts. Many other studies highlight that the decision to remain childfree is often influenced by economic and personal factors. From an economic perspective, Jafar [15] found that factors such as financial stability and the cost of raising children are the primary reasons for couples to choose the childfree lifestyle, with 42% of respondents in one study citing economics as the most significant influence on their decision. Additionally, personal factors like the desire for freedom, independence, and the ability to manage one's own time also contribute to the decision not to have children.[16] Individuals who choose the childfree lifestyle value their ability to make important and independent life choices.[17]

In a social context, the childfree trend can impact community social life. Some informants expressed concerns about the impact of the childfree phenomenon on the social life of the Muslim community.[18] However, on the other hand, some studies noted that younger generations tend to be more open to individuals who choose the childfree lifestyle.[19] Overall, the decision to be childfree is influenced by a combination of economic and personal factors and has significant social implications.

Similar research in Western countries has shown that the decision to be childfree is more influenced by personal and professional considerations, with social and economic aspects also playing a significant role. Studies conducted by Settle and Brumley,[20] for example, indicate that in many

[15] "The Childfree Phenomenon Based on Islamic Law and Its Respond on Muslim Society," *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 8, no. 2 (2023): 389–406, https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v8i2.-7865.

[16] Höglund and Hildingsson, "Why and When Choosing Child-Free Life in Sweden? Reasons, Influencing Factors and Personal and Societal Factors: Individual Interviews during 2020–2021."

[17] Höglund and Hildingsson.

[18] Jafar et al., "The Childfree Phenomenon Based on Islamic Law and Its Respond on Muslim Society."

[19] Höglund and Hildingsson, "Why and When Choosing Child-Free Life in Sweden? Reasons, Influencing Factors and Personal and Societal Factors: Individual Interviews during 2020–2021."

[20] "'It's the Choices You Make That Get You There': Decision-Making Pathways of Childfree Women," *Michigan Family Review* 18, no. 1 (December 2014): 1, https://doi.org/-

Western countries, the decision to be childfree is often more related to an individual's desire to pursue a career or personal hobbies or concerns about the environmental impact of population growth. Economic factors such as the cost of living and financial stability are still important, but the desire for personal freedom and autonomy often takes a more dominant position in the decision-making process.[21] Thus, the findings of this study highlight unique cultural and religious differences in the Malaysian context, where factors such as religious norms and family responsibilities have a greater influence than in Western societies. In Malaysia, considerations related to religious values and family expectations often play a more determining role in decisions regarding having children, in contrast to the trends observed in the West, where personal and professional reasons more frequently become the primary factors in choosing the childfree lifestyle.

This background underlies the views expressed in the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin," which rejects the practice of childfree. This interpretation, delving into the principles of Islam, emphasizes family and reproductive values as essential aspects of religious life. In the context of Malaysia, where Islam plays a significant role in social and cultural life, these religious norms become more dominant in influencing individual attitudes and decisions. This interpretation interprets the verses of the Qur'an in a way that emphasizes the importance of procreation in marriage as an expression of family responsibility and commitment to religious values. This is different from the more common view in Western countries, where personal and professional considerations more often dominate the decision not to have children. Therefore, the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin" rejects the childfree trend by referring to the fundamental religious values that emphasize the role of procreation in marriage, reflecting significant differences in cultural and religious influence between Malaysian society and the West.

The implications of the research findings that show the rejection of the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin" towards the childfree practice in Malaysia provide valuable insights into the continuing role of religious values as guidance in the contemporary world. Despite global trends leaning towards individualism and personal choice, as seen in the acceptance of the childfree lifestyle, this rejection indicates that religious principles still have a strong

10.3998/mfr.4919087.0018.102.

[21] Settle and Brumley.

influence, especially in a society that highly values its religious teachings and traditions. As explained by Pearce,[22] religion often serves as an anchor that provides stability and direction amidst rapid social change. In this case, the "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin" illustrates how the teachings of Islam can be seen as a foundational pillar offering moral and ethical guidance in addressing modern dilemmas. This attachment to traditional values suggests that, despite shifts in social norms and lifestyle choices, religious values remain relevant and necessary to provide perspectives and guidance in an ever-changing world.

This research highlights the strong influence of religious and cultural values in Malaysian society. Islam, in this context, is not only a spiritual belief system but also serves as a deep-rooted social and moral framework. Hossain[23] in his study emphasizes the significant role of tradition and religious values in child-rearing in multi-ethnic Malaysia. In contemporary Malaysian families, family values and religious beliefs, including traditional Islamic principles, Confucian teachings, and Hindu wisdom, continue to form the primary foundation for successful and moral child-rearing. These factors, including a commitment to tradition and family responsibilities, play a crucial role in influencing attitudes towards phenomena such as childfree. Therefore, the research findings indicate adherence to religious doctrine and the enduring influence of values and social norms deeply rooted in Malaysian society.

Considering the research findings that highlight the rejection of the childfree practice in the context of Malaysia and the significant role of religion in family life, the actions to be taken involve an inclusive approach and dialogue between religious values and the needs of contemporary society. Firstly, there is a need to raise awareness and understanding of how religious values can be synchronized with the challenges and social realities of modern times, especially in the context of family and reproductive decisions. This can be achieved through educational programs that integrate religious understanding with awareness of diverse lifestyle choices. Secondly, religious

[22] *A Faith of Their Own: Stability and Change in the Religiosity of America's Adolescents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753895.001.0001.

[23] "Parental Beliefs and Fathers' and Mothers' Roles in Malaysian Families," in *Science Across Cultures: The History of Non-Western Science*, ed. Helaine Selin (London: Springer, 2014), 77–90, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7503-9_7.

institutions and community leaders need to engage in open dialogues with community members to discuss how religious principles can be adapted or interpreted in the context of modern life without compromising their core values. Finally, further research that explores the relationship between religion, lifestyle choices, and family dynamics in Malaysia would greatly assist in formulating more responsive and inclusive policies and practices. This approach will enable Malaysian society to strike a balance between preserving tradition and adapting to changing times, ensuring that religious values remain relevant and beneficial in guiding family life in the modern era.

Conclusion

The main conclusion of this research highlights that the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia, influenced by factors such as individual freedom, economic conditions, and individualism, is in contradiction with the interpretation of the teachings of the Quran as per "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin." In the context of Islam, as explained in this tafsir, having offspring and continuing the generation are considered primary objectives and crucial elements in marriage. Verses such as QS Al-Baqarah: 187 and Al-Imran 14 in the tafsir emphasize the importance of the husband-wife relationship, which aims not only to satisfy desires but also to produce righteous offspring. These findings underscore the incongruity between the values and practices advocated in Islam and the concept of childfree. It highlights the significance of the role of offspring in the context of family life and religion, especially in Malaysia, where Islam holds significant influence. Thus, the childfree phenomenon can be seen as a deviation from the principles of religion in the context of Muslim society.

The scholarly contribution of this research lies in the in-depth exploration of the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia within the context of the interpretation of Islamic teachings, particularly through the study of "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin." This research offers a unique perspective by combining contemporary social analysis and religious interpretation, highlighting how religious and cultural norms interact and conflict with modern social trends. Its scholarly contribution primarily lies in providing new insights into how the Islamic perspective, as interpreted in traditional tafsir, influences and shapes attitudes toward lifestyle choices such as childfree. This research also fills a knowledge gap by providing insights into the complex social, economic, and religious dynamics in Malaysian society, which can influence policies and

practices in the fields of reproductive health, education, and family counseling. Furthermore, this research contributes to academic discussions about the interaction between religion, culture, and reproductive decisions in ethnically and religiously diverse societies, offering valuable insights for similar studies in other contexts.

One of the main limitations of this research is its limited focus on the interpretation of Islamic teachings in the context of "Tafsir Pedoman Muttaqin" related to the childfree phenomenon in Malaysia, which may not fully reflect the diversity of views in the broader Muslim community. This research also relies on the analysis of religious texts and respondent surveys, which may not fully capture the complexity of individual experiences and motivations behind the childfree lifestyle choice. For future research, it is recommended to involve broader qualitative studies, such as in-depth interviews or focus groups, to gain a deeper understanding of personal perceptions and individual experiences related to childfree. Additionally, it would be beneficial to explore how other interpretations of religion or Islamic denominations differ in their views on this phenomenon in Malaysian society. Research comparing attitudes toward childfree among various religious groups in Malaysia can also provide insights into how overall religious and cultural factors influence family and reproductive decisions. This approach can assist in formulating more inclusive and culturally sensitive policies and programs.

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The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Teaching Islam in American Universities

Mohamed Mosaad Abdelaziz Mohamed
Northern Arizona University, United States
e-mail: mosaad65@gmail.com

Abstrak

Signifikansi Ikhwanul Muslimin dalam dunia akademis Amerika terletak pada artikulasi akademis dari wacana Ikhwanul Muslimin sebagai ekspresi Islam modern secara umum. Dengan demikian, wacana kelompok politik tertentu diambil sebagai contoh yang tepat dari Islam arus utama modern. Perlakuan terhadap wacana Ikhwanul Muslimin ini menghasilkan asumsi bahwa Islam, atau setidaknya Islam modern, pada dasarnya bersifat politis. Oleh karena itu, tidak mengherankan jika kita dapat dengan mudah menemukan mata kuliah yang mengajarkan "Islam dan Politik", atau "Islam dan Demokrasi", yang tidak ada padanannya dalam mata kuliah yang diajarkan pada agama-agama lain. Apa yang menciptakan distorsi ini bukanlah semata-mata sifat politis Ikhwanul Muslimin sebagai sebuah organisasi. Melainkan pendefinisian ulang Islam sebagaimana yang telah disajikan oleh wacana para Ikhwan sejak pendiriannya. Di sana, Islam disajikan sebagai struktur yang berbeda yang mencerminkan struktur yang berbeda dari negara sekuler. Islam disajikan sebagai sistem modern yang komprehensif yang mencakup sejumlah sistem yang saling melengkapi: politik, ekonomi, sosial, pendidikan, kesehatan, dan sebagainya yang bekerja secara harmonis, dipandu oleh prinsip rasional maṣlaḥah, kepentingan umum. Wacana tentang para Ikhwan mendefinisikan objek studi bagi akademisi Amerika dan menetapkan agenda penelitiannya. Penyajian Islam secara berlebihan ini tidak hanya mempolitisasi Islam, tetapi juga meminggirkan sejumlah besar struktur dan konsep tradisional yang signifikan, serta beberapa tanggapan modern yang tidak termasuk dalam wacana Ikhwanul Muslimin. Politisasi Islam yang berlebihan dan penyajian Islam sebagai Islamisme telah menjadi bukan hanya masalah misrepresentasi media, tetapi juga krisis dalam kualitas pengetahuan tentang Islam yang diproduksi dan dipupuk di dunia akademis. Selain itu, situasi ini mengembangkan dua kesarjanaan yang tidak menguntungkan tentang Islam modern di dunia akademis Barat yang semakin mendistorsi dan menghalangi pengetahuan kita tentang Islam: yang satu bersifat minor dan Islamofobia, yang lain bersifat mayor dan Islamofilik. Pendekatan Islamofobia melihat Islam sebagai sesuatu yang secara inheren bertentangan dengan struktur modern seperti masyarakat sipil, demokrasi, keragaman budaya, dan pasar bebas. Pendekatan Islamofobia menggambarkan Islamisme - yang dilihat sebagai bentuk normatif dari Islam

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modern, yang dianut oleh masyarakat Muslim, sebagai gerakan protes pribumi yang sah dan populer terhadap rezim-rezim non-demokratis. Eksplorasi terhadap John Esposito, yang kesarjanaannya telah menentukan corak Islam di dunia akademis selama beberapa dekade, dan buku-bukunya telah diadopsi secara luas dalam mata kuliah yang diajarkan di berbagai universitas di Amerika, akan membuktikan argumen saya.

***Kata Kunci**: Ikhwanul Muslimin; Wacana akademis; Islam Modern; Overpolitisasi; Islamofobia.*

Abstract

The significance of the Muslim Brotherhood in American academia lies in the academic articulation of the brothers' discourse as the expression of modern Islam in general. As such, the discourse of a specific political group is taken as the appropriate example of modern mainstream Islam. This treatment of the brothers' discourse has resulted in an assumption that Islam, or at least modern Islam, is essentially political. It is not surprising, therefore, that one can easily find courses that teach "Islam and Politics," or "Islam and Democracy," which have no parallel in courses taught on other religions. What creates this distortion is not the mere political nature of the Brothers as an organization. It is the redefinition of Islam as has been presented by the brothers' discourse since its foundation. There, Islam is presented as a differentiated structure that mirrors the differentiated structure of the secular state. Islam is presented as a comprehensive modern system that includes a number of complementary systems: political, economic, social, educational, health, etc. that work in harmony, guided by the rational principle of maṣlaḥah, public interest. The discourse of the Brothers defined the object of studies for American academia and set its research agenda. Not only has this presentation of Islam over politicized it, but it marginalized a plethora of significant traditional structures and concepts, as well as several modern responses that are not included in the brothers' discourse. The overpoliticization of Islam and presenting it as necessarily Islamism has become not just a problem of media misrepresentation, but a crisis in the quality of knowledge about Islam that is produced and nurtured in academia. Moreover, this situation developed two unfortunate scholarships on modern Islam in Western academia that further distorted and blocked our knowledge on Islam: one is minor and Islamophobic, the other is major and Islamophilic. The Islamophobic approach sees Islam as inherently opposed to the modern structures of civil society, democracy, cultural diversity, and free market. The Islamophilic approach portrays Islamism—seen as the normative form of modern Islam, which is embraced by Muslim societies, as legitimate and popular native protest movement against non-democratic regimes. An exploration of John Esposito, whose scholarship has set the tone on Islam in academia for decades, and whose books have been widely adopted in courses taught in American universities will prove my argument.

***Keywords:** Muslim Brotherhood; Academic discourse; Modern Islam; Overpoliticization; Islamophobia.*

Introduction

Interestingly, Islam had no space in the American Academy of Religion, AAR, until the 1970s. The field of Islamic Studies had been defined and hosted mainly by the American Oriental Society. A new generation of scholars, who received their doctorates around or shortly after this time, for instance, Vincent Cornell, Richard C. Martin, Bruce Lawrence, William Graham, Marilyn Waldman, and Andrew Rippin, were concerned that the limited scope of Oriental Studies would not accommodate their academic projects and aspirations and tried to find a space in the AAR. It was a more senior scholar, Ismāʿīl al-Fārūqī, with an academic background in philosophy rather than religion, however, who led these efforts. In the 1970s, Fārūqī's career was shifting from Arabism to Islamism as his newly acquired commitment to Islam was shaped out through his intensive engagement with the Muslim Students Association, MSA—an organization that was founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood Group in the U.S.[1] It is worth noted that Fārūqī, in addition to presiding over the MSA, could cofound the Association of Muslim Social Scientists, AMSS, the Islamic Society of North America, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, IIIT. Fārūqī succeeded eventually in creating a *Group* for Islamic Studies within the AAR before his resignation in 1983. Fārūqī's participation at the AAR was described as exercising "such strong control of the major AAR program unit devoted to Islamic studies for his own ideological purposes."[2] Only in 1986, the AAR established a full *Section* to Islamic studies.

Two important events changed the academic course of Islamic studies in the U.S.: the publishing of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1979, and the Iranian Revolution in 1980.[3] Said's book was either the cause, or only the announcement of the collapse of the field of Oriental studies that followed its publication. Richard Martin wrote that "By the end of the first decade of the present century, Orientalism in substance and practice has all but disappeared."[4] Said's attack certainly removed a significant obstacle that stood against the new generation, who wanted to invite social sciences into the study of Islam, and paved the way for them to reshape Islamic studies in the U.S. The Iranian Revolution in 1980 supported this academic shift, thanks

[1] Steven Merley, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United States* (Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2009), 5–9.
[2] R. C. Martin, "Islamic Studies in the American Academy: A Personal Reflection," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 78, no. 4 (December 2010): 901, https://doi.org/10.-1093/jaarel/lfq089.
[3] Martin, "Islamic Studies in the American Academy: A Personal Reflection."
[4] Martin.

to the sudden and intense media interest in understanding Islam. The media was constantly interested in socio-cultural, and politico-economic interpretations of Islam that help their audience understand the dramatic events in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Needless to mention here the 1970s rise of religious nationalism around the world, and its echoes in the Islamic World in the form of a plethora of Islamic Movements that turned to political activism to assert its agenda. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the emergence of Hezbollah in 1985 further emphasized the political framing of Islam. Nothing however is compared—in effect on the image of Islam in the media and studying Islam in academia, to the tragic event of September eleventh. In his study, "Islamic Studies in US Universities," Kurzman and Ernst wrote that "especially since 9/11, scholarly interest in Islamic studies has mushroomed. … As a percentage of all dissertations in the ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Database, Islamic studies themes grew from less than one percent prior to the late 1970s to three percent in the 1980s and 1990s, to over four percent since 2001."[5]

With the collapse of Orientalism, this academic demand was accommodated mainly, not in religious studies departments, but in departments of area studies, which restressed, once again, the politico-economic, and socio-cultural framing of Islam. Kurzman and Ernst wrote that "The scholars who led the Middle East studies were hostile to Orientalist modes of inquiry, which they saw as antiquarian and unsuited to contemporary policy-relevant research."[6] Richard Martin in *Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies*, Rashid Khalidi in "Is There a Future for Middle Eastern Studies," and Marcia Hermansen in "The Academic Study of Sufism in American Universities" criticized this shift. Hermansen wrote, "area studies programs have been criticized for training specialists who speak to a narrow range of issues and, as a result, cannot engage in the broader theoretical debates and employ the cross-disciplinary methodologies that would make their work accessible and relevant to a broad range of scholars."[7] In fact, one can easily observe a number of challenges and awkwardness in studying Islam in area studies programs, as Kurzman and Ernst explained in their

[5] Charles Kurzman and Carl W. Ernst, "Islamic Studies in U.S. Universities," *Review of Middle East Studies* 46, no. 1 (March 2012): 24, https://doi.org/10.1017/S2151348100002974.
[6] Kurzman and Ernst, "Islamic Studies in U.S. Universities."
[7] Marcia Hermansen, "The Academic Study of Sufism at American Universities," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 24, no. 3 (April 2007): 25, https://doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v24-i3.423.

study. For instance, an Islamicist will have to focus only on Islam in a specific region, ignoring his interest in studying cross-regional themes. Scholars from a variety of disciplines find themselves constrained within, say, Middle East case studies. Even in a limited region, there would be more interest in studying violence than other phenomena. The interests of book publishers and funding agencies leave only a narrow space for scholars of Islam to negotiate their own academic interests and projects.[8]

Results and Discussion

1. Academic Interests and Political Support—Or the Other Way Around?

The interest in Islamic studies in the U.S. has in fact another story. Perhaps no one told this story better than Zachary Lockman in his two books, *Contending Visions in the Middle East*, and *Field Notes*. Lockman grounds the "rise of area studies," neither in an academic discussion around the value of Orientalism, nor in a number of political events, such as the Iranian Revolution. He explains how area studies rose because of the rise of the U.S. global role after the second World War, and the need of policy makers, strategists, the military, and the security institutions to have accurate and enough information on several areas in the world. Lockman explains the funding of Middle East studies by a number of organizations, such as Ford Foundation, Carnegie Foundation and RAND, as well as the direct Federal funding after the National Defense Education Act, which the Congress passed in 1958.[9] Lockman writes that "there were substantial number of academics who were willing, indeed eager, to put their skills to use in even more direct ways, accepting (even soliciting) open or secret funding from the military or intelligence agencies to conduct research that had a clear bearing on US policy in the Third World."[10] After years of receiving funds from Ford Foundation, the Middle East Studies Association, MESA, found it unacceptable to receive funds from military or intelligence entities to conduct research on the Middle East. It also criticized the National Security Education Program that was created by the National Security Education Act of 1991.[11] Lockman explains how the CIA was persistent in pursuing the MESA to work on its project by offering funds through the Agency for International Development, AID, which

[8] Kurzman and Ernst, "Islamic Studies in U.S. Universities."
[9] Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 122–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606786.
[10] Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*.
[11] Lockman.

Lockman describes as an arm of the Department of State that is frequently used by the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA.[12]

This background is important in the context of this paper because it explains the *definition* of Islam in the context of American academia—Islam as a political construct that invites security concerns. Lockman wrote that Middle East scholars, who strove to make their academic work policy-relevant, legitimized, rather than created, policies.[13] There is a striking example that Lockman invites to his narrative: Bernard Lewis. Lewis' example is striking because it brings us right to the Muslim Brotherhood. Bernard Lewis was invited after September eleventh to the White House to meet with the President, the Vice President, and members of the Defense Department's key Defense Policy Board. Lewis offered his understanding of the region and supported the decision to invade Iraq and turning it into a model of democracy for the Arab and Muslim Worlds. Lewis had published his book, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, which was considered by the administration and large sectors of the public as key in understanding Muslims. Bernard Lewis' understanding, and we can add many other scholars, for instance, Fouad Ajami, is an understanding of Islam that was celebrated by Bush's administration and supported U.S. policies in the Middle East. This understanding matches, concept by concept, argument by argument, and statement by statement the understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood Group of "Islam."

2. The Brothers' Islam

In 1928, Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) founded the Muslim Brotherhood Group in Egypt. Against the conventional wisdom among those who researched the Brothers, I argue that al-Bannā did not produce any original thought. Al-Bannā had two other achievements: first, weaving statements and pieces of knowledge that were popular in his time, but especially from ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Jāwīš (1876-1929), and weaving them into a coherent ideology, and second, organizing Muslim activists into a hierarchical organization. For the purpose of this article, the ideology of al-Bannā can be summarized in three principles. First, Muslims need to *return* o Islam. This principle could be observed in a very early article that he published in *al-Fatḥ* in 1928. In this article, al-Bannā focused on two concepts: *al-daʿwah* and *al-hijrah*. *Al-daʿwah* refers to a missionary work, activists should launch to call Muslims back to the folds of Islam. *Al-hijrah* literally means migration, and it refers to the act

[12] Zachary Lockman, *Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 194.
[13] Lockman, *Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States*.

of leaving an older, non-Islamic lifestyle and moving to a new way of life that is regulated by Islam. These two concepts assume a reality that is non-Islamic, and should be deserted for a new Islamic reality that needs to be recreated.

The second principle defines the political society, to which Muslims should belong. Regardless of their birthplace, all Muslims belong to one political community that is *al-ummah*. Here, as al-Bannā states, Islam is *waṭan wa jinsiyyah*, or a homeland and a citizenship. *Al-ummah* precedes the Caliphate, for the latter is only the political framework of governance, not the governed nation itself. *Al-ummah* provides Muslims with their political identity, and requires in return their loyalty. Al-Bannā emphasizes the need to have unity among all Muslims, unity that stands against their non-Islamic, national divisions.

The third principle is *šumūl*, which refers to the inclusiveness of Šarīʿah to all human activities. Al-Bannā explains repeatedly that all fields of activity, be they political, economic, social, cultural, athletic, spiritual, scientific, educational, entertainment, etc. should be regulated and organized by Islam. Islam is presented as *niẓām šāmil*, a comprehensive, or an inclusive system. He frequently uses *Islāmī* or *Islāmiyyah* as a character that distinguishes its objects, be they an economic system or *al-daʿwah* from other systems, movements, lifestyles and traditions that are not Islamic.

The Borthers' Islam has certainly never been the only type of Islam available for researchers. A plethora of traditions, practices, organizations, legislations, identities, etc. have emerged as a response to Muslims' encounter of modernit*ies*. Others were continuities of pre modern traditions. The question is why was this specific Islam of the Brothers that was extensively researched in American academia? How could the Brothers be that influential within academic discourses in the U.S.? How could a specific discourse of Islam, in the context of American academia, become the presentation of "Islam" as a whole, or at least the presentation of mainstream modern Islam? My short answer to this intriguing question is that the Brothers offered a discourse of Islam that, first, could match the interests of the American political and security institutions, and second, could fit perfectly within the established, and definitely limited, theoretical approaches in American academia.

In their discourse, the Brothers presented Islam as inherently political, and culturally opposed to the "West." This presentation matches the American political approaches to countries as different as Morocco and

Pakistan, or Iraq and Afghanistan. It provides the strategists and policymakers with an easy frame to deal with a complicated reality. In the previous section, I pointed out to Bernard Lewis' visit with the President, and to his ideas and writings. Lewis explains the growth of Islamist ideologies as a "return to Islam," which al-Bannā used in the form of *hijrah* almost a century ago. In fact, Fārūqī too, an advocate of Islam, matches the ideas of Lewis. Ghamari-Tabrizi wrote, "Adopting the allegory of the Prophet's migration or *hijra*, al-Faruqi constructed a fantastic notion of the *ummah* and a normative *homo islamicus* subject."[14] No matter what citizenship, culture or language a certain Muslim has, s/he has already been programmed, in his return to Islam, to think and act in a specific way, as a member of a global *ummah*. [15]

Lewis describes Islam as "independent, different , and autonomous religious phenomenon." He describes Muslims as an entire civilization that has religion as its primary loyalty. Like al-Bannā, Lewis emphasizes that in Islam religion and the state are twined together. This is why, Lewis argues, Muslims "found an outlet in programs and organizations of a different kind—led by religious leaders and formulated in religious language and aspiration." The perfect example Lewis gives for "Muslims" is no one but the Muslim Brotherhood Group. While other religions are limited in their scope, Lewis write, "Islam is not conceived as a religion in the limited Western sense but as a community, a loyalty, and a way of life." If al-Bannā writes that Islam is *manhaj ḥayāh*, Lewis echoes it by writing that Islam is a way of life—a literal translation of the Brothers' ideology offered as an academic work on Islam that is helpful and useful to American policymakers. A continuous theme in Lewis' work is the inherent incompatibility of Islam and modernity. Islam, removed from any historical context, makes a distinct civilization that has been and will always be antagonistic to Western secular modernity. Is this statement any radical next to al-Fārūqī's intellectual project of "Islamizing Knowledge"? Farūqī's *homo islamicus* emerges in Lewis' writings as Muslims who behave *instinctively* seeking *ummah* solidarity as they respond to the challenges of modernity.[16]

3. Western Academic Approaches

With admitted generalization, we can observe a dominance of modernization theory in the post WWII era until roughly the mid 1970s, where Marxism

[14] Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, "Loving America and Longing for Home: Isma'il Al-Faruqi and the Emergence of the Muslim Diaspora in North America," *International Migration* 42, no. 2 (June 2004): 61, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-7985.2004.00281.x.
[15] Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East*.
[16] Lockman.

and conflict theory began to gain significance in American academia. The 1980s came with interest in postmodern and post-structuralist approaches that paid attention to culture, identity, and discourse, and frequently visited notions of diversity, plurality, consumerism, globalization, gender, and the new social role of media. These theoretical frameworks articulated Islam in Islamic studies, as far as social sciences, and area studies programs were concerned. The early approaches of modernization theory that saw religion as a relic from the traditional past, soon to disappear, were replaced by approaches—still modernization-centered, that investigated the challenges of religious *encounter* of modernity.[17] Richard Martin and Carl Ernst wrote that,

> Modernity has been defined as an intrinsic characteristic of the civilization and culture of Europe and the United States; put in somewhat different terms, modernity is seen as a direct product of the Enlightenment. A corollary of this perspective is the customary expectation that Muslim societies are by definition excluded from that modernity, despite their having been on the receiving end of the Enlightenment through widespread colonization beginning in the late eighteenth century.

This premise is indeed the corner stone in a majority of the American scholarship on Islam, especially within the area studies programs—Muslims' culture is in essential conflict with Western modernity.

If we quickly review the syllabi of Islamic studies taught in American universities, we easily find topics, such as: Islam and Modernity, Islam and Democracy, Islam and Politics, Islam and the West, Islam and Human Rights, Islam and Gender, etc. By no means I see these courses as insignificant; they are significant and contribute to our understanding of modern Islam. The trouble with these topics however is twofold. First, why do not we see similar courses in studying other religions, for instance, Buddhism? The answer to this question comes from the assumption that while Buddhism is *only* a religion, and therefore can fit smoothly within the structures of the modern world, Islam comes with its own traditions and structures, be they political, social, economic, or otherwise. This is why Islam is necessarily challenged by a modern world, which it finds incompatible. This answer is indeed provided twice: once by American academia, and once by Ḥasan al-Bannā. It is here, where the Brothers influence the study of Islam in American universities. It is here where Lewis, who is certainly not a fan of Islam, Esposito, who usually

[17] Hermansen, "The Academic Study of Sufism at American Universities."

figures as the advocate of Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood Group meet in this simplistic and shallow assumption about a complex tradition, such as Islam.

Second, the trouble with these courses is that the narrow vision of Islam, on which they are based, provides *the* perspective, the approach par excellence, of studying Islam. Muslims are studied as being constantly in a crisis, struggling their way through the modern structures of society and state. When researchers occasionally pay attention to other phenomena in Islam, for instance, Sufism, these phenomena are explained as archaic remnants of premodern Islam, as marginal phenomena, or, at best, as representatives of *local* Islam. Against these phenomena lies mainstream normative Islam that fights daily to negotiate the modern world and fit within its structures. Unlike their brothers and sisters, who belong to other religions, Muslims live a life characterized by its ongoing tension with their own tradition and culture. Here, Muslims have to make one of two choices: either be liberal, find new *interpretations* of Islam that are in harmony with the modern reality, or choose their traditions over modernity and automatically become fundamentalists.

I want to argue here that the question of modernity is not merely a cultural or civilizational question; it is necessarily a *political* question. It is necessarily political because modernity assumes a rupture with traditional structures, and their replacement with political, social, and economic structures that create the modern state, society, and economy. Al-Bannā understood this very well as he was turning Islamic reflections, and responses into a modern ideology and a political project. His Islam was certainly political because it reflected, contrasted, or translated modernity and its structures. Al-Bannā came up with an ideology of rupture, a political society, and a group of *differentiated* systems—claimed to be Islamic systems, that are built on the same modern structures of the modern nation-state: economic, political, social, cultural, spiritual, educational, entertainments, etc. How convenient are the Brothers, thus, to the American scholar, who comes with an agenda to investigate the challenges Muslims have with modernity! Al-Bannā offers this scholar with a rational and systematic *classification* of Islamic fields that perfectly matches not only the structures of the modern society, but the disciplines of Western academia as well. The serious problem here is the assumption that by studying a variety of fields-specific questions, we would be studying *Islam* in the modern world—not just Islam according to the worldview of the Brothers. The Brothers' Islam, one ideological version of Islamism, is being studied and presented as the normative mainstream

version of Islam, or at least of modern Islam. Even if you are not studying the Muslim Brotherhood Group, you are still using their worldview in classifying and studying other Islamic phenomena.

Cultural, economic, and political approaches were tried to study Islam. Culturally, researchers investigated such notions as identity or ideology. Economically, Marxian approaches were used to explain Islamic movements as a manifestation of class conflict and grievance because of maldistribution of wealth. Politically, social movement theories were frequently used to frame Muslims' activism. Again, all of these approaches contribute significantly to our scholarship of modern Islam. The problem, however, remains its reduction of Islam into modern Islam, and modern Islam into political Islam, and eventually the use of the Brothers' worldview as the perfect academic agenda to studying Islam. One may ask, should we expect every Muslim to walk around with an ideology of a sort? A sophisticated scholar, such as William Shepard seems to say yes, for he wrote an article, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," where he classifies Muslims into eight groups: radical secularism, Islamic modernism, accommodationist-neo traditionalism, rejectionist neo-traditionalism, accommodationist traditionalism, rejectionist traditionalism, moderate secularism, and radical Islamism. He spreads these groups on a graph that has two dimensions: vertical for modernity, and horizontal for Islamic totalism.[18] One may also ask, can a Marxian approach help us understand even some aspects of political Islam itself, such as the leadership of Bin Lādin or Ẓawāhirī, who came from wealthy and prestigious families? Another question that can be raised is the capacity of social movement theories to analyze all patterns of social contention in Muslims societies that unnecessarily produce social movements.

Once again, I want to repeat that the above Western approaches contribute significantly to our understanding of modern Islam. The problem with these approaches, again, is their limitations and narrow perspective. The academic agenda of Islamic studies in the U.S. is, by and large, built on the worldview of the Brothers—or their ideological opponents who look like a mirror image of the Brothers, and on the political interests of strategic and security institutions in the U.S. Missing there are traditions, practices, ideas, actions, groups, movements, as well as a variety of social, cultural and economic formations that escape the limited scope of the modernist academic

[18] William E. Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, no. 3 (August 1987): 307–36, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800056750.

agenda. An approach that promises more capacity, and one that has been used more frequently since the 1990s is the Foucauldian *discourse*. One will have to wonder again: how may we investigate *undiscoursed* phenomena in Muslims' societies? How may we present a majority of Muslims, who buy or sell commodities every day without embracing or discussing the Islamic economic system, who go to schools, study, and graduate without reflecting on the Islamic epistemology of knowledge, or who start families, and work hard to raise their kids and take care of their partners without repeating statements on the Islamic family and its role in building the Muslim society? What we truly observe in our Muslims societies today is an implosion of Islam, not its withdrawal, but it is an implosion that escapes the Brothers' structures, and the American academic approaches.[19]

4. The Binary Phobic/Philic Response

Scholars of Islamic studies have been busy giving presentations, speeches and responding to media questions to refute Islamophobia. Richard Martin wrote,

> Since September 11, 2001 especially, messages on the ISLAMAAR listserv give evidence of members spending many hours seeking help in trying to educate the public about Islam in the face of so much hostility—in public lectures, talks with religious and civic groups, and media appearances, in developing new courses and new content in old courses that attempt to deconstruct the strong association of the Islamic tradition with violence, terrorism, wholesale misogyny, and anti-Western world views.[20]

Martin warns, however, against constantly advocating for Islam out of our passion as scholars of a field of study that we love, for problems in Islam that require recognition and investigation do exist. Martin seems equally concerned of new scholars of Islam, whose advocacy for Islam is based on their adoption of liberal interpretations, which they see as the true expression of the religion. Scholars of Islam, as they discuss Islam today, have no choice but to submit their evaluation of political Islam, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Whether they advocate for the Brothers, such as Charles Kurzman, or side with Bassam Tibi, who argued that Islamism is totalitarian, anti democratic and anti Western Civilization, that Jihadism is

[19] I find the less used approaches, in Islamic studies, of Pierre Bourdieu, especially his work on the logic of practice and his conept of *habitus*, and Deleuze and Guattari's approach and arsenal of concepts very useful to study Islam.
[20] Martin, "Islamic Studies in the American Academy: A Personal Reflection."

not just a militant movement, but it includes social movements as well, that the Muslim Brothers Movement is the root of this totalitarianism, these scholars will necessarily invite the discourse of the Brothers, reflecting on it, and giving an impression that, again, the Brothers so represent mainstream Islam—or at least the branch that is interesting to U.S. policymakers and the American public in general. Mahmood Mamdani argued in a popular article, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslims: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism," that September 11 resulted in the spread of "cultural talks," where religious experience has been turned into a political category, differentiating good Muslims from bad Muslims, rather than terrorists from civilians.[21] The war on terror, it seems, is only supporting further politicization of Islam, whether by Islamophobics, or by those who advocate for Islam and find themselves advocating for the Brothers as moderates and non-violent. That brings us to the next section.

5. The Example of Esposito

As a random sample, I downloaded a list of twenty Islam syllabi that are taught in different American schools in the undergraduate programs. Each one of these syllabi, with only one exception, had an Esposito's book on the list of the required readings. Not all these courses are "Introduction to Islam." Some of them are "Islam and Modernity," "Islam in the Contemporary World," "Islam in the Modern World," and "Religion and Politics in Muslims Societies." The one course that did not have an Esposito's book as a required reading was "Islam and Modernity." The instructor created an anthology of Muslim writers, whose ideas represent Islam's response to modernity. The list of these authors includes Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī, Sayīd Quṭb, Zaynab al-Ghazālī, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, and Rāšid al-Ghannūšī. Esposito's book that is most frequently used is *Islam: The Straight Path*. Next to it in popularity comes his book, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*

On the website of the Islamic Society of North America, ISNA, an organization that al-Fārūqī cofounded in 1963 as an offshoot of the Muslim Students Association, there is a short biography of John Esposito, a frequent guest speaker of the organization. I am copying the short biography here:

> John Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies and Founding Director

[21] Mahmood Mamdani, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 766–75, https://doi.org/10.-1525/aa.2002.104.3.766.

> of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and of The Bridge Initiative: Protecting Pluralism – Ending Islamophobia at Georgetown University. His more than 55 books include: *What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam*; *Shariah, What Everyone Needs to Know*,; *The Future of Islam*; *Who Speaks for Islam?*: *What a Billion Muslims Really Think; Religion and Violence*; *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam; The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?; Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring*, *Islamophobia and the Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century*. Esposito's writings are translated into more than 45 languages. Past President of the American Academy of Religion and Middle East Studies Association of North America**,** Esposito has been a member of the World Economic Forum's Council of 100 Leaders and the E. C. European Network of Experts on De-Radicalisation, a Senior Scientist for The Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, and ambassador for the UN Alliance of Civilizations. He has served as a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and other agencies, European and Asian governments, corporations, universities, and media worldwide.[22]

The biography of Esposito reflects both the scholarship of Islam in the U.S., the hosting of this scholarship in the AAR and the MESA, and the engagement of this scholarship with the Brothers, on the one hand, and American policymakers on the other hand. We need, however, to briefly explore the two popular books of Esposito in undergraduate programs.

In *Islam the Straight Path*, Esposito offers a historical review of Islam and its institutions to reach toward the middle of his book to modernity. There, he writes about "revivalism" of Islam. Esposito uses the theme of revivalism, resurgence, and resurrection in his writings to indicate a *return* of Islam that matches al-Bannā's *hijrah*, it seems. This theme comes in the text as a sort of conventional wisdom that requires no proof. In a pattern of continuous cycles, Islam returns every time Muslims face a challenge. There is revival in the nineteenth century, resurrection in the twentieth century and resurgence in the nineteenth seventies. This is a cornerstone in Esposito, who argues that Islam is not a threat to Western civilization, in Bernard Lewis, who is certain Islam is a threat to Western civilization, and in al-Bannā, who hopes to fight Western imperialism. The coming back of Islam emerges with the typical series that is quite common in Western and non-Western writings:

[22] ISNA, "John Esposito," Islamic Society of North America, 2022.

Afghānī-ʿAbduh-Riḍā—a series that assumes continuity of intellectual projects that are indeed radically different. Then, Islamic movements follow. Two Islamic movements make the modern history of Muslims worldwide: the Muslim Brotherhood Group in Egypt, and Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan. These movements combine religious ideology with political and social activism. Esposito calls them "neo-revivalists."[23]

In *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality*, a book that was written after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Esposito explains that Muslims—a fifth of the world population, are the remaining power challenging the triumphant West. He writes,

> However diverse in reality, the existence of Islam as a worldwide religion and ideological force embracing one fifth of the world's population, and its continued vitality and power in Muslim world stretching from Africa to Southeast Asia, will continue to raise the specter of an Islamic threat.[24]

The threat, it seems from the passage, is grounded in the large size of Muslim communities, and in Islam being an "ideological force." One wonders if Esposito, who like al-Bannā finds ideology in Islam, sees Buddhism too as an ideological force. He does not leave us wondering for long, for Esposito in another passage explains himself by writing, "Islam and Islamic movements constitute a religious and ideological alternative or challenge and, in some instances, a potential danger to Christianity and the West."[25] It is striking how a prominent scholar of Islam, whose books have set the tone in undergraduate programs in American schools, who presided over the two prominent academic associations that study Islam in America: the AAR and the MESA, would casually combine Islam and Islamic movements as synonyms—a behavior we expect from an Islamist not a scholar.

Repeatedly in the book, Esposito conflate Islam and Islamism, and portrays a picture of Islamic *resurgence* that has swept the Muslims world from Sudan to Indonesia and championed popular oppositions in their countries.[26] Moving to explain the worldview of "Islamic revivalism," Esposito writes,

[23] John Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
[24] Esposito.
[25] Esposito.
[26] Esposito.

> At the heart of the revivalist worldview is the belief that the Muslim world is in a state of decline. Its cause is departure from the straight path of Islam; its cure, a return to Islam in personal and public life which will insure the restoration of Islamic identity, values, and power.[27]

Again, Esposito write about Islam, revivalism, and political Islam as if they are either synonyms or at least some points on one continuum. That is made clear when he later on writes that "In the nineties Islamic revivalism has ceased to be restricted to small, marginal organizations on the periphery of the society and instead has become part of mainstream Muslim society." After identifying revivalism with *mainstream* Islam, Esposito adds that "Revivalism continues to grow as a broad-based socio-religious movement, functioning today in virtually every Muslim country and transnationally." After expanding the phenomenon globally, Esposito foresees the future and writes that revivalism is "a vibrant multifaceted movement that will embody the major impact of Islamic revivalism for the foreseeable future."[28]

In this book, as it is in the previous book, Esposito repeats that the Muslim Brotherhood Group in Egypt, and the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan are the two main revivalist groups in the world and that their global significance is undeniable. This passage is important and worth quoting:

> The significance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami extended far beyond their national homelands and in time took on transnational significance. The Brotherhood inspired the establishment of similar organizations in the Sudan, Syria, Jordan, the Gulf, and Africa[29]. The Jamaat developed sister organizations in India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. The writings of the Brotherhood's Hassan al-Banna and of Sayyid Qutb and Mawlana Mawdudi of the Jamaat-i-Islami would in time become widely translated and disseminated throughout much of the Islamic world. Their vision of Islam as an alternative ideology for state and society and the example of their organizations and activities provided a model for future generations of Muslims. As such, for many, they

[27] Esposito.
[28] Esposito.
[29] Treating Africa as a country is a common mistake among less educated Americans.

> constituted a link between the traditional religious heritage and the realities of modern life.[30]

The line between a scholar of Islam who is examining a specific phenomenon, and an Islamic studies scholar in American academia writing as he cooperates with the U.S. Department of State and other agencies, as well as European and Asian governments is as removed as the line between a specific group and mainstream Islam is.

Recently, Esposito and Emad al-Din Shahin published an edited volume, *Key Islamic Political Thinkers*. The book that was published in 2018 explores ten writers, six of them are Sunnis: Hassan al-Banna, Mawlana Mawdudi, Hassan al-Turabi, Sayyid Qutb, Rashid al-Ghannushi, and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Forty years in his career, Esposito, the advocate of Islam, is as consistent as Bernard Lewis was.

Conclusion

Based on the in-depth research into the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the teaching of Islam in American universities, it can be concluded that this organization has had a significant impact on shaping the academic narrative about Islam. This is particularly evident in the emphasis on the political and ideological aspects of Islam, often overshadowing the spiritual and cultural dimensions of the religion. The study reveals how events like the Iranian Revolution and the September 11 attacks have heightened interest in Islamic studies, yet often with a narrow and politicized focus. This has led to Islamic education in American universities tending to highlight the political and social aspects of Islam, while neglecting the richness and diversity of practices and views within Islam. The research also highlights limitations in the current academic approaches and calls for a need for broader and more inclusive perspectives in Islamic studies. This includes recognizing the diverse traditions and practices of Islam and the necessity of understanding Islam beyond narratives dominated by specific political viewpoints. This conclusion offers a direction for future research that can explore further the diversity and complexity of Islam, and promote a more balanced and comprehensive understanding of the religion in a global context.

[30] Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*.

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Melacak Jejak Konflik Keagamaan: Membangun Peta Keragaman Agama di Indonesia (2019-2022)

Hengki Ferdiansyah
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: hengki.ferdiansyah@uinjkt.ac.id

Muhamad Masrur Irsyadi
El-Bukhari Institute, Indonesia
e-mail: mas_roer@mhs.uinjkt.ac.id

Nurun Nisa'
Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Lakpesdam)
PBNU, Indonesia
e-mail: nurunnisa@lakpesdam.or.id

Zainuddin Lubis
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia
e-mail: zainudinlubis@gmail.com

Abi S. Nugroho
Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Lakpesdam)
PBNU, Indonesia
e-mail: abisnugroho@lakpesdam.or.id

Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memetakan dan menganalisis Konflik Keagamaan yang terjadi di Indonesia dari tahun 2019 hingga Agustus 2022, serta untuk mengidentifikasi peran Kementerian Agama dalam mengelola peran publik untuk mencegah dan mengatasi konflik tersebut. Dalam rangka mencapai tujuan ini, kami melakukan analisis terhadap sekitar 86 kasus konflik keagamaan selama periode tersebut. Hasil penelitian mengungkapkan bahwa konflik keagamaan di Indonesia dapat dibagi menjadi dua kategori utama, yaitu konflik antar agama dan konflik intra agama. Konflik intra agama, terutama di kalangan umat Islam, cenderung memiliki potensi konflik yang lebih tinggi daripada konflik antar agama, mengindikasikan tingkat toleransi yang lebih tinggi terhadap pemeluk agama lain. Kami juga mendapati bahwa konflik antar agama umumnya berhubungan dengan isu-isu terkait rumah ibadah,

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pembatasan aktivitas keagamaan, dan pemaksaan atribusi agama tertentu. Di sisi lain, konflik intra agama melibatkan isu-isu seperti penyesatan kelompok dalam Islam, pembatasan aktivitas keagamaan, rumah ibadah, dan terorisme, dengan penyesatan kelompok menjadi isu yang dominan. Pemeluk agama Kristen dan kelompok Salafi sering menjadi korban dalam konflik ini. Selain itu, Kementerian Agama memegang peran strategis dalam penyelesaian konflik keagamaan melalui Subdit Bina Paham Kegamaan Islam dan Penanganan Konflik (BPKI-PK) serta Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama (PKUB). Mereka menggunakan berbagai pendekatan, termasuk dialog, partisipasi tokoh agama, dan penggunaan pernyataan publik, serta melibatkan penyuluh agama sebagai agen resolusi konflik. Meskipun memiliki potensi besar, penelitian juga mengungkapkan bahwa respons Kementerian Agama tidak selalu berhasil meredam konflik, dan terkadang bahkan dapat memperkuat eskalasi konflik, seperti yang terjadi dalam kasus pelarangan perayaan natal dan pendirian gereja di Dhamasraya pada tahun 2019. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini menyoroti perlunya terus meningkatkan efektivitas langkah-langkah yang diambil oleh Kementerian Agama dalam menyelesaikan konflik keagamaan di Indonesia. Dalam periode penelitian ini, konflik keagamaan mengalami fluktuasi, dengan peningkatan yang signifikan pada tahun 2021 dan 2022, menekankan pentingnya upaya berkelanjutan untuk menciptakan kerukunan antarumat beragama di Indonesia.

***Kata Kunci**: Kementerian Agama; Konflik Keagamaan; Moderasi Beragama; Resolusi Konflik; Toleransi Beragama.*

Abstract

This research aims to map and analyze Religious Conflicts that occurred in Indonesia from 2019 to August 2022 and to identify the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in managing its public role to prevent and address these conflicts. To achieve this goal, we conducted an analysis of approximately 86 cases of religious conflicts during that period. The research findings reveal that religious conflicts in Indonesia can be divided into two main categories: inter-religious conflicts and intra-religious conflicts. Intra-religious conflicts, especially among Muslims, tend to have a higher potential for conflict than inter-religious conflicts, indicating a higher level of tolerance towards followers of other religions. We also found that inter-religious conflicts are generally related to issues concerning places of worship, restrictions on religious activities, and the imposition of specific religious attributes. On the other hand, intra-religious conflicts involve issues such as the misguidance of Islamic groups, restrictions on religious activities, places of worship, and terrorism, with the misguidance of groups being the dominant issue. Followers of the Christian faith and Salafi groups often become victims in these conflicts. Furthermore, the Ministry of Religious Affairs plays a strategic role in resolving religious conflicts through its Sub-Directorate for Islamic Religious Understanding and Conflict Handling (BPKI-PK) and the Center for Interfaith Harmony (PKUB). They employ various approaches, including dialogue, involvement of religious leaders, and the use of public statements, while

engaging religious counselors as conflict resolution agents. However, the research also reveals that the Ministry of Religious Affairs' responses do not always succeed in quelling conflicts and can sometimes even escalate them, as seen in the case of the ban on Christmas celebrations and the establishment of churches in Dhamasraya in 2019. Therefore, this study highlights the need to continually enhance the effectiveness of measures taken by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in resolving religious conflicts in Indonesia. During the research period, religious conflicts experienced fluctuations, with a significant increase in 2021 and 2022, emphasizing the importance of ongoing efforts to promote harmony among religious communities in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Ministry of Religious Affairs; Religious Conflicts; Religious Moderation; Conflict Resolution; Religious Tolerance*

Pendahuluan

Agama pada satu sisi mengajarkan tentang cinta dan kasih. Misi agama menyebarkan kasih sayang pada umat manusia. Dalam ajaran, esensi dari agama adalah memanusiakan manusia. Agama, seyogianya mendorong pemeluknya untuk menciptakan perdamaian, dan membangun peradaban, untuk kemanusian yang hakiki. Sebaliknya, agama memiliki kekuatan paradoksial. Tak ada daya ledak yang lebih besar dari agama. Profesor Komaruddin Hidayat, dalam Harian Kompas 3 Desember 2020, menulis tak ada kekuatan yang melebihi agama. Klaim atas nama agama, seseorang rela hati mengorbankan nyawanya. Pun atas nama agama, marak sekali praktik intoleransi dan persekusi.

Berbagai praktik kekerasan dan konflik keagamaan mewarnai perjalanan bangsa Indonesia. Rangkaian demi rangkaian, terus berkelindan terjadi di negara multi etnis dan agama ini. Konflik agama, menjadi akar utama dari rentetan konflik yang terjadi. Konflik berdarah Poso 25 Des 1998 – 20 Des 2001, konflik Sambas, konflik berdarah Tanjung Priok, serta berbagai kasus terorisme seperti Bom Bali I dan II, yang menewaskan ratusan orang. Konflik keagamaan berbasis sektarian, juga marak terjadi di Indonesia. Kekerasan yang menimpa pemeluk Syiah di Sampang dan Nusa Tenggara Barat, pembantaian Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia di Parung dan Cikeusik, diskriminasi penganut aliran kepercayaan, serta aliran-aliran keagamaan yang divonis sesat oleh otoritas agama, turut memberikan daftar panjang kasus konflik keagamaan berbasis sektarian di Indonesia. Konflik komunal antar umat beragama juga turut memberikan sumbangsih besar dalam memperpanjang kasus konflik berbau agama di Indonesia. Sebut saja

larangan perayaan Natal dan pendirian gereja di Dharmasraya, pelarangan ibadah Natal di Sijunjung, serta peyerangan terhadap tempat ibadah umat Hindu di Buol, Sulawesi Tengah.

Dampak nyata dari konflik keagamaan tersebut tentu jatuhnya korban yang mengakibatkan kerugian besar, berupa kehilangan nyawa(korban jiwa) ataupun kerugian materi. Dalam laporan Varsney, yang dimuat dalam Dinamika Konflik dan Kekerasan di Indonesia, dalam kurun 1990-2001 terdapat 10.402 korban meninggal dunia akibat konflik.[1] Lebih jauh lagi, dalam kurun waktu tersebut terjadi sebanyak 2567 insiden konflik. Selanjutnya, sepanjang tahun 2008-2010, terjadi sebanyak 2.498 insiden kekerasan di Indonesia. Jika dibagi berdasarkan tahun, setiap tahun rata-rata terjadi 701,6 kasus konflik. Pada peristiwa konflik dan kekerasan periode 2008-2010, tercatat sebanyak 340 orang meninggal dunia. Sedangkan korban luka-luka berat dan ringan sebanyak 5.042 orang.

Sementara itu dalam laporan tahunan Kemerdekaan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (KBB) yang diterbitkan Wahid Foundation tahun 2019, mencatat bahwa korban pelanggaran KBB oleh aktor negara, non negara, dan korporasi pada tahun 2019 sebanyak 141 orang. Secara akumulatif mereka yang terdampak adalah kelompok aliran yang dituduh sesat dengan jumlah menjadi korban mencapai 30 orang. Korban terbanyak selanjutnya adalah umat Kristen (19 korban), umat Islam (18 korban), dan warga masyarakat (18 korban).[2]

Pada dasarnya, studi dan penelitian terkait konflik bukan kajian baru, sebelumnya sudah banyak kajian yang terkait dengan konflik. Sejumlah penelitian sebelumnya menjadikan media massa sebagai sumber rujukan penelitian studi konflik. Merrill & Lowenstein[3], Danzger[4], Franzosi[5], Olzak

[1] Rio Soumahu, *Dinamika Konflik Dan Kekerasan* (Jakarta: Institut Titian Perdamaian, 2012), 2.
[2] Wahid Foundation, *Laporan Tahunan Kemerdekaan Beragama/Berkeyakinan (KBB) Tahun 2019 Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2020), 46.
[3] J. C. Merrill and R. L. Lowenstein, *Media, Messages and Men: NewPerspectives in Communication* (New York: McKay, 1971).
[4] M. Herbert Danzger, 'Validating Conflict Data', *American Sociological Review* 40, no. 5 (October 1975): 570, https://doi.org/10.2307/2094196.
[5] Roberto Franzosi, 'The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers', *Historical Methods* 20, no. 1 (1987): 5.

1989[6], Varshney & Tadjoeddin[7] adalah beberapa peneliti yang menjadikan media massa sebagai sumber data tentang kasus protes dan kekerasan. Sementara pakar seperti Cho & Lacy[8], Clarke & Blankenburg[9], Gerbner[10]; dan Littleton[11], merupakan peneliti yang menjadikan media sebagai objek kajian, terkait protes dan kekerasan. Yang juga dikenal sebagai studi *media effects research* (pengaruh media).

Sementara itu dalam tiga tahun terakhir, berbagai konflik keagamaan terjadi di Indonesia, dengan tingkat eskalasi konflik yang tinggi. Konflik itu menimbulkan berbagai kerusakan fasilitas publik, dan sarana yang dimiliki masyarakat. Kasus penolakan pembangunan rumah ibadah di Aceh Singkil[12], pembakaran rumah penganut Budha di Mareje[13], pembakaran masjid Ahmadiyah di Sintang[14], penyerangan warga Syiah di Surakarta[15], dan Perusakan serta Pembakaran Masjid dan fasilitas Pesantren As-Sunnah

[6] Susan Olzak and Elizabeth West, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Rise and Fall of Ethnic Newspapers', *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 4 (August 1991): 458, https://doi.org/10.2307/2096268.

[7] Ashutosh Varshney, Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, and Rizal Panggabean, 'Creating Datasets in Information-Poor Environments: Patterns of Collective Violence in Indonesia, 1990–2003', *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8, no. 3 (24 December 2008): 361–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800006470.

[8] Hiromi Cho and Stephen Lacy, 'International Conflict Coverage in Japanese Local Daily Newspapers', *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 77, no. 4 (25 December 2000): 830–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/107769900007700407.

[9] William B Blankenburg, 'Trends in Violent Content in Selected Mass Media', in *Television and Social Behavior: Reports and Papers*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), 188.

[10] George Gerbner, 'Toward "Cultural Indicators": The Analysis of Mass Mediated Public Message Systems', *AV Communication Review* 17, no. 2 (1969): 137–48.

[11] Nan E Feldkamp Littleton, 'Conflict Management of Dangerous Situations' (University of Cincinnati, 1995).

[12] Mallia Hartani and Soni Akhmad Nulhaqim, 'Analisis Konflik Antar Umat Beragama Di Aceh Singkil', *Jurnal Kolaborasi Resolusi Konflik* 2, no. 2 (2020): 93–99.

[13] Saparwadi, 'Agama Dan Konflik Sosial: Studi Kasus Tentang Konflik Komunal Antar Umat Beragama Di Dusun Ganjar Desa Mareje Kecamatan Lembar Kabupaten Lombok Barat' (IAIN Mataram, 2016).

[14] Abdul Jamil Wahab, 'Resolusi Konflik Struktural Dan Kultural: Studi Kasus Perusakan Rumah Ibadah Ahmadiyah Di Sintang Kalbar', *Harmoni* 20, no. 2 (31 December 2021): 188–208, https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v20i2.506.

[15] Ali Makhsum, 'Stigmatisasi Dan Propaganda Anti-Syiah: Sorotan Deskriptif Gerakan Annas', *Center of Middle Eastern Studies (CMES): Jurnal Studi Timur Tengah* 12, no. 2 (2019): 182–91.

Lombok[16]. Berbagai kasus kekerasan dalam riset tersebut, faktornya tak terlepas dari sikap intoleransi, paham radikalisme, dan ekstremisme yang pro terhadap kekerasan. Berbagai faktor tersebut menjadi ancaman nyata bagi kebangsaan Indonesia. Terlebih jika paham tersebut diwujudkan dengan tindakan-tindakan ekstrem yang berujung pada kekerasan, seperti pembakaran, perusakan, dan pembunuhan.

Pada sisi lain, timbul pertanyaan, kenapa berbagai konflik agama kian marak terjadi di masyarakat? Baik itu konflik keagamaan antar umat beragama, maupun intra umat beragama, keduanya setiap tahun senantiasa terulang. Dan sejauh mana peran Kementerian Agama dalam menjalankan peran publik untuk menghindari dan mencegah konflik keagamaan di tengah masyarakat? Pertanyaan ini seyogianya penting diajukan pasalnya bertanggung jawab kepada publik dalam menjaga kerukunan, perdamaian, dan harmonisasi umat beragama di Indonesia. Karena itulah, penelitian ini mencoba mendokumentasikan berbagai kasus konflik; intra maupun antar agama di Indonesia. Media daring nasional maupun daerah menjadi sumber data utama dalam memetakan kasus konflik. Lebih lanjut, penelitian ini akan melihat peran Kementerian Agama dalam penyelesaian berbagai kasus konflik keagamaan yang terjadi di Indonesia.

Dalam penelitian ini, kami mengambil pendekatan yang hati-hati dalam mengumpulkan data konflik keagamaan di Indonesia dari sumber media daring. Kami menerapkan beberapa pembatasan untuk mengatasi kompleksitas penelitian ini. Pertama, kami membagi pencarian konflik menjadi dua kategori utama: peristiwa konflik yang terjadi di lima daerah dengan Indeks Kerukunan Beragama (KUB) terendah pada tahun 2021, serta peristiwa konflik yang dilaporkan oleh media nasional. Selain itu, kami mengidentifikasi konten konflik keagamaan dengan menggunakan teknik pencarian yang spesifik di mesin pencari Google, dengan kata kunci awal seperti "konflik", "konflik keagamaan", dan "konflik [nama daerah]". Kami juga memperluas kata kunci ini untuk mencakup isu-isu terkait konflik keagamaan. Kami membatasi rentang waktu penelitian dari tahun 2019 hingga Agustus 2022 untuk mengukur dampak program mainstreaming

[16] Fitri Rachmawati and Priska Sari Pratiwi, 'Kasus Perusakan Ponpes Di Lombok Timur, Polisi Imbau Warga Tak Terprovokasi', Kompas, 2022, https://regional.kompas.com/read/-2022/01/03/082919478/kasus-perusakan-ponpes-di-lombok-timur-polisi-imbau-warga-tak-terprovokasi.

moderasi beragama yang diluncurkan oleh Kementerian Agama pada tahun 2019. Terakhir, kami melakukan pemetaan data untuk mengorganisir informasi konflik yang kami kumpulkan dan melihat keterlibatan Kementerian Agama dalam menangani konflik keagamaan.

Hasil dan Pembahasan

1. Peta Konflik Keagamaan 2019-2022

a. Jenis Konflik

Konflik yang terjadi kisaran tahun 2019-2022 dalam penelitian ini dipetakan menjadi dua kategori: konflik antar agama dan intra agama. Konflik antar umat beragama maksudnya ialah perseteruan yang berkaitan dengan masalah keagamaan antara satu pemeluk agama dengan pemeluk agama lain. Sementara konflik intra agama adalah konflik yang terjadi dalam satu agama tertentu. Misalnya, konflik muslim dengan muslim, katolik dengan katolik, dan hindu dengan hindu. Dalam penelitian ini, konflik intra agama yang paling banyak ditemukan berkaitan dengan umat Islam. Ini bisa dipahami karena Islam menjadi agama mayoritas di Indonesia. Selama tiga tahun terakhir, penelitian ini menemukan ada sekitar 86 konflik keagamaan di Indonesia. Temuan ini merujuk pada berita media online nasional atau lokal, dan data Kementerian Agama. Konflik yang paling banyak terjadi, seperti tampak dalam gambar 1, adalah konflik yang berkaitan dengan intra agama. Dari 86 kasus, konflik intra agama ditemukan 57 kasus (66 %), sedangkan konflik antar agama 29 kasus (34 %). Artinya, potensi konflik intra agama, khususnya umat Islam, lebih besar ketimbang konflik antar agama.



Gambar 1 Jenis Konflik Keagamaan

Konflik antar agama yang paling sering terjadi di Indonesia berkaitan dengan tiga isu besar: konflik rumah ibadah, pembatasan ekspresi agama, dan pemaksaan atribut agama tertentu kepada pemeluk agama lain. Sebagaimana ditunjukkan gambar 2, pendirian rumah ibadah kerapkali memancing perseteruan antara satu pemeluk agama dengan pemeluk agama lainnya. Ada sekitar 16 (55 %) kasus konflik rumah ibadah dalam 29 34% 57 66% Antar Agama Intra Agama Gambar 1: Grafik Jenis Konflik 16 tiga tahun terakhir ini. Kasus konflik yang didasarkan pada pembatasan ekspresi keagamaan ditemukan 11 kasus (38 %), dan pemaksaan atribusi keagamaan 2 (7 %) kasus.



Gambar 2 Bentuk Konlik Keagamaan

Sementara konflik intra agama dalam penelitian ini dikelompokkan menjadi empat isu besar: penyesatan kelompok tertentu di dalam Islam, pembatasan aktivitas dan ekspresi keagamaan, rumah ibadah, dan terorisme. Kasus penyesatan atau pemberian label sesat terhadap satu aliran tertentu, seperti terlihat dalam gambar 3, ditemukan 30 (53 %) kasus , pembatasan aktivitas dan ekspresi keagamaan 15 (26 %) kasus, konflik rumah ibadah 11 (19 %) kasus, aksi terorisme 1 (2%).



Gambar 3 Isu besar Konflik Keagamaan

b. Korban Konflik

Dilihat dari korban konflik antar agama, pemeluk agama Kristen paling banyak mendapat perlakuan intoleransi dari pemeluk agama lain, baik dalam hal pendirian rumah ibadah, pembatasan aktivitas dan ekspresi keagamaan, dan pemaksaan atribut keagamaan tertentu. Gambar 4 menunjukkan dari 29 kasus konflik antar agama, pemeluk agama Kristen menjadi korban dalam 19 kasus konflik, pemeluk agama hindu 5 kasus, penganut agama lokal 2 kasus, Budha dan Tionghoa masing-masing 1 kasus.



Gambar 4 Jumlah Korban Konflik Antar Agama

Adapun konflik intra agama, pimpinan kelompok yang dituduh sesat mendapat perlakuan intoleransi dan penolakan, terutama pada saat menyampaikan dan mengekspresikan keyakinannya. Seperti ditujukan pada

gambar 5, ditemukan sekitar 9 kasus penolakan terhadap pimpinan kelompok yang dituduh sesat; diskriminasi terhadap jemaah Ahmadiyah dan Salafi ada 8 kasus, dan sikap intoleransi terhadap individu ataupun masyarakat yang memiliki pandangan keagamaan berbeda dengan mayoritas ditemukan 5 kasus.



Gambar 5 Jumlah Korban Konflik Intra Agama

c. Aktor Konflik

Aktor yang dimaksud di sini ialah setiap orang, kelompok, atau lembaga yang terlibat dalam konflik, baik dari negara ataupun masyarakat umum. Keterlibatan mereka bisa saja memperkuat eskalasi konflik atau menurunkan eskalasi konflik. Titian Perdamaian membagi aktor dalam dua kategori: aktor sekuritisasi (securitizing actor) dan aktor fungsional (functional actor), Aktor sekuritasi ialah aktor utama, kebanyakan non-negara, yang dapat memberi pengaruh pada suatu kelompok, seperti tokoh politik, tokoh agama, tokoh masyarakat, tokoh adat, tokoh ormas, dan lain-lain. Sementara aktor fungsional adalah aktor yang dapat menjembati antara aktor sekuritisasi dengan kelompok rentan. Dalam konteks ini, pemerintah atau negara dapat disebut sebagai aktor fungsional. Kalau pemerintah dapat memainkan peran, bisa menjadi jembatan antara aktor sekuritisasi dengan kelompok rentan, maka eskalasi konflik akan menurun. Tapi kalau tidak mampu memainkan peran, berpihak pada aktor sekuritasasi, konflik akan semakin melebar dan menguat.[17]

Perlu digarisbawahi, keterlibatan aktor dalam konflik antar atau intra agama tidak selalu tunggal. Dalam beberapa kasus, ada banyak aktor yang terlibat, sehingga eskalasi konflik semakin menguat. Misalnya, penyegelan masjid Ahmadiyah di Depok tahun 2021. Kasus ini melibatkan Pemkot Depok, Satpol PP, Polisi, TNI, dan masyarakat. Pemerintah kota mengeluarkan peraturan Wali Kota nomor 9 tahun 2011, setelah itu diterbitkan pula Peraturan Gubernur Jawa Barat No. 12 Tahun 2011, dan Satpol PP, Polisi, dan TNI dikerahkan untuk melakukan penyegelan masjid Ahmadiyah. Masyarakat juga turun andil dalam proses penyegelan ini, karena sebagian mereka menolak keberadaan Ahmadiyah dengan melakukan demonstrasi.

Kalau dilihat dari institusinya, Kepolisian memiliki andil besar dalam menurunkan eskalasi konflik di Indonesia. Gambar 6 menunjukkan, dari 86 kasus tahun 2019-2022, ada sekitar 9 konflik yang berhasil diselesaikan polisi. Selain polisi, Bupati, Menteri, dan Walikota juga dapat memainkan peran dalam menyelesaikan konflik keagamaan. Bupati ditemukan menyelesaikan 6 kasus, Menteri 4 kasus, dan walikota 2 kasus.

[17] PTD PMU Bappenas, *Guideline Institusionalisasi: Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Peace Through Development (PTD) Program Manager Unit (PMU) Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, 2006).



Gambar 6 Aktor Negara yang Menurunkan Konflik

Apabila pada gambar 6, kepolisian memiliki andil besar dalam proses penyelesaian konflik, sebaliknya pada gambar 7, polisi juga berperan dalam menaikkan eskalasi konflik. Ada sekitar 13 konflik yang tidak berhasil ditangani kepolisian dengan baik, sehingga membuat eskalasi konflik semakin tinggi. Selain polisi, TNI, Bupati, dan Satpol PP juga kerapkali membuat konflik keagamaan di masyarakat semakin tegang. Ditemukan 10 kasus yang pertikaiannya semakin kuat karena keterlibatan TNI dan Bupati, dan 7 konflik karena keterlibatan Satpol PP.



Gambar 7 Aktor Negara yang Menaikkan Eskalasi Konflik

Adapun aktor non-negara, keterlibatannya hampir sama dengan aktor negara. Ada yang memperkuat esklasi konflik, dan ada pula yang menurunkan eskalasi konflik. Masyarakat umum berada pada posisi paling dalam memperuncing esklasi konflik. Pada gambar 8 disebutkan ada sekitar 35 kasus. Sebagian besar berkaitan dengan penolakan masyarakat umum terhadap aliran ataupun pandangan keagamaan yang berbeda. Selain masyarakat, lembaga Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), Majelis Pemusyawaratan Ulama (MPU) Aceh, dan Organisasi Masyarakat juga berperan dalam menaikan eskalasi konflik. Ada sekitar 15 kasus konflik yang menjadi semakin kuat pertikaiannya karena keterlibatan MUI dan MPU, 6 kasus karena keterlibatan Ormas.



Gambar 8 Aktor Negara yang Menaikkan Eskalasi Konflik

Peran Majelis Ulama Indonesia sebenarnya tidak selalu menaikan eskalasi konflik. Penelitian ini juga menemukan praktik baik yang dilakukan Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Paling tidak, ada 6 kasus konflik keagamaan yang berhasil diselesaikan oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Hal ini sebagaimana tampak pada gambar 9.



Gambar 9 Aktor Non-Negara yang Menurunkan Konflik

Data keterlibatan aktor di atas menunjukkan bahwa Polisi dan MUI memiliki peran strategis dalam proses penyelesaian konflik di negara ini. Kedua lembaga ini dapat berperan ganda: menaikan eskalasi konflik atau menurunkan esklasi konflik. Praktik buruk kepolisian dan MUI dalam penanganan konflik sangat tinggi, dan praktik baik penyelesaian konflik dari dua lembaga ini juga tinggi. Temuan ini tidak jauh berbeda dengan laporan Wahid Foundation tahun 2019 di mana polisi, Pemkab/Pemkab, warga masyarakat, dan MUI kerapkali menghambat proses penyelesaian konflik. Apabila kesadaran masing-masing aktor ini terhadap hak Kebebasan Beragama dan Keyakinan (KBB) semakin baik dan tinggi, maka eskalasi konflik akan semakin menurun. Namun jika kesadaran mereka terhadap hak KBB rendah dan berpihak pada mayoritarianisme, potensi eskalasi konflik akan semakin naik dan tinggi.[18]

2. Peran Kementerian Agama dalam Penyelesaian Konflik Keagamaan di Indonesia

a. Subdit BPKI-PK dan PKUB: Dua Modal Kementerian Agama

Selain memetakan konflik keagamaan, penelitian ini juga berupaya melihat peran Kementerian Agama dalam penyelesaian konflik yang terjadi tahun 2019-2022, baik konflik antar agama ataupun intra agama. Merujuk pada UU No. 7 tahun 2012 tentang penangangan konflik sosial, Kementerian yang membidangi agama, dalam hal ini Kementerian Agama, termasuk aktor yang berperan penting dalam penyelesaian konflik. Apalagi dalam internal Kementerian Agama sendiri terdapat dua badan khusus yang ditugaskan untuk menyelesaikan konflik keagamaan. Kedua badan itu ialah Subdit Bina Paham Kegamaan Islam dan Penanganan Konflik (BPKI-PK) dan Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama (PKUB).Subdit BPKI-PK lebih fokus pada penyelesaian konflik atau masalah internal umat Islam, sementara PKUB difokuskan pada konflik antar agama.

Tugas BPKI-PK ialah melakukan pembinaan paham keagamaan Islam dan penanganan konflik sosial keagamaan, bekerjasama dengan tokoh agama, tokoh masyarakat, dan stakeholder, melalui dialog, konsultasi, dan

[18] Subhi Azhari and Gamal Ferdhi, *Laporan Tahunan Wahid Foundation: Kemajuan Tanpa Penyelesaian Akar Masalah* (Jakarta: Wahid Foundation, 2020), 69.

rekonsiliasi sosial, supaya terwujud kedamaian dan kerukunan di internal umat beragama.[19]

Dalam Peraturan Menteri Agama (PMA) No. 42 tahun 2016, Subdit BPKI-PK memiliki empat fungsi. Pertama, penyiapan bahan perumusan, koordinasi, dan pelaksanaan kebijakan teknis di bidang bina paham keagamaan Islam dan penanganan konflik. Kedua, penyiapan bahan penyusunan norma, standar, prosedur, dan kriteria di bidang bina paham keagamaan Islam dan penanganan konflik. Ketiga, penyiapan bahan pelaksanaan bimbingan teknis dan supervisi di bidang bina paham keagamaan Islam dan penanganan konflik. Keempat, penyiapan bahan pelaksanaan evaluasi dan laporan di bidang bina paham keagamaan Islam dan penanganan konflik.

Untuk menjalankan keempat fungsi di atas, Subdit BPKI-PK memiliki tiga struktur: Pertama, seksi identifikasi paham keagamaan Islam. Tugasnya melakukan penyiapan bahan perumusan, koordinasi, dan pelaksanaan kebijakan, penyusunan norma, standar, prosedur, kriteria, bimbingan teknis, dan evaluasi serta laporan identifikasi paham keagamaan Islam. Kedua, Seksi Bina Paham Keagamaan Islam. Tugasnya melakukan penyiapan bahan perumusan, koordinasi, dan pelaksanaan kebijakan, penyusunan norma, standar, prosedur, kriteria, bimbingan teknis, dan evaluasi serta laporan bina paham keagamaan Islam. Ketiga, Seksi Advokasi dan Penanganan Konflik. Tugasnya menyiapkan bahan perumusan, koordinasi, dan pelaksanaan kebijakan, penyusunan norma, standar, prosedur, kriteria, bimbingan teknis, dan evaluasi serta laporan advokasi dan penanganan konflik.

Selain memiliki struktur di level nasional, BPKI-PK juga memiliki struktur di level provinsi, karena pengelolaan urusan agama tidak hanya diserahkan pada pemerintah daerah semata, tetapi juga menjadi tanggung-jawab pemerintah pusat.20 Hal ini sebagaimana diatur dalam pasal 7 UU No. 22 tahun 1999 tentang otonomi daerah. Dalam aturan itu ditegaskan bahwa bidang pemerintahan yang tidak menjadi wewenang daerah adalah politik luar negeri, pertahanan keamanan, peradilan, moneter dan fiskal, dan agama. Sebab itu, Kementerian Agama memiliki kordinasi dengan pejabat

[19] Dirjen Bimas Islam, *Himpunan Peraturan Bidang Paham Keagamaan Islam & Penanganan Konflik* (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI, 2018), 5.

Kementerian Agama di daerah, dan mereka punya kewajiban untuk melaporkan apa yang sudah dikerjakan kepada Kemenag.

Tidak hanya memiliki struktur di masing-masing provinsi, Subdit ini juga dibantu oleh para penyuluh agama yang ada pada setiap kecamatan dan kabupaten. Menurut Muhammad Syafaat, tim Pokja Moderasi Beragama, ada dua tugas utama dari penyuluh agama: penyuluh kerukunan umat beragama dan penyuluh radikalisme dan aliran sempalan. Sampai saat ini, jumlah penyuluh agama PNS ada sekitar 5002 dan non-PNS 45.412.[20] Mereka tersebar hampir di semua wilayah, dari kota hingga desa terpencil.

Dilihat dari struktur dan jaringannya, BPKI-PK punya potensi besar dalam penyelesaian konflik keagamaan, khususnya yang berkaitan dengan internal umat agama, dan mewujudkan perdamaian serta kerukunan. Apalagi subdit ini juga memiliki garis kordinasi dengan para penyuluh agama yang jumlahnya sangat banyak, dan tersebar hampir setiap wilayah di Indonesia.

Seperti BPKI-PK, Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama (PKUB) juga memiliki jaringan sampai ke level bawah. PKUB mempunyai struktur di Kanwil Kemenag Provinsi dan Kabupaten. PKUB juga bermitra dengan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) yang ada di setiap Provinsi dan Kabupaten/Kota. FKUB merupakan wadah bagi tokoh atau aktivis lintas agama untuk berdiskusi, berdialog, dan menyelesaikan persoalan keagamaan yang terjadi di tengah masyarakat. Setidaknya, ada empat kegiatan FKUB yang selama ini sudah berjalan. Pertama, melakukan dialog berbagai tokoh agama dan masyarakat. Kedua, menyerap aspirasi masyarakat dari berbagai kalangan terkait kerukunan umat beragama. Ketiga, menyalurkan aspirasi tentang kerukunan umat beragama kepada pemerintah. Terakhir, mensosialisasikan kebijakan pemerintah terkait kerukunan umat beragama.

Sementara tugas utama PKUB, menurut PMA No. 42 tahun 2016 pasal 879 ialah merumuskan kebijakan dan rencana operasional di bidang kerukunan umat beragama; kordinasi pelaksanaan program kerukunan umat beragama; penyusunan norma, standar, prosedur, dan kriteria kerukunan umat beragama; pengembangan komunikasi terhadap aliran kepercayaan; koordinasi pelaksanaan program pencegahan dan penanganan masalah

[20] Kemenag, 'Sistem Elektronik Penyuluh Agama', Kementerian Agama RI, 2022, https://epa.kemenag.go.id/home.

kerukunan umat beragama; pemberian bimbingan teknis dan evaluasi kerukunan umat beragama.

Dalam Rancangan Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) 2020- 2024 dan Renstra Kementerian Agama 2020-2024, PKUB diamanahkan untuk penguatan moderasi dan kerukunan umat beragama. PKUB memiliki tiga tugas utama yang berkaitan dengan penguatan harmoni dan kerukunan umat beragama: perlindungan umat beragama untuk menjamin hak-hak sipil dan beragama; penguatan peran lembaga agama, organisasi sosial keagamaan, tokoh agama, tokoh masyarakat, ASN, TNI, dan Polri sebagai perekat persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa; penguatan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) untuk membangun solidaritas sosial, toleransi, dan gotong royong.

PKUB bukti keseriusan Kementerian Agama dalam menyelesaikan konflik antar agama di Indonesia. Apalagi PKUB berada di bawah tanggung-jawab Menteri Agama dan Sekretaris Jendral Kementerian Agama secara langsung. Kepala PKUB Wawan Djunaedi menyadari betul kekuatan PKUB. Dia selalu meminta kepada bawahannya yang berada di wilayah untuk selalu menuliskan laporan konflik yang terjadi di masyarakat. Laporan ini penting untuk mengetahui akar masalah yang menyebabkan terjadinya konflik, sehingga dapat dicari solusi yang tepat.

Melalui dua lembaga ini, subdit BPKI-PK dan PKUB, posisi Kementerian Agama dalam penyelesaian konflik keagamaan sangat strategis. Apalagi, Kemenang memiliki jaringan dari atas sampai bawah, jumlahnya pun sangat banyak. Kedua lembaga ini asset berharga Kementerian Agama dan perlu didorong terus untuk menyelesaikan masalah keagamaan dan mewujudkan kerukunan umat beragama.

b. Pendekatan Kementerian Agama dalam Penyelesaian Konflik

Pendekatan pertama yang dilakukan Kementerian Agama ialah membuka ruang dialog. Konflik kerapkali terjadi karena tidak saling mengenal dan berkomunikasi. Pintu dialog mesti terus dibuka agar masyarakat dapat menghargai perbedaan dan bisa hidup berdampingan dengan orang yang berbeda. Dalam penyelesaian konflik, tokoh agama merupakan aktor kunci yang perlu diajak untuk bicara. Tokoh agama punya kuasa untuk meredam konflik yang terjadi di tengah masyarakat. Karena itu,

pertemuan dan dialog yang melibatkan tokoh agama sangat penting untuk dilakukan.

FKUB termasuk salah satu forum yang digunakan Kementerian Agama untuk membuka ruang dialog antar umat beragama. Pembentukan FKUB didasarkan pada Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 9 dan 8 Tahun 2006 (PBM 2006) Tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Daerah Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat. Menurut PBM tersebut, FKUB didirikan oleh masyarakat pada tiap provinsi atau wilayah masing-masing dengan difasilitasi Pemda setempat.22 FKUB sudah terbentuk hampir di setiap daerah. Tahun 2020 diinformasikan sudah terbentuk sebanyak 542 FKUB di seluruh Indonesia, baik pada tingkat Provinsi ataupun Kabupaten/Kota.

Kepala PKUB Wawan Djunaedi mengakui selalu melibatkan FKUB dalam penyelesaian konflik. FKUB wadah strategis untuk membantu meredam konflik yang terjadi di banyak wilayah. Wawan Djunaedi mengatakan:

> Kemenag RI itu juga punya mitra, lembaga antar kerukunan yang kita sebut dengan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB). Forum ini biasanya modal kita kalau ada dinamika konflik di lapangan terutama terkait konflik antar agama, contoh sekarang ya kasus di Cilegon. Nah kita langsung kontak kanwilnya, dan kita kontak FKUB nya. Terlebih jika konflik tersebut mengenai tempat ibadah atau lainnya. Di sana kita minta, melakukan dialog agar tercipta deeskalasi konflik.[21]

Presiden Jokowi juga berharap besar pada FKUB untuk selalu membuka ruang dialog dengan pemuka lintas agama. Jokowi mengibaratkan FKUB sebagai miniature kebinekaan. Dalam Rakornas FKUB tahun 2020, beliau menuturkan:

> Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (FKUB) merupakan miniatur kebinekaan Indonesia. Saya berharap, tidak ada satu pun yang ditinggalkan ataupun dipinggirkan. FKUB hendaknya menjadi tenda

[21] Wawancara dengan Wawan Djunaedi, Senin 13 September 2022

> bangsa yang mengayomi semua umat beragama dari beragam kelompok. Komitmen ini harus tertanam kuat dalam kesadaran para tokoh dan aktivis FKUB di semua tingkatan. Pemerintah mendukung agar peran-peran FKUB semakin optimal dalam menyemai nilai-nilai moderasi beragama. Moderasi beragama merupakan pilihan yang tepat dan selaras dengan jiwa Pancasila di tengah adanya gelombang ekstremisme di berbagai belahan dunia.[22]

Pelibatan FKUB dalam penyelesaian konflik dan penciptaan kerukunan menunjukkan persegeran paradigma Kementerian Agama. Kemenag menyadari betul pentingnya keterlibatan masyarakat dalam penyelesaian konflik. Pasalnya, pada masa orde baru, masyarakat tidak banyak dilibatkan dalam meredam konflik dan usaha bina damai. Zainal Abidin Bagir menegaskan, pasca reformasi, Kemenag lebih sadar akan multikulturalisme dan keragaman masyarakat Indonesia. FKUB merupakan tradisi baru dalam program pembangunan yang melibatkan masyarakat. Ini berbeda dengan pendekatan Orde Baru yang menjadikan masyarakat sebagai objek program dan tidak dilibatkan dalam banyak hal. Sementara pada masa sekarang, masyarakat didorong dan difasilitasi untuk bertemu, berdialog, dan membincarakan banyak hal.[23]

Selain FKUB, Kementerian Agama juga berperan dalam penyelesaian konflik melalui pelibatan penyuluh agama. Melibatkan penyuluh agama dalam penyelesaian konflik termasuk pendekatan strategis. Selain jumlahnya sangat banyak, mereka bersentuhan langsung dengan masyarakat. Mereka paling tahu tentang information yang berkembang di masyarakat. Peran penyuluh agama sebagai agen resolusi konflik sudah masuk dalam Renstra Kementerian Agama 2020-2024. Dalam Renstra ini juga disebutkan perlunya penguatan kompetensi aktor kerukunan umat beragama, terutama penyuluh agama. Beberapa cara yang bisa dilakukan untuk penguatan kompetensi aktor ini adalah pendalaman pemahaman terhadap regulasi moderasi dan kerukunan umat beragama; peningkatan kemampuan manajemen

[22] 4 Pernyataan Joko Widodo, Presiden RI pada acara Rakornas FKUB, 3 November 2020. Video pernyataan resminya dapat dilihat di: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnfDSd1-uKqU, diakses pada: Senin 13 September 2022

[23] J.B. Banawiratma et al., *Dialog Antarumat Beragama: Gagasan Dan Praktik Di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Kerjasama Mizan Publika dan Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya (CRCS) Sekolah Pascasarjana UGM, 2010), 86.

pencegahan dan penanganan konflik; pelatihan promosi kerukunan umat beragama; penyiaran media yang berorientasi pada jurnalisme damai.[24]

Dalam rangka meningkatkan kapasitas penyuluh sebagai agen resolusi konflik, Subdit BPKI-PK tahun 2022 menginisiasi program Seleksi Penyuluh Agama Agen Resolusi Konflik (SPARK). Mohammad Syafaat, salah satu inisiator SPARK, menjelaskan bahwa kegiatan ini dimaksudkan untuk penguatan tiga hal: peningkatan pengetahuan tentang konflik keagamaan, membentuk keterampilan para penyuluh agama terkait deteksi dan respons dini konflik keagamaan berlatar perbedaan paham dan budaya Islam, dan memotivasi penyuluh untuk aktif di lapangan. Akmal Salim Ruhana, mantan Kasubdit BPKI-PK, menambahkan, SPARK merupakan langkah tepat dalam proses penanganan konflik, karena dengan melibatkan aktor lokal yang mempunyai wawasan resolusi konflik, eskalasi konflik diharapkan tidak akan membesar dan menguat. Apalagi jumlah penyuluh di Indonesia sangat banyak, ini menjadi peluang strategis untuk melibatkan mereka dalam pendeteksian dan penangangan konflik di wilayah mereka masing-masing.[25]

Kesadaran untuk melibatkan penyuluh agama sebagai agen resolusi konflik tidak hanya muncul dari pusat, tetapi juga berasal dari Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Agama. Kanwil Sumatera Barat misalnya, mereka memperdayakan penyuluh agama dengan membuat program one penyuluh one village. Dr. H. Helmi, M. Ag, Kepala Kanwil Sumatera Barat, menjelaskan bagaimana keterlibatan penyuluh dalam penyelesaian konflik di Sumatera Barat. Dia memberikan empat tugas kepada penyuluh. Pertama, mendatangi lokasi kejadian atau konflik. Kedua, kordinasi dengan Kementerian Agama Kabupaten. Ketiga, penyuluh agama diminta untuk bersinergi dengan Babinkabtinmas, Kejaksaan/Bakorpakem, dan MUI. Sinergitas yang dibangun bertujuan untuk bergerak bersama-sama dalam menangani konflik keagamaan, agar tingkat eskalasi konflik tidak naik. Keempat, para penyuluh agama diberikan tugas untuk melaporkan konflik, dan mendata aliran keagamaan di Sumatera Barat yang dianggap menyimpang.[26]

[24] Kemenag, *Rencana Strategis Kementerian Agama 2020-2024* (Jakarta: Kementerian Agama RI, 2020), 24.
[25] Wawancara dengan Akmal Salim Ruhana (Kasubdit Bina Paham Keagamaan Islam Ditjen Bimas Islam Kementerian Agama), Selasa, 20 September 2022
[26] Wawancara dengan Dr. H. Helmi, M.Ag (Kanwil Kemenag Sumatra Barat), Rabu, 21 September 2022.

Sejauh ini, menurut pengakuan Helmi, seluruh konflik keagamaan, baik intra ataupun antar agama sudah selesai di tingkat kabubapten/kota. Aktor yang berperan besar dalam hal ini adalah penyuluh agama. Berdasarkan data dari Subkor Bina Paham Keagamaan dan Kepustakaan Islam, dari tahun 2020 sampai 2022, sudah ada tiga konflik keagamaan intra agama yang diselesaikan oleh Kanwil Kemenag Sumbar. Seperti terlihat pada tabel 1, tahun 2020, aliran Milah Ibrahim di Kecamatan X Koto, Kabupaten Solok, statusnya sudah diselesaikan. Kemudian tahun 2021, ada aliran Bermasalah Pelindung Kehidupan di Pauh Nan Duo, Kabupaten Solok Selatan, yang sudah diselesaikan oleh MUI dan Pakem. Ketiga, tahun 2022 ada kasus Bab Kesucian, di Kabupaten Tanah Datar, dengan status terselesaikan.

Tabel 1 Laporan Kasus Konflik yang Diselesaikan Kanwil Sumatera Barat

Nama Aliran	Pimpinan	Kecamatan	Kab/Kota	Keterangan	Tahun
Milah	M. Syakur	X Koto	Kab. Solok	Sudah selesai	2020
Pelindung Kehidupan	Edi	Pauh Nan Duo	Solok Selatan	Sudah selesai oleh MUI dan Pakem	2021
Bab Kesucian	Syaiful	X Koto	Tanah Datar	Sudah selesai	2022

Peran lainnya dari Kementerian agama adalah berupa Mengeluarkan Pernyataan Publik. Mengeluarkan pernyataan publik termasuk pendekatan yang digunakan Kementerian Agama dalam merespons konflik keagamaan. Pernyataan itu biasanya diserbaluaskan melalui media massa, baik cetak ataupun digital. Menteri Agama Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, dalam tiga tahun terakhir ini, paling sering mengeluarkan pernyataan publik tentang konflik keagamaan dibanding pejabat lainnya. Salah satu pernyataannya ialah mengecam perusakan tempat ibadah jemaah Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Sintang, Kalimatan Barat, tahun 2021. Tindakan main hakim sendiri, kata Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, apalagi merusak rumah ibadah dan harta benda milik orang lain, ancaman nyata bagi kerukunan umat beragama. Yaqut meminta

aparat keamanan perlu mengambil langkah dan upaya tegas untuk mencegah dan mengatasi tindakan main hakim sendiri.

Dalam pemberitaan Kompas.com, Menteri Agama meminta pelaku perusakan dan pembakaran juga diproses secara hukum. Pelakunya mesti mempertanggungjawabkan perbuatannya di hadapan hukum demi kepastian hukum dan tegaknya keadilan. Ia meminta pula kepada pemerintah daerah untuk menjalankan fungsinya dalam menjaga kerukunan umat beragama di wilayah masing-masing. Sebab hal ini sudah diatur dalam Peraturan Bersama Menteri Agama dan Menteri Dalam Negeri (PBM) Nomor 9 dan 8 tahun 2016 tentang Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Kepala Daerah/Wakil Kepala Dalam Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Umat Beragama, Pemberdayaan Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadat.[27]

Dirjen Bimas Islam Kamaruddin Amin beberapa kali juga mengeluarkan pernyataan di media tentang konflik internal umat Islam. Misalnya, penolakan keberadaan Jamaaah Ahmadiyah di Depok, dan penyegelan masjid Ahmadiyah Depok. Kamaruddin Amin meminta agar semua pihak patuhi SKB 3 Menteri yang ada. Menurutnya SKB tiga menteri adalah titik moderat yang mengakomodir kepentingan semua pihak dan masih relevan untuk dijadikan instrumen mengatasi masalah Ahmadiyah. Syaratnya semua pihak harus patuh pada SKB tersebut. SKB mengatur apa yang harus dilakukan oleh Jamaah Ahmadiyah, masyarakat dan juga pemerintah.[28]

Menurutnya, rumah ibadah Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) yang sudah berdiri di Sintang agar dapat tetap difungsikan sebagai masjid yang bisa dimanfaatkan oleh seluruh umat Muslim. Ia mengatakan kubah masjid rumah ibadah Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Sintang telah dibongkar untuk dilakukan alih fungsi sebagai masjid bagi seluruh umat Islam. Jika akan

[27] Sania Mashabi and Diamanty Meiliana, 'Menag Kecam Perusakan Tempat Ibadah Ahmadiyah Di Kalimantan Barat', Kompas, 2021, https://nasional.kompas.com/read-/2021/09/03/18242031/menag-kecam-perusakan-tempat-ibadah-ahmadiyah-di-kaliman-tan-barat.

[28] Detik, 'Sekretariat Ahmadiyah Depok Disegel, Kemenag Ingatkan Soal SKB 3 Menteri', Detik, 2021, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5780940/sekretariat-ahmadiyah-depok-disegel-kemenag-ingatkan-soal-skb-3-menteri.

dimanfaatkan untuk fungsi yang lain, harus melalui musyawarah dengan jamaah Ahmadiyah sebagai pemilik lahan dan bangunan.[29]

Kalau diperhatikan, mengeluarkan pernyataan publik pendekatan paling sering dilakukan pejabat Kementerian Agama dalam merespons konflik keagamaan. Namun yang menjadi pertanyaan, apakah pendekatan ini efektif dan bisa menurunkan eskalasi konflik? Abdul Jamil Wahab, peneliti BRIN (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional), mengibaratkan pendekatan pernyataan publik dalam merespons konflik seperti pisau bermata dua. Pada satu sisi statement publik berguna sebagai upaya dalam meredam konflik, sekaligus menunjukkan peran, dan kehadiran negara dalam merespons isu tersebut. Namun, pada sisi lain, statement publik juga memiliki kelemahan, bahkan bisa menaikkan eskalasi konflik, jika tidak cermat dalam membuat komentar. Penyelesaian konflik tidak cukup dengan sekedar mengeluarkan pernyataan. Itu hanya sebagai langkah awal, setelah pengeluarkan pertanyataan, perlu dilakukan mediasi agar eskalasi konflik tidak naik, dan pernyataan yang dikeluarkan Kementerian Agama tidak "digoreng" oleh kelompok tertentu.[30]

c. Respons Kementerian Agama Atas Konflik Keagamaan tahun 2019-2022

Kementerian Agama, seperti disinggung di awal, memiliki potensi besar dalam penyelesaian konflik di Indonesia. Apalagi, Kemenag mempunyai struktur dan jaringan dari level pusat sampai wilayah. Namun sayangnya, tiga tahun terakhir ini, Kementerian Agama belum terlalu maksimal dalam penyelesaian konflik. Sebagaimana tampak dalam gambar 10, dari 86 konflik yang terjadi tahun 2019-2022, hanya 31 (36 %) kasus yang direspons Kementerian Agama. Sementara 55 (64 %) kasus lainnya tidak mendapat respons.

[29] Andi Firdaus, 'Ini Imbauan Kemenag Untuk Rumah Ibadah Ahmadiyah Sintang', Antara, 2022,https://kalbar.antaranews.com/berita/503245/ini-imbauan-kemenag-untuk-rumah-ibadah-ahmadiyah-sintang.

[30] Wawancara dengan Abdul Jamil Wahab (Peneliti BRIN), Senin, 19 September 2022



Gambar 10 Perbandingan Keterlibatan Kemenag (dalam Kasus)

31 kasus konflik yang direspons Kementerian Agama berkaitan dengan konflik antar agama, dan ada pula yang berkaitan dengan intra agama. Gambar 2 menunjukkan 7 (23 %) kasus konflik antar agama dan 24 intra agama.



Gambar 11 Konflik Intra dan Antar Agama yang Direspon Kemenag

Respons Kementerian Agama terhada peristiwa konflik tidak selalu berujung pada hasil yang baik. Temuan penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam beberapa kasus keterlibatan Kementerian Agama justru berdampak

pada naiknya eskalasi konflik, alih-alih meredam atau menurunkan eskalasi konflik. Apabila dilihat dari tabel di bawah ini, 25 aktor berperan dalam meredam dan menurunkan konflik, sementara 13 lainnya justru memperkuat eskalasi konflik.

Dalam beberapa kasus, Kementerian Agama mampu menjadi jembatan komunikasi bagi kelompok yang sedang bertikai. Kementerian Agama memberi penjelasan, melakukan diskusi dan musyawarah, dan memberikan solusi agar konflik tidak semakin melebar dan menguat. Misalnya, Kementerian Agama bekerjasama dengan Lakpesdam menginisasi bantuan rumah untuk Ahmadiyah yang digusur dari kampung halamannya. Kementerian Agama meluruskan penyesatan MPTT-I (Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid-Tasawuf Indonesia) Aceh. Bimas Islam menjelaskan kepada publik kalau MPTT-I tidak sesat.

Sementara pada kasus yang lain, Kementerian Agama tidak memberikan solusi, sehingga eskalasi konflik semakin menguat. Misalnya, pelarangan perayaan natal dan pendirian gereja di Dhamasraya tahun 2019, Kanwil Sumatera Barat justru memperkuat sekuritisasi aktor dengan menyatakan pelarangan pendirian rumah ibadah di Dhamasraya sudah sesuai dengan aturan. Kepala Kantor Kementerian Agama Aceh mendukung pelarangan salat Jumat di masjid Salafi Aceh Barat. Alasannya, pendirian masjid Salafi tidak sesuai aturan pendirian rumah ibadah.

Kesimpulan

Kesimpulannya, dalam periode 2019-2022, Indonesia mengalami sekitar 86 kasus konflik keagamaan, yang dapat dibagi menjadi konflik antar agama (29 kasus) dan konflik intra agama (57 kasus). Konflik intra agama, terutama di kalangan umat Islam, memiliki potensi konflik yang lebih tinggi daripada konflik antar agama, menunjukkan toleransi yang lebih tinggi terhadap pemeluk agama lain. Konflik antar agama umumnya berkaitan dengan masalah rumah ibadah, pembatasan aktivitas keagamaan, dan pemaksaan atribusi agama tertentu. Di sisi lain, konflik intra agama mencakup penyesatan kelompok dalam Islam, pembatasan aktivitas keagamaan, rumah ibadah, dan terorisme, dengan penyesatan kelompok menjadi isu yang dominan. Pemeluk agama Kristen dan kelompok Salafi sering menjadi korban dalam konflik ini. Aktor konflik bervariasi, termasuk aktor negara yang belum selalu berhasil mengatasi konflik, serta

Kementerian Agama yang memiliki peran strategis dalam penyelesaian konflik keagamaan. Konflik sering terjadi dalam bentuk aksi damai dan kekerasan, dengan aksi damai lebih banyak terjadi, meskipun ini tidak selalu mencerminkan penerimaan terhadap perbedaan. Lokasi konflik terutama terjadi di Jawa Barat, dan tren konflik keagamaan mengalami fluktuasi selama periode tersebut, dengan peningkatan yang signifikan pada tahun 2021 dan 2022.

Kementerian Agama memiliki peran penting dalam penyelesaian konflik keagamaan di Indonesia melalui dua badan khususnya, yaitu Subdit Bina Paham Kegamaan Islam dan Penanganan Konflik (BPKI-PK) dan Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama (PKUB). Mereka menggunakan berbagai pendekatan, seperti dialog, partisipasi tokoh agama, dan penggunaan pernyataan publik, serta melibatkan penyuluh agama sebagai agen resolusi konflik. Meskipun memiliki potensi besar, penelitian menunjukkan bahwa respons Kementerian Agama tidak selalu berhasil meredam konflik, misalnya, pelarangan perayaan natal dan pendirian gereja di Dhamasraya tahun 2019, Kanwil Sumatera Barat justru memperkuat sekuritisasi aktor dengan menyatakan pelarangan pendirian rumah ibadah di Dhamasraya sudah sesuai dengan aturan. Kepala Kantor Kementerian Agama Aceh mendukung pelarangan salat Jumat di masjid Salafi Aceh Barat. Oleh karena itu, perlu terus meningkatkan efektivitas langkah-langkah yang diambil oleh Kementerian Agama dalam menyelesaikan konflik keagamaan di Indonesia.

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Essay

Peranan NU dalam Menghadapi *Triple Planetary Crisis*

Sidik Permana
Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia (Lakpesdam)
PWNU Jawa Barat, Indonesia
e-mail: sidikpermana8311@yahoo.com

Secara global permasalahan lingkungan hidup bukanlah suatu hal yang baru, sejatinya permasalahan lingkungan hidup sudah terjadi sejak bumi tercipta (zaman purba). Perubahan iklim dan kejadian geologi yang terjadi di masa lampau tersebut telah mengakibatkan ribuan kepunahan hewan, dan tumbuhan, serta manusia purba. Misalnya dinosaurus, dan hewan melata zaman purba.[1] Pada masa perkembangan peradaban manusia, kitab suci Al-Qur'an pun mencatat banyak masalah lingkungan antara lain seperti bencana banjir air bah yang dialami oleh kaum Nabi Nuh, kekeringan yang dialami oleh Nabi Yusuf dan negaranya, kekeringan dan kelaparan yang dialami oleh kaum Nabi Ilyas.[2] Selanjutnya kejadian geologi yang dahsyat pernah terjadi di masa lampau antara lain seperti runtuhnya peradaban Pompei di Italia yang disebabkan oleh letusan Gunung berapi Vesuvius pada tahun 79[3],

[1] O. Soemarwoto, *Ekologi, Lingkungan Hidup, Dan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 2004).
[2] C. Faizah, "Ajaran Moral Dalam Kisah Nabi Yusuf A.S. (Analisis Semiotik Roland Barthes)" (Jurusan Tafsir Hadits Fakultas Ushuluddin Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo, 2015); Muhammad Rusydi, "Makna Kisah Nuh AS Dalam Al-Qur'an (Perspektif Hermeneutika Filosofis)," *Al-Banjari : Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 16, no. 1 (June 2017): 27, https://doi.org/10.18592/al-banjari.v16i1.1271; Meliana, "Aplikasi Pembelajaran Kontekstual Pada Mata Pelajaran Pendidikan Agama Islam (PAI) Untuk Meningkatkan Hasil Dan Motivasi Belajar Siswa Kelas V SD Negeri Raman Fajar Kec. Raman Utara Tahun Pelajaran 2017/2018" (IAIN Metro, 2018); S.M.I. Harahap, "Kisah Nabi Nuh Dalam Perpektif Al-Qur'an (Studi Analisis Surat Al-Mu'minun Ayat 31 Dalam Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al-Azim Karya Ibnu Kasir" (Ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Tafsir Fakultas Ushuluddin dan Studi Islam Universitas Islam Negeri Sumatera Utara, 2021).
[3] Haraldur Sigurdsson, Stanford Cashdollar, and Stephen R. J. Sparks, "The Eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79: Reconstruction from Historical and Volcanological Evidence," *American Journal of Archaeology* 86, no. 1 (January 1, 1982): 39–51, https://doi.org/10.2307/504292.

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letusan berapi Gunung Tambora di Sumba pada tahun 1815[4], dan letusan Gunung berapi Krakatau di Selat Sunda terjadi pada tahun 1680 dan pada tanggal 26 dan 27 Agustus tahun 1883.[5] Letusan Gunung Krakatau yang terjadi pada tahun 1883 mengeluarkan jutaan ton material berupa batu, debu, dan magma yang menutupi wilayah seluas 827.000 km^2 yang diikuti oleh gelombang tsunami yang melanda pesisir Banten dan lampung, sedangkan suara letusannya yang keras mencapai Srilangka dan Karachi, Pakistan, serta Australia bagian Timur. Perubahan iklim dan kejadian geologi yang menimpa manusia pada masa lampau tersebut merupakan permasalahan lingkungan hidup yang disebabkan oleh perubahan alam atau bersifat alamiah.

Seiring meningkatnya populasi manusia, kemajuan teknologi, dan peningkatan industrialisasi permasalahan lingkungan kian besar.[6] Penggunaan bahan bakar fosil untuk kepentingan industri telah memicu peningkatan gas emisi karbon yang berdampak pada perubahan iklim yang besar pada tahun tahun 1950-an dan 1960-an dan. Selain berkontribusi pada peningkatan perubahan iklim, perluasan industri dan peningkatan populasi penduduk juga mencemari badan-badan air seperti sungai, dan danau sehingga mengakibatkan terjadinya kerusakan lingkungan. Permasalahan lingkungan yang memuncak pada tahun 1970-an, ditandai oleh ledakan penduduk yang mengakibatkan terjadinya kerusakan lingkungan menimbulkan kesadaran pada kalangan internasional dengan menyelenggarakan konferensi PBB tentang lingkungan hidup di Stockholm, Swedia, konferensi ini dikenal dengan Konfrensi Stockholm.[7] Dibandingkan dengan permasalahan lingkungan hidup yang bersifat alamiah, kerusakan lingkungan yang disebabkan aktivitas manusia (antropogenik) dipandang oleh kalangan ahli berkontribusi besar terhadap kerusakan lingkungan.[8]

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[4] Bernice de Jong Boers, "Mount Tambora in 1815: A Volcanic Eruption in Indonesia and Its Aftermath," *Indonesia* 60 (October 1995): 37, https://doi.org/10.2307/3351140.

[5] Lisetta Giacomelli et al., "The Eruption of Vesuvius of 79 AD and Its Impact on Human Environment in Pompeii," *Episodes* 26, no. 3 (September 2003): 235–38, https://doi.org/-10.18814/epiiugs/2003/v26i3/014; S.C. Wibisono, *Bencana Dan Peradaban Tambora 1815* (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Nasional Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2017); E. Tantri, "Letusan Krakatau 1883: Pengaruhnya Terhadap Gerakan Sosial Banten 1888," *Jurnal Masyarakat Dan Budaya* 16, no. 1 (2014): 191–214, https://doi.org/10.14203/jmb.v16i1.61.

[6] Sigit Fitro Prasetyo, "Harmony of Nature and Culture: Symbolism and Environmental Education in Ritual," *Journal of Contemporary Rituals and Traditions* 1, no. 2 (September 11, 2023): 67–76, https://doi.org/10.15575/jcrt.361.

[7] Soemarwoto, *Ekologi, Lingkungan Hidup, Dan Pembangunan*.

[8] Catherine M. Hill, "Primate Conservation and Local Communities—Ethical Issues and Debates," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 4 (December 2002): 1184–94, https://doi.org-/10.1525/aa.2002.104.4.1184; J. Iskandar, *Etnobiologi Dan Pembangunan Berkelanjutan*

Suatu kenyataan bahwa perubahan iklim yang kini terjadi baik pada level global maupun nasional, pada negara maju maupun negara berkembang, tidak dapat dihindari oleh umat manusia. Dengan kenaikan suhu sekitar 1,5^{0}C diprediksi sekitar 50-75 %, populasi manusia global berpotensi terdampak kondisi perubahan iklim pada tahun 2100.[9] Selain perubahan iklim yang mengancam kehidupan manusia, permasalahan lingkungan lain yang dihadapi oleh manusia adalah hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati, polusi dan kerusakan lingkungan. Hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati menjadi ancaman bagi kesehatan manusia dan jasa ekosistem. Berdasarkan data IPBES, saat ini sekitar 1 juta species tumbuhan dan hewan menghadapi ancaman kepunahan.[10] Sementara itu, polusi udara dinisbatkan menjadi penyebab penyakit dan kematian terbesar di dunia, dengan 4,2 juta kematian setiap tahun.[11] Ketiga permasalahan lingkungan pokok ini saling berkaitan satu sama lain atau saling mempengaruhi satu sama lain dan mengancam bumi dan kehidupan umat manusia disebut dengan istilah *triple planetary crisis.*

Manusia sebagai makhluk yang diberikan akal oleh Tuhan mengembangkan kebudayaan dalam menghadapi tiga permasalahan lingkungan tersebut. Adapun upaya yang dilakukan oleh manusia adalah melakukan adaptasi. Adaptasi dapat diartikan sebagai upaya penyesuaian dalam sistem manusia pada skala yang berbeda mulai dari tingkatan lokal hingga global, dan oleh aktor yang berbeda misalnya pemerintah, individu, rumah tangga, dll) sebagai respons terhadap rangsangan iklim.[12] Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) sebagai salah satu organisasi terbesar keagamaan di Indonesia berupaya beradaptasi terhadap perubahan iklim dengan membentuk Lembaga Penanggulangan Iklim Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBI_NU). Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan dampak perubahan iklim, hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati tumbuhan dan hewan, serta polusi dan kerusakan lingkungan

(Bandung: Puslitbang LPPM Unpad Bandung, 2012); L. King and Auriffeille, *Environmental Sociology: From Analysis to Action*, ed. Leslie King and Deborah McCarthy (UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, 2014); S. Permana, *Etnoekologi: Pengetahuan, Pengelolaan, Dan Konservasi Alam Berbasis Masyarakat* (Yogyakarta: Graha Ilmu, 2020).

[9] IPCC, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability* (Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2022).

[10] IPBES, *The Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Summary for Policy Makers* (Germany: The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), 2019).

[11] UNFCC, *United Nations Climate Change Annual Report 2022* (Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 2022).

[12] Lea Berrang-Ford, James D. Ford, and Jaclyn Paterson, "Are We Adapting to Climate Change?," *Global Environmental Change* 21, no. 1 (February 2011): 25–33, https://doi.org/-10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.09.012.

(triple planetary crisis) di Indonesia, adaptasi Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) terhadap perubahan iklim, serta tantangan dan harapan bagi NU dalam menghadapi *triple planetary crisis.*

Dampak Triple Planetary Crisis di Indonesia

Kalangan ilmuwan/peneliti menyepakati bahwa bumi saat ini menghadapi tekanan yang ekstrem, suhu permukaan global saat ini mengalami kenaikan yakni sekitar 1,09^{0}C, suhu global tersebut lebih tinggi dalam 10 tahun terakhir antara tahun 2011-2020, dan lebih tinggi lagi dibandingkan suhu global pada tahun 1850-1900. Para ilmuwan juga memperkirakan bahwa suhu global diperkirakan akan mencapai 1,5^{0}C antara tahun 2030 –2100. Dampak dari adanya kenaikan suhu global mengancam kehidupan manusia di muka bumi, para ahli juga memperkirakan dari sekitar 50-75% populasi dunia terancam kematian pada tahun 2100.[13] Sementara itu, organisasi internasional *Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)* melaporkan bahwa telah terjadi penurunan kondisi alam yakni hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati dan kerusakan ekosistem yang disebabkan oleh ekstraksi sumber daya alam yang tanpa batas dan tidak terhenti untuk pemenuhan kebutuhan hidup manusia antara lain seperti untuk kebutuhan pangan, energi, permukiman, dan industri, pada gilirannya mengakibatkan perubahan iklim, menghancurkan lingkungan, dan meningkatkan polusi udara.[14] Polusi udara dinyatakan sebagai penyebab penyakit dan kematian dini sekitar 4,2 juta kematian setiap tahun. Sementara itu, hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati mengancam kesehatan manusia dan menurunkan jasa ekosistem. Saat ini, para ahli memperkirakan sekitar 1 juta species tumbuhan dan hewan menghadapi ancaman kepunahan.[15]

Di Indonesia perubahan iklim, polusi dan kerusakan lingkungan, dan hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati *(triple planetary crisis)* menjadi penyebab intensitas kejadian bencana hidrometerologi. Pada tahun 2021 tercatat 5.402 kejadian bencana alam. Dari kejadian bencana alam tersebut, 98%-99% adalah bencana hidrometereologi yang mengakibatkan korban jiwa dan kerugian ekonomi, serta menganggu sistem/struktur sosial (tata nilai, tata kelola, ketahanan social/social resilience, dan kelembagaan (pranata social). Di darat petani mengalami kesulitan dalam menentukan kapan harus

[13] IPCC, *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability*.
[14] UNEP, *Emissions Gap Report 2020* (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2020).
[15] IPBES, *The Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Summary for Policy Makers*.

bercocok tanam, karena musim hujan tidak bisa diprediksi, sehingga mereka harus menyesuaikan kalander pertanian dengan iklim yang berubah, banjir yang kerap terjadi di musim hujan mengganggu aktivitas ekonomi penduduk, menghancurkan tanaman padi dan tanaman musiman lainnya. Sementara di pesisir, nelayan harus mencari ikan jauh dari permukiman mereka. Selain itu, akibat kenaikan muka air laut, banyak pulau-pulau yang tenggelam dan desa-desa di pesisir yang hilang. Pada penjaringan isu pembangunan berkelanjutan yang dilakukan oleh Bappenas pada 26 Januari 2023, isu bencana metereologi (banjir, longsor, kekeringan, dll) merupakan isu teratas dari 10 isu perubahan iklim. Isu perubahan iklim lainnya adalah deforestasi dan degradasi hutan, peningkatan Emisi Gas Rumah Kaca (GRK), kelangkaan/krisis permukaan air laut dan tanah, kerawanan pangan, ancaman, kesehatan fisik dan mental dan kesejahteraan hidup, peningkatan muka air laut, peningkatan suhu perkotaan, keterbatasan teknologi hijau, peningkatan kerentanan masyarakat. Isu peningkatan intensitas bencana hidrometereologi merupakan isu teratas dalam perubahan iklim dengan jumlah responden sebanyak 548 responden. Isu deforestasi dan degradasi hutan sebanyak 378 responden, isu peningkatan emisi gas rumah kaca (GRK) sebanyak 351 responden, isu kelangkaan/krisis permukaan air dan air tanah sebanyak 342 responden, isu kerawanan pangan sebanyak 244 responden, isu ancaman kesehatan fisik mental dan kesejahteraan hidup sebanyak 244 responden. Sementara, isu peningkatan kerentanan masyarakat mendapat peringkat terendah sebanyak 118 responden.



Sumber: data diolah kembali dari Bappenas[16]

Isu mengenai polusi dan kerusakan lingkungan mencakup isu pencemaran tanah, air, dan udara, ketidakpedulian masyarakat terhadap lingkungan, meningkatnya polusi plastik dan mikroplastik, berkurang dan hilangnya cadangan sumber daya alam, DAS yang semakin kritis, tempat pemrosesan akhir (TPA) penuh, meningkatnya polusi dari sector transportasi, menurunnya kualitas lingkungan perkotaan, dan isu meningkatnya polusi dari sektor industri. Peningkatan pencemaran tanah, air, dan udara merupakan isu yang mendapat posisi teratas sebanyak 600 responden, ketidakpedulian masyarakat terhadap lingkungan sebanyak 356 responden, meningkatnya polusi plastik dan mikroplastik sebanyak 341 responden, tingginya sampah domestic yang tidak terkelola sebanyak 272 responden, berkurang dan hilangnya cadangan sumber daya alam sebanyak 256 responden, DAS yang semakin kritis sebanyak 230 responden, Tempat Pemrosesan Akhir (TPA) penuh sebanyak 203 responden, meningkatnya polusi dan sektor transportasi sebanyak 185 rsponden, menurunnya kualitas lingkungan perkotaan sebanyak 161 167 responden. Dan terakhir isu meningkatnya polusi dari sektor industri merupakan isu yang mendapat peringkat terendah yakni sebanyak 161 responden.



[16] Bappenas, *Kick-Off Penyusunan KLHS RPJPN 2025-2045 : Penjaringan Isu Pembangunan Berkelanjutan* (Jakarta: Bappenas, 2023).

Sumber: data diolah kembali dari Bappenas[17]

Selanjutnya isu mengenai keanekaragaman hayati meliputi isu kerusakan ekosistem dan habitat, kepunahan species, rendahnya pemahaman kesadaran tentang pentingya keanekaragaman hayati bagi kehidupan, degradasi kawaan konservasi, kerusakan ekosistem dan berkurangnya populasi keanekaragaman hayati di laut, perdagangan illegal tumbuhan dan satwa liar, hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati di wilayah perkotaa, meningkatnya dampak pencemaran terhadap ekosistem laut, peran masyarakat adat semakin terpinggirkan, dan hilangnya plasma nutfah (sumber daya genetik). Isu kerusakan ekosistem dan habitat merupakan isu teratas yakni sebanyak 529 responden, kepunahan species sebanyak 374 responden, rendahnya pemahaman dan kesadaran tentang pentingnya keanekaragaman hayati bagi kehidupan sebanyak 334 responden, degradasi kawasan konservasi sebanyak 281 responden, kerusakan ekosistem dan berkurangnya populasi keanekaragaman hayati di laut sebanyak 261 responden, perdagangan illegal tumbuhan dan satwa liar sebanyak 241 responden, hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati di wilayah perkotaan sebanyak 189 responden, meningkatnya dampak pencemaran terhadap ekosistem laut sebanyak 176 responden, peran masyarakat adat semakin terpinggirkan sebanyak 174 responden. Sedangkan isu hilangnya plasma nuffah (sumber daya genetik) merupakan isu yang terendah yakni sebanyak 171 responden.



[17] Bappenas.

Sumber : data diolah kembali dari Bappenas, 2023.

Adaptasi NU: Tantangan dan Harapan

Perubahan iklim di Indonesia telah berdampak pada berbagai sektor dengan berbagai tingkatan yang berbeda terhadap kesejahteraan masyarakat, baik secara sosial dan ekonomi. Kebijakan yang dirancang oleh pemerintah pusat dalam upaya meningkatkan ketahanan iklim mengarahkan pemangku kepentingan terkait untuk memberikan kontribusi sebagai upaya adaptasi dan mitigasi terhadap perubahan iklim. Adaptasi dan mitigasi terhadap perubahan iklim merupakan tindakan kolaboratif berbagai pemangku kepentingan mulai dari pemerintah maupun lembaga non-pemerintah, swasta, akademisi, sampai individu. Dampak yang terjadi pada skala lokal dapat ditangani secara efektif dengan melibatkan kelompok dan lembaga yang bergerak di tingkat akar rumput di seluruh wilayah Indonesia. Mengingat mekanisme kelembagaan non-pemerintah dan lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan memiliki potensi kapasitas adaptasi yang potensial, karena memiliki alat yang paling sering dan banyak digunakan, serta didukung oleh finansial dimana adaptasi dapat diimplementasikan.[18] Anggaran finansial pemerintah untuk penanggulangan iklim masih minim, dan hal ini merupakan tantangan dalam penanganan perubahan iklim yaitu, sebagian besar dana dialokasikan untuk program pembangunan rendah karbon (sebagian besar dialokasikan untuk sector energy dan transportasi, sedangkan untuk pembiayaan ketahanan iklim terus tertinggal). Walaupun terdapat tren positif pada pembiayaan adaptasi, namun secara keseluran pendanaan yang ada masih sangat jauh tertinggal dari yang dibutuhkan untuk mengatasi perubahan iklim saat ini dan masa depan. Sebagaimana diketahui sebagian besar pendanaan untuk aksi iklim pada tahun 2019 dan 2020 adalah dalam bentuk uang, dan utang suku bunga pasar menyumbang 88% dari total tersebut. Hampir 100% dari utang untuk proyek berbunga lunak hanya disediakan oleh lembaga-lembaga publik. Lalu, instrument pendanaan iklim yang dianjurkan oleh UNFCCC yakni dalam bentuk konsesionalitas (hibah atau pinjaman berbunga rendah) justru memiliki presentasi kecil.

Sebagai bagian dari lembaga non-pemerintah, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) dalam merespon perubahan iklim secara kelembagaan telah membentuk Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana Iklim (LPBI-NU) berdasarkan kesepakatan muktamar NU ke 32 di Makassar tahun 2010. Lalu ditetapkan dalam rapat pleno harian PBNU untuk membentuk LPBI pasca muktamar NU ke 33 di Jombang, Jawa Timur, tahun 2015 melalui pembentukkan kepengurusan

[18] Berrang-Ford, Ford, and Paterson, "Are We Adapting to Climate Change?"

baru PP. LPBI NU berdasarkan SK No. 19/A II.04/09/2015. Secara struktural LPBI-NU memiliki bidang-bidang kepengurusan yaitu, bidang riset dan pengembangan, kelembagaan dan advokasi kebijakan, pengelolaan resiko bencana, tanggap darurat dan rehabilitasi-rekontruksi bencana, *knowledge management* dan *networking,* bidang pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan. Peranan LPBI-NU dalam penanggulangan perubahan iklim dalam bentuk program dan kegiatan mencakup penanggulangan bencana, pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan melalui riset, advokasi kebijakan pada tingkat provinsi dan kabupaten dengan pendampingan, penguatan dan koordinasi antar stake holder, penguatan kelembagaan, penguatan isu, peningkatan kapasitas masyarakat, pengendalian perubahan iklim, mengumpulkan dan mendistribusikan bantuan kemanusian, terlibat dalam forum nasional dan internasional untuk pengurangan resiko bencana dan perubahan iklim.[19]

Berbagai program dan kegiatan terkait penanggulangan bencana, pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan sedang dan telah dilaksanakan oleh LPBI NU antara lain seperti kajian dan riset terkait isu penanggulangan bencana, pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan. Hasil kajian lalu didokumentasikan dalam bentuk buku, majalah, manual, booklet, stiker, dan poster. Saat ini, tercatat ada 13 judul buku termasuk manual terkait dengan 3 (tiga) isu tersebut. Advokasi kebijakan di tingkat Provinsi dan Kabupaten dengan melakukan pendampingan: Penyusunan regulasi yaitu Perda Penanggulangan Bencana dan regulasi turunan dari Perda tersebut. Penyusunan perencanaan dalam penanggulangan bencana meliputi: Rencana Penanggulangan Bencana (RPB), Rencana Aksi Daerah Pengurangan Resiko Bencana (RAD PRB) dan Rencana Kontijensi Penanggulangan Bencana. Penguatan Koordinasi Stakeholder dalam Penanggulangan Bencana dengan mendorong dan menginisiasi pembentukan Forum PRB Provinsi dan Kabupaten. Forum PRB merupakan wadah koordinasi para pihak (pemerintah, masyarakat dan dunia usaha) dalam upaya pengurangan risiko bencana. Penyelenggaraan workshop dan pelatihan PRB, PDRA, Tanggap Darurat dan penyusunan rencana kontijensi, Fasilitator, Community Organizer (CO), Teknik dan Strategi Advokasi serta Kajian Risiko Bencana Berbasis Sistem Informasi Geografis (SIG) sebagai bentuk penguatan kelembagaan dalam penangulangan bencana.

Rangkaian kegiatan tersebut diikuti oleh perwakilan pemerintah, masyarakat dan media. Pengarusutamaan isu pengurangan risiko Bencana, pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan kepada masyara-

[19] Bappenas, *Peran Lembaga Non-Pemerintah Dalam Ketahanan Iklim* (Jakarta: Bappenas, 2021).

kat di daerah rawan bencana. Peningkatan kapasitas masyarakat dalam penanggulangan bencana, pengendalian perubahan iklim dan pelestarian lingkungan dengan mengadakan pelatihan: PRB, PDRA, tanggap darurat, adaptasi perubahan iklim serta pengelolaan sampah. Pengendalian perubahan iklim dalam bentuk konservasi kawasan pesisir, penanaman pohon, dan pengelolaan sampah berbasis masyarakat. Mengumpulkan dan mendistribusikan bantuan kemanusiaan untuk pemenuhan kebutuhan dasar, psikososial serta pengembalian fungsi dasar fasilitas umum untuk masyarakat terdampak bencana berdasarkan hasil penilaian dan kajian (assessment). Terlibat aktif dalam forum nasional terkait pengurangan risiko bencana seperti Platform Nasional Pengurangan Risiko Bencana (PLANAS PRB) dan Konsorsium Pendidikan Bencana (KPB). Terlibat dalam forum atau pertemuan regional dan internasional seperti UNFCCC, WCDRR, GPDRR, WOC, International MACCA dan AMCDRR (http://lpbi-nu.org). Keterlibatan LPBI-NU dalam penanggulangan perubahan iklim diharapkan dapat meningkatkan resiliensi sosial masyarakat dalam beradaptasi dengan perubahan lingkungan dan menemukan inovasi-inovasi dan pemecahan baru yang adaptif dengan system sosial-budaya masyarakat.

Kesimpulan

Perubahan iklim merupakan permasalahan lingkungan memberikan dampak yang besar bagi manusia tidak mengherankan jika NU membentuk badan yang secara khusus menangani perubahan iklim yaitu LPBI-NU. Namun permasalahan lingkungan hari ini bukan saja permasalahan perubahan iklim, melainkan permasalahan lingkungan yang saling terkait satu sama lain yaitu, hilangnya keanekaragaman hayati dan polusi dan kerusakan ekosistem. Karena itu NU memerlukan pendekatan yang komprehensif (holistik) terhadap perubahan lingkungan, mengingat permasalahan lingkungan merupakan permasalahan yang sistemik atau saling berkaitan satu sama lain, secara kelembagaan NU harus membentuk lembaga – lembaga sebagai bentuk adaptasi terhadap krisis lingkungan yang terjadi. Misalnya membentuk lembaga yang secara khusus menangani penurunan keanekaragaman hayati, dan lembaga yang menangani polusi dan kerusakan lingkungan. Memang tidaklah mudah membentuk lembaga baru, namun suatu keniscayaan karena pakar atau ahli yang berkenaan dengan lingkugan di NU cukup banyak, NU bisa memanfaatkan SDM yang tersedia untuk menangani permasalahan lingkungan . Selain itu, permasalahan krisis lingkungan yang terjadi hari ini banyak terkait dengan aktivitas manusia atau system sosial-budaya masyarakat. Perhatian terhadap system sosial dalam merespon perubahan lingkungan menjadi penting. Menurut Andi Simarmata

(2023) bagaimana sistem social masyarakat itu bisa mengatur/mengelola ketika ada *unexpected event*, ada masyarakat yang sangat cepat dalam merespon seperti banjir, dan ada pula yang lambat dalam merespon seperti kejadian kenaikan muka air laut, dan bagaimana system sosial mengatur/mengelola intensitas yang ekstrim seperti banjir besar yang biasa terjadi di Jakarta. Menilik hal itu, maka upaya mitigasi dan adaptasi perlu memperhatikan pengetahuan, sistem sosial, dan budaya masyarakat lokal, karena tujuan mitigasi dan adaptasi yang hanya menekankan pada aspek lingkungan, tanpa memperhatikan sistem sosial budaya masyarakat, maka tujuan mitigasi dan adaptasi terhadap perubahan lingkungan *(triple planetary crisis)* akan sulit diwujudkan.[20]

Tinjauan Pustaka

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PEDOMAN PENULISAN NASKAH
TASHWIRUL AFKAR

A. PERSYARATAN UMUM PENULISAN NASKAH

1. Naskah belum pernah dipublikasikan atau tidak sedang dalam proses pengajuan untuk publikasi ke media lain dan tidak mengandung unsur plagiat dengan dilampiri pernyataan tertulis dari penulis.
2. Naskah ditulis dalam bahasa Indonesia atau bahasa Inggris dengan kerapatan baris 1 spasi, *font Cambria* 12, ukuran kertas B5, *margin* atas 2.2 cm., bawah 2.2 cm., kiri 2.2 cm., dan kanan 2.2 cm.
3. Panjang naskah minimal 4000 kata (sekitar 15 halaman) dan maksimal 8000 kata (sekitar 30 halaman) sudah termasuk gambar, grafik/ tabel (jika ada) dan daftar pustaka yang menyertainya.
4. Naskah harus disertai dengan abstrak dalam bahasa Inggris dan bahasa Indonesia.
5. Naskah dikirim melalui online submission Tashwirul Afkar dengan alamat https://tashwirulafkar.net/index.php/afkar/about/submissions (klik daftar/register).
6. Semua naskah yang masuk ke redaksi akan melalui proses *blind review* oleh mitra bebestari setelah review oleh redaksi. Naskah yang dimuat akan disunting kembali oleh redaksi tanpa mengubah substansi isi.

B. STRUKTUR NASKAH ILMIAH

1. Judul

a. Judul hendaknya ringkas, efektif dan informatif, dengan jumlah 14 kata¸termasuk kata penghubung.
b. Jenis huruf *Cambria 14,* ditebalkan, dengan jarak baris 1 spasi.

2. Identitas Penulis

a. Artikel disertai dengan identitas penulis yang meliputi: Nama penulis tanpa gelar akademik (*Cambria 12,* ditebalkan), afiliasi kelembagaan penulis, alamat lembaga, dan *e-mail (Cambria 10, spasi 1).*
b. Nama penulis dan urutan penulis (bila lebih dari satu penulis) harus sudah disepakati semua penulis, biasanya berdasarkan besarnya kontribusi dan partisipasi dalam pelaksanaan penelitian dan penulisan laporan, dan semua penulis bertanggung jawab atas isi artikel.

3. Abstrak

a. Abstrak ditulis secara ringkas dan faktual, meliputi tujuan penelitian, metode penelitian, hasil dan simpulan.

b. Abstrak ditulis dalam bahasa Inggris dan bahasa Indonesia, panjang abstrak berkisar antara 150 - 250 kata dalam satu paragraf, huruf *(Cambria 10, spasi 1).*

4. Kata Kunci

a. Kata kunci terdiri atas 3 – 5 kata dan/atau kelompok kata.
b. Kata-kata diketik miring (*italic*), antara kata kunci dipisahkan oleh titik koma (;)

5. Pendahuluan

a. **Pendahuluan** jarak 1 spasi dan ditebalkan.
b. Pendahuluan hendaknya mengandung latar belakang masalah; hipotesis (bila ada), tujuan dan metode penelitian; umumnya artikel tidak terlalu ekstensif; pendahuluan mengacu pada beberapa pustaka yang menjadi landasan teori atau alasan penelitian.

6. Hasil dan Pembahasan

a. **Hasil dan Pembahasan**, jarak 1 spasi dan ditebalkan.
b. Sajian dalam hasil dan pembahasan ditulis secara bersistem, hanya hasil data/informasi yang terkait dengan tujuan penelitian; sederhanakan tabel dan menggunakan tabel terbuka, dan gambar peta lebih difokuskan pada objek yang diteliti serta jangan terlalu besar ukuran filenya serta rumit (diupayakan dalam format JPG); tabel dan gambar diberi nomor urut. Contoh penulisan tabel: Tabel 3.
c. Penggunaan subjudul dalam pembahasan sesuai dengan keperluan pembahasan.
d. Teknik pengutipan sumber rujukan menggunakan catatan kaki/*footnote*, menggunakan sistem sitasi *Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition, Cambria 10*, selengkapnya lihat contoh di ketentuan teknis penulisan catatan kaki.

7. Simpulan

a. **Simpulan**, jarak 1 spasi dan ditebalkan.
b. Simpulan hendaknya merupakan jawaban atas pertanyaan penelitian, dan diungkapkan bukan dalam kalimat stastistik.

8. Ucapan Terima Kasih

a. Bila ada **Ucapan Terimakasih**, jarak 1 spasi dan ditebalkan
b. Berisi ucapan terimakasih kepada lembaga pemberi dana, dan atau individu yang telah membantu dalam pelaksanaan penelitian dan penulisan artikel.

9. Daftar Pustaka

a. **Daftar Pustaka**, jarak 1 spasi dan ditebalkan
b. Literatur yang dicantumkan dalam daftar pustaka hanya memuat sumber-sumber yang dirujuk atau dikutip dalam artikel.

c. Sumber rujukan yang dirujuk dalam artikel, hendaknya merujuk dari salah satu atau beberapa artikel jurnal ilmiah.
d. Teknik penulisan daftar pustaka, menggunakan sistem sitasi *Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition font Cambria 12*. Selengkapnya bisa dilihat pada ketentuan teknis penulisan daftar pustaka.

C. KETENTUAN TEKNIS PENULISAN NASKAH

1. Penulisan Pengutipan

a. Pengutipan rujukan dalam pembahasan hendaknya tidak terlalu panjang.
b. Kutipan langsung kurang dari lima baris ditulis di antara tanda kutip lengkap bersatu dalam alinea dan dimiringkan (*italic*).
c. Kutipan langsung lima baris atau lebih ditulis dalam alinea tersendiri tanpa tanda kutip. Posisi penulisan diberi *indent* lurus dengan baris awal alinea.
d. Kutipan tidak langsung yaitu pengutipan sebuah teks yang disarikan dan dituliskan dalam kalimat sendiri, ditulis sebagai bagian dari alinea tanpa tanda kutip/tanda petik.
e. Pengutipan hasil penelitian atau pendapat orang lain, sebaiknya menggunakan kutipan tidak langsung (menggunakan kalimat sendiri, bukan kalimat yang persis sama).
f. Kutipan ayat Alquran dan Hadis dituliskan dengan huruf Arab sesuai teks aslinya, termasuk tanda-tanda bacanya, dengan menggunakan *Traditional Arabic* 16 cetak tebal. Ayat Alquran ditulis lengkap dengan nama dan nomor surah serta nomor ayat, sedangkan Hadis ditulis lengkap sanad dan rawinya serta dilengkapi *footnote* yang berisi: Nama kitab, jilid, bab, nomor hadis dan halaman. Contoh:

Berdasarkan firman Allah Swt. dalam surah Al-Ankabut 29: 67-69:

أَوَلَمْ يَرَوْا أَنَّا جَعَلْنَا حَرَمًا آمِنًا وَيُتَخَطَّفُ النَّاسُ مِنْ حَوْلِهِمْ أَفَبِالْبَاطِلِ يُؤْمِنُونَ وَبِنِعْمَةِ اللَّهِ يَكْفُرُونَ (67) وَمَنْ أَظْلَمُ مِمَّنِ افْتَرَى عَلَى اللَّهِ كَذِبًا أَوْ كَذَّبَ بِالْحَقِّ لَمَّا جَاءَهُ أَلَيْسَ فِي جَهَنَّمَ مَثْوًى لِلْكَافِرِينَ (68) وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ (69)

Hal ini sejalan dengan sabda Nabi Muhammad Saw.:

عَنْ عَائِشَةَ (رَضِيَّ اللهُ عَنْهَا) قَالَ: كَانَ رَسُولُ اللهِ (صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّم) إِذَا عَصَفَتِ الرِّيْحُ قَالَ: "اَللَّهُمَّ إِنِّي أَسْأَلُكَ خَيْرَهَا وَخَيْرَ مَا فِيْهَا وَخَيْرَ ماَ أَرْسَلْتَ بِهِ، وَأَعُوْذُ بِكَ مِنْ شَرِّهَا وَشَرِّ مَا فِيْهَا وَشَرِّ مَا أَرْسَلْتَ بِهِ" (رواه مسلم)٠

g. Khusus pengutipan ayat Alquran yang tidak lengkap dalam satu ayat, diberi tanda titik tiga buah sebelum atau sesudahnya. Contoh:

... ۚ لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ ٱللَّهِ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ ٱلدِّينُ ٱلْقَيِّمُ وَلَٰكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ ٱلنَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ...(الروم : 30 : 30)

h. Anotasi (keterangan pendek) ditulis di antara dua kurung besar [...] langsung setelah ungkapan atau kalimat yang diberi anotasi. Anotasi yang melebihi satu baris ditulis sebagai catatan kaki.
i. Kutipan dari ayat-ayat Alquran tidak diperlukan catatan kaki karena nama dan nomor surah serta nomor ayat telah dituliskan dalam ayat yang dikutip.

2. Penulisan Kutipan Catatan Kaki dan Daftar Pustaka

Teknik penulisan catatan kaki, menggunakan sistem sitasi *Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition font Cambria 10*, ditulis secara berurutan: Nama penulis [tanpa pangkat dan gelar], *Judul buku diketik miring,* cetakan/*edition* [jika ada], jilid/*series* [jika ada] (Tempat/kota penerbit: Nama penerbit, Tahun terbit), nomor halaman.

Buku yang disunting oleh editor diikuti "ed." tanpa kurung setelah penulisan nama. Jika buku ditulis tanpa kota penerbit diketik "t.k."; tanpa penerbit diketik "t.p."; jika tanpa tahun terbit diketik "t.t.". Apabila tahun penerbitan berupa tahun hijriyah diketik "H." setelah penyebutan tahun. Halaman tanpa penulisan simbol halaman, langsung pada penulisan angka. Apabila ingin menyebutkan lagi sumber yang terdahulu harus disebutkan nama penulis dan diikuti dengan nama buku yang dimaksud. Dalam penyebutan ulang ini, **tidak digunakan istilah** tertentu: **ibid.**, **op. cit.**, dan **loc. cit.**.

Sumber rujukan yang berasal dari bahasa Arab, ditulis dalam huruf latin berdasarkan pedoman transliterasi Tashwirul Afkar [*Legal of Congress*] dengan merubah *font* ke *Times New Arabic 10* (lihat pedoman transliterasi Tashwirul Afkar).

Teknik penulisan daftar pustaka, menggunakan sistem sitasi *Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition font Cambria 12*, ditulis secara berurutan: Nama penulis ditulis nama belakangnya lebih dahulu, diikuti nama depan dan nama tengah (atau inisial). *Judul buku (diketik miring)*.

Cetakan/*Edition.* Jilid/*Series* (bila ada). Kota penerbit: Nama penerbit, Tahun penerbitan.
Jika literatur ditulis lebih dari dua orang: Nama penulis pertama ditulis nama belakangnya lebih dahulu, dilanjutkan penulis kedua dan seterusnya dan nama belakang tidak perlu dibalik seperti penulis pertama. Ditulis 1 spasi, berurutan secara alfabetis tanpa nomor. Penulisan daftar pustaka tidak menggunakan et al., sebagai pengganti penulis kedua dan seterusnya.
Sumber rujukan yang berasal dari bahasa Arab, ditulis dalam huruf latin berdasarkan pedoman transliterasi Tashwirul Afkar [*Legal of Congress*] dengan merubah *font* ke *Times New Arabic* 12 (lihat pedoman transliterasi Tashwirul Afkar).

Dibawah ini beberapa contoh catatan kaki dan daftar pustaka untuk berbagai sumber kutipan:

a. Kutipan dari Buku

1) Satu penulis.

[1]Muh}ammad ‘A<bid Al-Ja>biri>, *Nah}nu Wa Al-Tura>th: Qira>at Mu’a>s}irat Fi> Tura>thina> Al-Falsafi*> (Beirut: Markaz al-Thaqafi> al-‘Arabi>, 1990), 29.

Al-Ja>biri>, Muh}ammad ‘A<bid. *Nah}nu Wa Al-Tura>th: Qira>at Mu’a>s}irat Fi> Tura>thina> Al-Falsafi*>. Beirut: Markaz al-Thaqafi> al-‘Arabi>, 1990.

2) Dua atau tiga penulis/editor [nama tetap dicantumkan].

[2]Atang Abdul Hakim dan Jaih Mubarok, *Metodologi Studi Islam* (Bandung: Rosda Karya, 1999),47-48.

[3]Morris Neiburger, James G. Edinger, and William Bonner, eds., *Understanding Our Atmospheric Environment* (San Francisco, California: W. H. Freeman, 1973), 87.

Hakim, Atang Abd., dan Jaih Mubarok. *Metodologi Studi Islam*. Bandung: Rosda Karya, 1999.

Neiburger, Morris, James G. Edinger, and William Bonner, eds. *Understanding Our Atmospheric Environment*. San Francisco, California: W. H. Freeman, 1973.

3) Empat penulis/editor atau lebih, dalam catatan kaki dicantumkan hanya penulis/editor pertama diikuti *et al.*, dalam daftar pustaka dicantumkan semua penulis/editor.

[4] Philip S.Gorski et al., eds., *The Post-Secular in Quetion: Religion in Contemporary Society* (New York and London: New York University Press, 2012), 135.

Gorski, Philip S., David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, eds. *The Post-Secular in Quetion: Religion in Contemporary Society*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2012.

4) Jika mengutip sumber yang sudah dikutip sebelumnya (tanpa ibid. dan op.cit.).

[5]Jala>luddi>n Al-Suyu>t}i>, *Al-Itqa>n Fi>'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, Jilid 2 (Beirut: Da>rul-Fikr, t.t.),19.

[6]Al-Suyu>t}i>, *Al-Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, 77.

[7]Muh}ammad ibn 'Alawi> Al-Ma>liki> Al-H{asani>, *Zubdah Al-'Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n* (Jeddah: Da>r Al-Shuru>q, 1983), 24.

[8]Al-Suyu>t}i>, *Al-Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, 83.

[9]Al-H{asani>, *Zubdah Al-'Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, 28.

Al-Suyu>t}i>, Jala>luddi>n. *Al-Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*. Jilid 2. Beirut: Da>rul-Fikr, t.t.

Al-H{asani>, Muh}ammad ibn 'Alawi> Al-Ma>liki>. *Zubdah Al-'Itqa>n Fi> 'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*. Jeddah: Da>r Al-Shuru>q, 1983.

5) Jika buku yang dikutip lagi itu lebih dari satu jilid, dan yang digunakan lebih dari satu jilid.

[10]Al-Zarkashi>, *Al-Burha>n Fi>'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, Jilid 1 (Beirut: Da>r al-Ma'rifah, 1391 H.), 45.

[11]Al-Zarkashi>, *Al-Burha>n Fi>'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*, Jilid 2 (Beirut: Da>r al-Ma'rifah, 1391 H.), 16.

Al-Zarkashi>. *Al-Burha>n Fi>'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*. Jilid 1. Beirut: Da>r al-Ma'rifah, 1391 H.

———. *Al-Burha>n Fi>'Ulu>m Al-Qur'a>n*. Jilid 2. Beirut: Da>r al-Ma'rifah, 1391 H.

6) Buku teks terjemahan.

[12] Mark Woodward, *Islam Jawa: Kesalehan Normatif versus Kebatinan*, trans. Hairus Salim "Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism" (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), 88.

Woodward, Mark. *Islam Jawa: Kesalehan Normatif versus Kebatinan*. Translated by Hairus Salim "Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism". Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999.

7) Buku terbitan lembaga/badan/organisasi yang tidak ada nama penulisnya.

[13] Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia, *Pendidikan Anti Korupsi Untuk Perguruan Tinggi*, Cetakan I (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi Bagian Hukum, 2011), 38.

Indonesia, Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik. *Pendidikan Anti Korupsi Untuk Perguruan Tinggi*. Cetakan I. Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Tinggi Bagian Hukum, 2011.

b. Kutipan dari artikel

1) Artikel Jurnal Ilmiah

Dalam catatan kaki: Nama penulis artikel, "judul artikel ditulis di antara tanda petik rangkap," *Nama jurnal dimiringkan*, Volume, Issue/Nomor (Tahun terbit): Nomor halaman yang dikutip, doi (jika ada).

Dalam daftar pustaka: Nama belakang penulis, Nama depan dan tengah. "Judul artikel."*Nama Jurnal (cetak miring)* Volume, Nomor/Issue (Tahun terbit): Halaman Artikel. Doi (jika ada)

Jurnal yang penulisan titimangsa terbitnya: Volume dan Tahun

[14]Husnul Qodim, "Dinamika Salafisme Di Indonesia: Akar Intelektualitas Dan Orientasi Ideologis Yang Beragam," *Tashwirul Afkar: Jurnal Refleksi Pemikiran Keagamaan & Kebudayaan* 21 (2007), 65.

Jurnal yang penulisan titimangsa terbitnya: Volume, Issue/Nomor dan Tahun

[15] Lyn Parker, Irma Riyani, and Brooke Nolan, "The Stigmatisation of Widows and Divorcees (janda) in Indonesia, and the Possibilities for Agency," Indonesia and The Malay World 44, no. 128 (2016): 30, doi:10.1080/-13639811.2016.1111677.

Parker, Lyn, Irma Riyani, and Brooke Nolan. "The Stigmatisation of Widows and Divorcees (janda) in Indonesia, and the Possibilities for Agency." *Indonesia and The Malay World* 44, no. 128 (2016): 27–46. doi:10.1080/13639811.2016.1111677.

Qodim, Husnul. "Dinamika Salafisme Di Indonesia: Akar Intelektualitas Dan Orientasi Ideologis Yang Beragam." *Tashwirul Afkar: Jurnal Refleksi Pemikiran Keagamaan & Kebudayaan* 21 (2007): 46–74.

2) Artikel dalam bab atau bagian lain dari buku kompilasi/book section dengan editor atau terjemahan.

[16]Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World," in *Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative Perspective*, ed. Miriam Levering (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), 31.

[17]Maribeth Erb, "Kebangkitan Adat Di Flores Barat: Budaya, Agama Dan Tanah," dalam*Adat Dalam Politik Indonesia*, ed. Jamie S. Davidson, David Henley, and Sandra Moniaga, trans. Emilius Ola Kleden and Nina Dwisasanti "The Revival of Tradition in Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism" (Jakarta: YOI dan KITL, 2010), 270.

Erb, Maribeth. "Kebangkitan Adat Di Flores Barat: Budaya, Agama Dan Tanah." Dalam*Adat Dalam Politik Indonesia*, edited by Jamie S. Davidson, David Henley, and Sandra Moniaga, translated by Emilius Ola Kleden dan Nina Dwisasanti " The Revival of Tradition in Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism," 269–299. Jakarta: YOI dan KITL, 2010.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. "Scripture as Form and Concept: Their Emergence for the Western World." In *Rethinking Scripture: Essays from a Comparative Perspective*, edited by Miriam Levering, 29–57. New York: State University of New York Press, 1989.

3) Artikel dari Ensiklopedi.

[16]Parvis Morewedge, "Theology," ed. John L. Esposito et al., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of The Modern Islamic World*, vol. 4 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 214.

Morewedge, Parvis. "Theology." Edited by John L. Esposito, Shahrough Akhavi, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, James P. Piscatori, Abdulaziz Sachedina, Sharon Siddique, John O. Voll, and Fred R. von der Mehden. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of The Modern Islamic World*. Vol.4. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

4) Artikel dari surat kabar atau majalah.

[18]Usep Romli, "Trend Wisata Alam: Ngitung Lembur, Ngajajah Milang Kori," *Pikiran Rakyat*, Bandung, 5 Januari 2013, 25.

Romli, Usep. "Trend Wisata Alam: Ngitung Lembur, Ngajajah Milang Kori." *Pikiran Rakyat*. Bandung. 5 Januari 2013.

c. Kutipan dari Tesis/Disertasi yang tidak diterbitkan.

[3]Nuryah Asri Sjafirah, "Transformasi Identitas Pelaku Konversi Agama Etnis China" (Disertasi Program Pascasarjana, Universitas Padjadjaran Bandung, 2010), 177.

Sjafirah, Nuryah Asri. "Transformasi Identitas Pelaku Konversi Agama Etnis China." Disertasi Program Pascasarjana, Universitas Padjadjaran Bandung, 2010.

d. Kutipan prosiding konferensi/seminar/simposium.

[1]Muhammad Yasir Alimi, "When Religion Fails to Nature Character", (Prosiding International Conference Ethics in Development, Semarang, 17-19 Juli 2011), 59.

Alimi, Muhammad Yasir. "When Religion Fails to Nature Character." Prosiding International Conference Ethics in Development, Semarang, 17-19 Juli 2011.

e. Kutipan dari makalah ilmiah yang dipresentasikan dalam seminar atau konferensi.

[1]Rachel Adelman, "Such Stuffas as Dreams Are Made On: God's Footstool in the Aramaic Targumim and Midrashic Tradition" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of the Biblical Literature, New Orleans, Lousiana, 21-24 November 2009), 14.

Adelman, Rachel. "Such Stuffas as Dreams Are Made On: God's Footstool in the Aramaic Targumim and Midrashic Tradition." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of the Biblical Literature, New Orleans, Lousiana, 21-24 November2009.

f. Kutipan dari Tashwirul Afkar

[19] Komar Nuruzzaman (santri), wawancara oleh Busro, Pesantren Buntet Cirebon, tanggal 14 November 2015.

Nuruzzaman, Komar (santri), wawancara oleh Busro. Pesantren Buntet Cirebon. Tanggal 14 November 2015.

PEDOMAN TRANSLITERASI

Pedoman Transliterasi Tashwirul Afkar menggunakan sistem *Library of Congress*. Secara garis besar uraiannya sebagai berikut:

b	=	ب	z	=	ز	f	=	ف
t	=	ت	s	=	س	q	=	ق
th	=	ث	sh	=	ش	k	=	ك
j	=	ج	s{	=	ص	l	=	ل
h{	=	ح	d}	=	ض	m	=	م
kh	=	خ	t{	=	ط	n	=	ن
d	=	د	z{	=	ظ	h	=	ه
dh	=	ذ	‘	=	ع	w	=	و
r	=	ر	gh	=	غ	y	=	ي
	=			=			=	

Vokal Pendek	Vokal Panjang
___اَ___ = a	(ـَـا) = a>
___اِ___ = i	(ـِـى) = i>
___اُ___ = u	(ـُـو) = u>

Diftong	Pembauran
(أو) = aw	(ال) = al
(أي) = ay	(الش) = al-sh
	(وال) = wa al-

Ketentuan penulisan kata sandang al (*ali>f la>m*), baik *ali>f la>m qamariyyah* maupun *ali>f la>m shamsiyah* ditulis apa adanya (*al*) contoh:

الحديث = al-h}adi>th التفسير = al-tafsi>r

Ta' Marbutah di Akhir Kata

1. Bila dimatikan ditulis "h",
   حكمة = h}ikmah
   Ketentuan ini tidak berlaku pada kosakata bahasa Arab yang sudah terserap ke dalam bahasa Indonesia seperti zakat, salat dan lain-lain kecuali memang dikehendaki sesuai lafal aslinya.
2. Bila dihidupkan karena berangkaian dengan kata lain, ditulis "t"
   نعمة الله = ni'matullah
   زكاة الفطر = zaka>t al-fit}ri

Istilah keislaman (serapan): istilah keislaman ditulis dengan berpedoman kepada Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia. Berikut beberapa contoh:

No.	Transliterasi Asal	Dalam KBBI
1	Al-Qur'a>n	Al-Qur'an
2	Al-H{adi>th	Hadis
3	Sunnah	Sunah
4	Nas}	Nas
5	Tafsi>r	Tafsir
6	Sharh}	Syarah
7	Matn	Matan
8	S{ala>t	Salat
9	Tas}awwuf	Tasawuf
10	Fiqh	Fikih
Dan lain-lain (lihat KBBI)		

Catatan:
Jenis Font yang digunakan untuk transliterasi Arab-Indonesia menggunakan Times New Arabic dengan ketentuan ukuran 12 pt untuk tulisan pada artikel dan daftar pustaka, ukuran 10 pt untuk catatan kaki.

1. Untuk membuat titik di bawah:
   a. Huruf kapital (H{) dengan menekan tombol "H" diikuti{
   b. Huruf kecil (h}) dengan menekan "h" diikuti }
2. Untuk membuat garis di atas huruf:
   a. Huruf kapital (A<) dengan menekan "A" diikuti <
   b. Huruf kecil (a>) dengan menekan "a" diikuti >

LAKPESDAM

LEMBAGA KAJIAN & PENGEMBANGAN
SUMBER DAYA MANUSIA

Nahdlatul Ulama

Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia,
Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama
Jl. KH. Ramli Selatan No. 20A Menteng Dalam, Tebet Jakarta
Telp: (+62) 218298855, Fax: (+62) 218354925,
E-mail: tashwirulafkar9@gmail.com, Web: tashwirulafkar.net
FB: Lakpesdam NU, Twitter: @Lakpesdam

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